Part One<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Logic of the Composition<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Logic of the Composition<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Issue of the Mishnah\u2019s Relationship to Scripture<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The advent of the Mishnah in circa A.D. 200 demanded that people explain the status and authority of the new document. At its very beginnings the Mishnah was turned into an authoritative law code, the constitution, along with Scripture, of Israel in its Land. Accordingly, when completed, the Mishnah emerged from the schoolhouse and forthwith made its move into the politics, courts, and bureaus of the Jewish government of the Land of Israel. Men who mastered the Mishnah thereby qualified themselves as judges and administrators in the government of Judah the patriarch as well as in the government of the Jewish community of Babylonia. Over the next three hundred years, the Mishnah served as the foundation for the formation of the system of law and theology we now know as Judaism.
\nThe vast collection constituted by the Mishnah therefore demanded explanation: What is this book? How does it relate to the (written) Torah revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai? Under whose auspices, and by what authority, does the law of the Mishnah govern the life of Israel? These questions, we realize, bear both political and theological implications. The crisis precipitated by the Mishnah stimulated wide-ranging speculation, inventive experiments of a literary and (in the nature of things) therefore also political, theological, and religious character. The Talmud\u2019s work of defining and explaining the Mishnah in relationship to the (written) Torah, interpreting the meaning of the Mishnah, expanding upon and applying its laws, ultimately yielded the making, also, of compilations of the exegeses of Scripture.
\nWhat in fact was the place of Scripture in the Mishnah? The philosophers of the Mishnah conceded to Scripture the highest authority. At the same time what they chose to hear, within the authoritative statements of Scripture, would in the end form a statement of its own. To state matters simply: all of Scripture was authoritative. But only some of Scripture was found to be relevant. And what happened is that the framers and philosophers of the tradition of the Mishnah came to Scripture when they had reason to do so. That is, they brought to Scripture a program of questions and inquiries framed essentially among themselves. So they were highly selective. That is why their program itself constituted a statement upon the meaning of Scripture. They and their apologists hastened to add that their program consisted of a statement of, and not only upon, the meaning of Scripture.
\nThe way in which the sages of the Mishnah utilized the inherited and authoritative tradition of Scripture is simple. On the one hand, wherever they could, they repeated what Scripture says. This they did, however, in their own words, so they established a claim of relevance and also authority. They spoke to their own day in their own idiom. On the other hand, they selected with care and precision what they wanted from Scripture and ignored the rest. They took up laws, not prophecies; descriptions of how things are supposed to be, not accounts of what is going to happen.
\nSo much for the role of Scripture in the Mishnah. We turn now to how the heirs and continuators of the Mishnah, the rabbinical sages who inherited the document after circa A.D. 200, sorted out the diverse questions before them.
\nThree different kinds of literature flow from the Mishnah and refer to it. One, the Tosefta, supplements to the Mishnah, is a wholly dependent, secondary, and exegetical formulation, in which the Mishnah provides the whole frame of organization and redaction for all materials, and in which citation and secondary expansion of the statements of the Mishnah define the bulk, though not the whole, of the work. The next, Sifra, exegeses of Leviticus, focuses not upon the Mishnah but upon Scripture, and proposes to provide a bridge between the two. To a lesser degree, Sifre to Numbers and Sifre to Deuteronomy also fall into this second category. The last kind of writing about the Mishnah is in the middle, both dependent upon, and autonomous of, the Mishnah. This type takes up its individual statements and amplifies them, but also expands and develops autonomous discussions. The two Talmuds, one produced in the Land of Israel, the other in Babylonia, constitute this kind of writing.
\nHow did these successor documents define the role of Scripture in the Mishnah? The answer lay in one age-old and commonplace mode of dealing with precisely the same problem. It was through the exegesis of Scripture in relationship to the statements of the Mishnah. One thing was read in terms of the other. So the authors of the successor documents in various ways, implicit here, explicit there, stated the view that the Mishnah was the opposite of what it seemed. The Mishnah stood formally autonomous of Scripture, rarely citing proof texts. In fact, they proposed to demonstrate, the Mishnah rested on the foundations of Scripture, statement by statement, verse by verse. A conventional way of reading Scripture commonly called midrash and here called simply exegesis, had long proved acceptable. Why change now? As we know full well, Israelite thinkers\u2014whether lawyers and philosophers like the heirs of the Mishnah in the Talmuds, or visionaries and prophets like the Essenes at Qumran, or messianists and evangelists like the members of the school of Matthew\u2014routinely read one thing in relationship to something else, old Scripture in the setting of fresh concerns and sure knowledge of new truth. So there is nothing remarkable in what the heirs of the Mishnah did. To seek, through biblical exegesis, to link the Mishnah to Scripture, detail by detail, represented a well-trodden and firmly packed path.
\nOnly one document opened a new road to Scripture, and that is Leviticus Rabbah. It is the first major rabbinic composition to propose to make topical and discursive statements, not merely a phrase-by-phrase or verse-by-verse exegesis of a document. Rather, the framers of that composition undertook to offer propositions, declarative sentences (so to speak), in which, not through the exegesis of verses of Scripture in the order of Scripture but through an order dictated by their own sense of the logic of syllogistic composition, they would say what they had in mind. To begin with, they laid down their own topical program, related to, but essentially autonomous of, that of the book of Leviticus. Second, in expressing their ideas on these topics, they never undertook simply to cite a verse of Scripture and then to claim that that verse states precisely what they had in mind to begin with. Accordingly, through rather distinctive modes of expression, the framers said what they wished to say in their own way\u2014just as had the authors of the Mishnah itself. True, in so doing, the composers of Leviticus Rabbah treated Scripture as had their predecessors. That is to say, to them as to those who had gone before, Scripture provided a rich treasury of facts.
\nBut the literary form and the intellectual, substantive message of Leviticus Rabbah approaches Scripture in a way that is essentially unprecedented within the canon of rabbinic Judaism. Leviticus Rabbah absorbed Scripture into its system rather than being absorbed by it. The way to expose how the authors of Leviticus Rabbah thought and the conclusions they laid forth lies through the close analysis of the logic, both of form and of composition, of their document. It is to that analysis, which occupies the rest of this chapter and the two that follow, that we now turn.
\nWhat these philosophers in a distinctive idiom proposed to do with Scripture, of course, would not have surprised Origen, who more than a century earlier had done much the same thing, or Philo, who expressed his ideas in modes revealed in the rabbinic corpus. That is, he too provided verse-by-verse exegesis of Scripture and topical essays making ample use of verses of Scripture. But he used a mode unknown in rabbinic writings, that is, abstract essays of argument about theorems, resorting not at all to Scripture. But the comparison of modes of thought in the great exemplars of biblical theology in antiquity would carry us far afield.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Problem of Leviticus Rabbah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Leviticus Rabbah, which reached closure at circa A.D. 400\u2013425, on the surface compiles exegeses of verses of the book of Leviticus. It is, however, far more than a collection of comments on one thing or another. As is now clear, I propose to demonstrate that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes a sustained and vigorous composition, intelligible whole and not only in its smallest parts. The composition will be shown to be integrated in both form and argument as much as is the Mishnah itself. Indeed, I shall prove that Leviticus Rabbah in no way constitutes a mere compilation of exegeses of a handful of verses of the book of Leviticus, an anthology of random and episodic observations on this and that, placed in order only by the formalities of the sequence of verses in Leviticus. My argument is that the book constitutes a cogent syllogistic statement, made intelligible by both logic and topic. Only in light of that fact will the relationship of Leviticus Rabbah to Scripture become fully clear.
\nTopic (topos) defines the localization or specification of a large-scale principle in its concrete terms; it tells how people describe a region in detail, how they arrange and explain a place. By extension here I mean the specific positioning of ideas, the things people talk about and the order in which they discuss them. Logic (logos) defines the underlying principle that accounts for the unity and cogency of the whole, the foundation for composing diverse thoughts into a single composition. By definition what is local and specific, the topical, will be diverse. What effects the composition of diverse sentences into a single syllogism, what joins together this and that into a cogent and important proposition, and what makes that syllogism intelligible\u2014these define the logic. More to the point, they derive from that logic that tells us the relation, the correspondence, the proportions of the whole. In Chapter 3 I specify in detail precisely what sort of logic I believe we confront.
\nThis book presents a fresh reading of Leviticus Rabbah because it proposes to discover the logic of the document, to examine its topical character, and so to translate the whole into an intelligible syllogism. I also propose that the syllogism of the document addressed the setting in which the document as a whole reached closure. In the end, therefore, I shall point to correspondences between context and content, setting and substance. In that way Leviticus Rabbah may serve as further evidence on the condition of that form of Judaism that produced it and adopted it as authoritative.
\nThe proposition contrary to the one I propose is that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes no syllogistic exercise, that, while it deals with diverse subjects, it presents no topical program, and that it in no way coheres through an underlying logic of form and theme. If all we have is an anthology of materials on diverse topics, we also have no warrant for asking how the whole, reaching closure at a given moment, constituted a statement to its own time and place. For if no principle of selection and organization dictated how the document as a whole should reach closure and final form, then we cannot ask questions about the interplay of context and content. All we should know would concern the bits and pieces collected in one place: Rabbi X is alleged to have made such and such a statement, Rabbi Y told such and such a story. Since we cannot know whether or not Rabbis X and Y said any such thing, we also cannot claim to show that, in making such statements, they spoke to a given context and framed a given message for that context. In that case we have in hand timeless, but not timely, opinions\u2014statements wholly divorced from context, free of concrete relevance to the specific condition of late antique Israel. So the issue of logic is critical. If I can demonstrate cogency of form and logic of intelligible discourse, everything else follows. If not, we have no systematic statement to a concrete circumstance, only a scrapbook of sayings. So the issue is clearly drawn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Defining the Syllogism of Rabbinic Discourse<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The task of making sense of a book begins with the simple question: Precisely what is this book? By that I mean to ask for a definition of how the book is so constructed as to become intelligible in its context (and in ours). Only when we can see the whole are we ready to investigate the parts. Seeing the whole demands that we explain what holds it together, what makes the whole whole. For, at the very outset, I have claimed that the document at hand constitutes not a mere collection of unrelated or random statements but a set of related and purposeful ones. Then, to prove my thesis, I must explain what defines the relationship, and how we shall make sense of the purpose. To answer that question I must uncover the fundamental logic of organization and topic: the logos of both intellect and aesthetics that account for the whole; the topics that render the book as we have it a sustained syllogism.
\nThe first mode by which we may see a book whole is to stand back and survey it in context. The book at hand, Leviticus Rabbah, presents itself from two perspectives, in two dimensions. It is part of a literature of its own time, the rabbinic canon. It also stands in relationship to a literature long before its own time, the midrashic genre. It constitutes a component of a large corpus of writings of rabbis of late antiquity\u2014the first seven centuries A.D. It also derives from a literary activity underway many centuries prior to its own time. On the face of things, then, we take up a rabbinic document of scriptural exegesis, a collection of remarks concerning the book of Leviticus. So we take up a line of sight dictated by the activity of the book\u2014the interpretation of Scripture, that is to say, a vertical, or diachronic perspective. It also is a collection of statements assigned to rabbis who flourished principally in the third and fourth centuries A.D. Our other perspective requires that we seek a horizontal line of sight, a synchronic perspective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Midrash in Context<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The exegesis of the Hebrew Scriptures got underway even before those Scriptures had reached closure. So the book at hand stands in an ancient tradition of exegesis. One writer responded to what an earlier writer had said; one book served as a systematic reworking of the materials of a prior composition. Collecting these exegeses in a systematic and orderly way, moreover, had occupied Jewish writers and editors long before the first rabbi made his appearance on the scene. The sustained exegetical-redactional efforts represented by the book of Chronicles, the Pesharim of the Essene library at Qumran, and the Gospel produced by Matthew\u2019s school serve to exemplify one ancient, entirely familiar mode of cogent discourse (making books). Indeed, purposefully joining together comments on familiar biblical passages represents a standard and conventional way in which, for nearly a millenium before Leviticus Rabbah appeared at circa A.D. 400\u2013425, Israel\u2019s religious sentiments reached verbal expression and entered broad circulation.
\nWe come to the synchronic context. Who wrote this book? In the protracted history of the explanation of a verse of Scripture in terms of some other consideration than the one original to the verse, only one thing changed in the fourth and early fifth centuries. A new group of exegetes, rabbis, then joined the now thousand-year-long procession. Residents of the Land of Israel, many were employed as clerks in the Jewish government headed by the ethnarch of the Jewish sector of Palestine, called the nasi, translated patriarch. All of them in common exhibited mastery of a particular set of Jewish traditions. They further undertook common disciplines of discipleship to masters who allegedly stood in direct succession to earlier authorities, a chain extending\u2014the clerks maintained\u2014back to Sinai. These two traits, the one of erudition, the other of practical political discipline, defined the clerks at hand as a group and distinguished them from all those other Jews who did not accept the authority of the masters, who did not enjoy, or aspire to, employment in the Jewish administration, and who did not claim to know the sector of the Torah particular to the movement of the clerks.
\nThe particular traditions mastered by these clerks, called by the (merely honorific) title \u201crabbis,\u201d were ordinarily known only in part or not at all by other Jews. To begin with, the distinctive compositions formed the aggregate of materials now contained in the Mishnah, a philosophical law code produced under the auspices of the Jewish ethnarch of the Land of Israel at circa A.D. 200. The code drew together in a massive and exceptionally well-organized, topical composition, opinions on concrete matters affecting and effecting the sanctification of Israel, the Jewish people. These opinions derived from authorities who flourished mainly in the second century, but in some measure also of the middle and later first century.
\nThe whole code was laid out by topics set forth in an order dictated by the logic of each topic. While occasionally citing verses of Scripture, and commonly making use of facts presented by scriptural law, the authors of the Mishnah in no way intended to present a systematic exegesis of legal passages of Scripture. They chose their own mode of organization, made use of their own kind of Hebrew, and presented a code lacking precedent of any kind in the antecedent literature of Israel. The logic of the Mishnah flowed from the logos of classification and topical differentiation of which Aristotle would have approved.
\nFor the next two hundred years the heirs and successors of the framers of the Mishnah studied the document and applied some of its laws to the administration of the Jewish community subject to their authority. In the context of a community believing that God had given the Torah for their governance, of course, the clerks faced a dual task. They had, first, to show the numerous links between the Mishnah, distinctive to their own group, and Scripture, accepted as supreme revelation on the part of the entire community. They furthermore had the on-going work of confronting the authoritative Scriptures and deriving from them (or, we should say, imposing upon them) warrant for their own viewpoint and system.
\nThe clerks between A.D. 200 and A.D. 400 produced a sizable corpus of writings serving to amplify the Mishnah and also to cite and explain passages of Scripture. These later compositions dealt both with the narrow question of foundations, in Scripture, for diverse laws of the Mishnah and with the broader and encompassing question of meanings to be imputed to verses of Scripture unrelated to laws of the Mishnah. The result of the twin labor on Scripture reached the form in which we have it in a number of documents. We do not know the exact dates in which any of these documents reached closure, and we also have no probative evidence on the temporal relationship between one document and the next. But we are able to classify the documents of the two centuries beyond the conclusion of the Mishnah and, in an approximate way, to indicate their order of closure and redaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Logic of Differentiation within the Clerks\u2019 Canon<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The criterion for differentiation among the rabbinic documents produced in the aftermath of the Mishnah derives from the Mishnah. (1) Some documents clearly carry forward the literary and redactional program of the Mishnah. (2) Others certainly ignore that program, and (3) another group falls in the middle. The Mishnaic sector of the rabbinic corpus comprises the Tosefta, a vast supplementary code, organized along the lines of the Mishnah\u2019s own tractates, chapters, and topics, and formulated in the language and style of the Mishnah; Abot, a collection of sayings in the names of authorities who appear, also, in the Mishnah, in which various moral opinions provide a secondary apologetic for the Mishnah; and a group of writings organized around the order of biblical verses but focused upon legal questions deriving from the Mishnah. This third group takes an exegetical style and follows the sequence of scriptural verses. It encompasses Sifra on the book of Leviticus, Sifre on Numbers, and Sifre on Deuteronomy.
\nThe work of the exegetes of the named biblical books derives from both the character and the contents of the Mishnah. Since the Mishnah omits reference to biblical verses, the exegetes propose in some places to link cited passages of the Mishnah with relevant verses of Scripture. Since the Mishnah goes over the laws of Scripture, the exegetes further plan to demonstrate wherever they are able that the laws of the Mishnah rest upon the authority of the Mosaic code.
\nThe Mishnaic sector of the post-Mishnaic corpus therefore focuses attention on the Mishnah. The sector itself subdivides, to be sure, by the differentiating criterion of the principle of organization and redaction. Part of the Mishnaic corpus is organized around the structure of the Mishnah itself. The other part is organized around the structure of biblical books\u2014the order of verses in Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, in particular. But the Mishnaic sector of the rabbinical canon clearly takes shape around the basic code itself, its topics and its issues.
\nOn the opposite side stand compositions organized solely around large-scale theological themes, ignoring the Mishnah and its program of legal topics altogether. Leviticus Rabbah is the first of this type of book. The compositions at hand treat such issues as God\u2019s personal traits, God\u2019s relationship to Israel, Israel\u2019s obligations to God, the life of holiness, the redemption of Israel from the thrall of the gentiles, and similar matters. These topics scarcely make an appearance in the pages of the Mishnah. In the compositions that attend upon the Mishnah they prove no more commonplace, though in the exegetical passages of biblical law presented in Sifra and the two Sifres, relevant sayings do turn up. In many ways this other group of compositions presents us with a mirror image of the Mishnah, alike but opposite. Just as the Mishnah divides itself up by topics, each topic then defining a sustained tractate, so the compositions of which we speak likewise break down by major topics, with each topic then undergoing sustained and, so far as possible, systematic and logical unpacking. If the Mishnah, therefore, presents a tractate (massekhet) on writs of divorce or a schematic and protracted essay dealing with the entire corpus of civil law, the counterpart at hand will give us a \u201ctractate\u201d (which they call the parashah; plural: parashiyyot) on the importance of philanthropy, the love of God for Israel, the evils of drunkenness, the priority of sexual purity, and the importance of the study of the Torah. If, further, we had to specify a single overriding concern exhibited throughout the Mishnah, it would be the sanctification of Israel. The counterpart and complement for this other corpus, the single recurrent point of insistence of the compositions at hand, concerns the salvation of Israel.
\nAccordingly, this opposite and complementary corpus of writings finds definition not solely or mainly in its sustained stress on the exegesis of Scripture. That is so despite the fact that the works under discussion constantly cite proof texts and in other ways refer to Scripture; its stories and sayings, as the hermeneutical key to the affairs of the contemporary age. But the proof texts that formally dominate do not, in substance, dictate the structure or logic of discourse. They rather subordinate themselves to the main point that the writer at any given passage proposes to make. So while proof texts abound, resort to them does not define what is characteristic or what distinguishes this set of documents from the other.
\nThat negative point proves critical to the argument, since the positive one, that we witness a major stage in the unfolding history of Judaic thought, depends on it. What makes the documents at hand different from the Mishnah is rather the selection of the topic for exposition\u2014theological rather than legal. But then, once the topic is chosen, the redactional principle is the same. It indeed would have found ready recognition among any Greco-Roman redactors of law or theology, as a superficial glance at how Roman law codes and Christian theological treatises are organized will tell us.
\nWhen, to conclude, we look for the largest, the most obvious, trait at hand, we turn to the simple matter of how documents organize ideas. We find that the Mishnah and the collections at hand represented by Leviticus Rabbah exhibit a single trait. They organize ideas topically, systematically working out the logic of a given topic and selecting and arranging all compositions of ideas to contribute to that single logical exposition. The Mishnah and these compositions in no way find in the sequence of biblical verses the redactional principle governing the exposition of topics. The logos governs, not the inherited Scripture. Then how do we differentiate within the rabbis\u2019 canon? It is quite simple. One large set of writings deals with legal matters, the other with theological ones\u2014just as everyone has always known (!).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Leviticus Rabbah and the Mishnah: Salvation and Sanctification<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Leviticus Rabbah was the first in a long line of essentially topical essays constructed out of exegetical comments of various sorts. Beyond Leviticus Rabbah lie the two Pesiqtas and, still further out, the various late antique and earlier medieval compositions on Lamentations and others of the Five Scrolls. But we suffice to focus upon the document at hand, which forms the bridge from one mode of organizing ideas to another.
\nUp to now I have emphasized that the Mishnah and Leviticus Rabbah resort to a single logos for so organizing, ordering, and presenting ideas as to compose an intelligible statement. The two documents have in common topical arrangement, allowing the inner logic of a given topic to dictate the order and govern the aggregation of ideas. Yet I have now to place Leviticus Rabbah into its temporal setting, for we should otherwise miss why the document constitutes, in its way, as stunning a step on a new path as did the Mishnah in its day.
\nThe span of two hundred years separates the Mishnah from Leviticus Rabbah. During that time, the bulk of the clerks\u2019 literary work consisted of exegesis of texts: first the Mishnah, and then, partly for purposes of Mishnah exegesis, also Scriptures. That is to say, the group of texts that focus upon the Mishnah generally follows one of two modes of organizing and presenting ideas. Either a text will follow the order of the Mishnah and explain its sentences, one by one, or a text will follow the order of a book of Scripture and, with the Mishnah\u2019s interests in mind, do the same thing. But Leviticus Rabbah, as we shall see in exquisite detail in my translation, does not do that at all. As I have said, in seeking to make a sustained and intelligible statement, it reverts to the Mishnah\u2019s own logoi of topical logic.
\nBut the authors did so not only two hundred years after people had grown accustomed to the exegetical mode of organizing ideas. They also did so in response to a text other than the Mishnah, that is, to the book of Leviticus. In context more original still: the book of Leviticus served solely as pretext for what the essayists (for that is what they were) really wished to discuss, which was a program of their own, completely outlined at the beginning of Chapter 3. In context, therefore, Leviticus Rabbah in its day presented just as fresh and unprecedented a mode of intellectual expression as had the Mishnah in its time.
\nContrast and complement to the Mishnah, Leviticus Rabbah inaugurated a literature and corpus of thought that would extend alongside the Mishnah for as long as the Mishnah would be studied. The two Talmuds, the one of the Land of Israel, the other of Babylonia, would form a bridge between the Mishnah and the corpus of writings inaugurated by Leviticus Rabbah, that is, from legal exegesis and speculation to theological essays in quasi-exegetical form. The Babylonian one, in particular, would join the large themes of the two sectors of the prior canon\u2014sanctification and salvation\u2014as well as grand-scale compositions of both familiar types. But while, from the Talmuds\u2019 time onward, the Mishnah by itself would rarely attract sustained attention (Maimonides, only eight hundred years later, would write the first Mishnah-commentary autonomous of that of the Talmuds), the compositions of the sort represented by Leviticus Rabbah would maintain their independence. No Talmud would ever surround and engulf Leviticus Rabbah in the way in which both Talmuds captured the Mishnah.
\nTo be sure, the other possible route beyond the fortresses of the past, a d\u00e9marche around them, would guide thinkers a mere half millenium beyond Leviticus Rabbah. What they chose to do was to comment on Scripture in a systematic and sustained way, reading the Scripture not only as source for a composite essay on a general and abstract theme or topic, as the framers of Leviticus Rabbah and its successors did, but also as a problem unto itself. So biblical commentary would draw upon but also sidestep the exegetical essays of late antiquity. Through the middle ages and into early modern times, biblical exegetes would focus attention on verses of Scripture rather than on theological speculation carried on through concatenations of verses of Scripture. For them Scripture would then provide not pretexts or proof texts but texts. But the mode of thought on theology through scriptural pretexts and proof texts also would go forward on its own. The making of compositions in the model of Leviticus Rabbah and the two Pesiqtas (or derivative from their model) would not conclude much before our own day. What began, then, in the astonishing and unprecedented minds that produced Leviticus Rabbah would, for all intents and purposes, never end.
\nLet us turn back briefly to specify how in the two hundred years beyond the Mishnah the clerks organized their ideas. In this way we shall see how in reverting to the Mishnah\u2019s topical-logical mode and yet preserving the intervening exegetical form in attending (at least in pretense) to scriptural verses, Leviticus Rabbah constituted an amazing innovation. By A.D. 400 the established mode of organizing ideas\u2014the conventional logos of the clerks\u2014centered upon a given text: first the Mishnah; then, in parallel form but on a different text, the Scripture. Tosefta built upon the Mishnah, much as Sifra and the two Sifres built upon Scripture. Following the order of the base document, the redactors of each then took up a single encompassing problem, the exposition of the Mishnah. Tosefta took the route of inquiry into the Mishnah itself, expansion of its ideas in its own language.
\nSifra and the two Sifres followed the course dictated by a separate issue, the relationship of the Mishnah to Scripture, alongside the systematic exposition of legal passages (but not only legal passages) of Scripture. So they accepted the order set out by Scripture itself. The organizing principle was simple: to follow the order of topics laid forth by the base text. The substance of inquiry then was equally simple. They did, in connection with the base text, that sustained labor of exegesis, of relating other things to the given text, that the framers of the Mishnah chose not to do.
\nBut, as is clear, the authors of Leviticus Rabbah did no such thing. The text they made deals only with a handful of passages of their base document, the book of Leviticus. They made no pretense at all at undertaking a verse-by-verse or even phrase-by-phrase exegesis of their chosen text. Rather, they selected a large topic and, using the chosen verse, worked out the sense and implications\u2014the inner logic, the structure, the governing principle\u2014of that topic. Leviticus Rabbah looks like a systematic exegesis of Scripture\u2014the book of Leviticus\u2014only until we read more than two or three sentences, chosen at random.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mediating Documents<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In distinguishing among the types of rabbinical compositions of late antiquity, I have thus located two poles around which the bulk of the literature divides itself. The one pole, the legal, is formed by the Mishnah, with such associated documents as Abot, Tosefta, Sifra, and the two Sifres. The other pole, the theological, is formed (later on) by Leviticus Rabbah, the two Pesiqtas, and still newer compositions of late antiquity. Polar opposites in topic, the writings\u2014Mishnah, Leviticus Rabbah\u2014have in common an interest in the exposition of themes, not of received documents. They mirror one another in the choice of themes, but at the depths they rest upon the same logoi, or, in our language, redactional and conceptual logic. We distinguish, therefore, not between the Mishnah, on the one side, and other legal documents, on the other, or Leviticus Rabbah and other exegetical documents. Our distinction derives, rather, from the distinction between documents that flow from the Mishnah and its topics and those that flow from the quite distinct agenda of theological and moral issues. The point of differentiation emerges not on the foundation of exegesis versus abstract exposition. Let me speak with the required emphasis: Both sets of writings in fact take shape around logic, not exegesis, the logic of law or of theology, not the exegesis of the Mishnah or of Scripture. What distinguishes documents congregating around one pole and those around the other is the point of interest: law or theology\u2014that alone.
\nThe not-inconsiderable corpus of ancient writings of the rabbis of late antiquity consists of the two Talmuds, on the one hand, and Genesis Rabbah, on the other. One of the two Talmuds, the one written in the Land of Israel, took shape at pretty much the same time as Leviticus Rabbah, at circa A.D. 400\u2013450. The other, written in Babylonia, dates from 500 and reached closure, it is commonly asserted, at about 600\u2013700 (though the first independent evidence of its existence reached us from long after the rise of Islam in the seventh century). Genesis Rabbah, for its part, generally is supposed to have come to closure at about \u201cthree generations\u201d before the completion of Leviticus Rabbah. All authorities place the book before Leviticus Rabbah, which uses materials that fit well into Genesis Rabbah and poorly into Leviticus Rabbah. Hence if we place that document at about the same time as our text, we cannot be far from the truth. Lewis Barth proposes circa 420 for Genesis Rabbah and 450 for Leviticus Rabbah.
\nWhat these three enormous compositions\u2014the two Talmuds and Leviticus Rabbah\u2014have in common is their mode of aggregation. All three are made up of exegeses of prior texts, the two Talmuds serving the Mishnah, Genesis Rabbah, the book of Genesis. Just as the two Talmuds work through the Mishnah, sentence by sentence, so Genesis Rabbah (like Sifra and the two Sifres) makes its way through its base document, verse by verse.
\nBut if we look more closely at the two Talmuds (Genesis Rabbah requires study in its own terms), we find numerous topical-logical essays. These treat both legal and theological questions. True, the essays are small-scale, more like a short article than a sustained tractate of the Mishnah or a parashah of Leviticus Rabbah. Accordingly, in the two Talmuds, and particularly the second one, we find both distinct modes of organizing materials\u2014the one exegetical and episodic, the other discursive, sustained, and abstract. The large-scale form of both Talmuds follows the former mode, but many individual units of discourse follow the latter.
\nSo the two Talmuds join logoi\u2014syllogistic, exegetical\u2014that had originally come to expression as distinct and individual. In doctrinal insistence too, the two Talmuds link sanctification to salvation. They repeatedly state that the one is the precondition of the other and so present the doctrine and teleology that would define Judaism from that time to this. The mediating documents, and in particular the later of the two, thus wrote an appropriate conclusion to the formation of the clerks\u2019 canon by drawing together and integrating the whole\u2014logoi of organization, topoi of discourse, alike.
\nTo summarize, modes of intelligible discourse in the rabbinic canon take two forms, syllogistic and exegetical. The former presents cogent and coherent statements joined together to make a larger point or proposition. Both the principle of aggregation and composition, the arrangement and ordering of statements, derive from the inner logic of the syllogistic essay itself. The latter type of forming intelligible discourse also presents statements that, one by one, prove cogent and internally coherent. But in the aggregate they are not joined together to make some larger point and composed on the basis of an inner logic of the whole. Rather the statements are ordered in accord with an external principle of arrangement, namely, a text quite outside the set of statements at hand. The exegetical discourse then is ordered and organized in accord with that other text. It in no way presents a logic internal to itself. An example of the syllogistic composition is the Mishnah, an instance of an exegetical composition, Tosefta. For Scripture, an exegetical collection, for the period at hand, is Sifra; others are the two Sifres and Genesis Rabbah. In Chapters 2 and 3 I shall demonstrate that Leviticus Rabbah is a syllogistic composition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Composition of Logic and Topic<\/p>\n\n\n\n
My thesis, as I have indicated, is that Leviticus Rabbah falls into the classification of syllogistic compositions, not of exegetical collections. The proposition is that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes not a compilation of random sentences but a purposeful and sustained composition, comparable to the Mishnah in its principles of organization and aggregation of materials. On what basis do I claim that the document in hand constitutes a single and systematic statement? The mode of demonstration begins with an examination of the document\u2019s neutral, formal traits, and not with episodic observations about how, in a subjective way, I can hear, see, or smell that order that others may not perceive at all. The data I shall now assemble are facts. These facts moreover turn out to be subject to classification. Hence the facts follow rules. They are not random. They conform to a plan and indicate the presence of purpose. Let me then explain the logic of my plan to uncover the logic of the redactors of Leviticus Rabbah.
\nI shall state matters both negatively and positively. What would constitute adequate proof that we have an anthology or a typical compilation, lacking a logic of either form or topic? What would constitute decisive proof that we have a sustained composition, exhibiting in detail an inner, animating, and encompassing logic? If we cannot falsify, we also cannot validate or proposition. Accordingly, I lay forth what I conceive to be evidence and argumentation to guide us on whether we are right or wrong.
\nThe negative: if we wished to demonstrate that a text in the rabbinic canon comprised nothing more than a compilation of discrete sentences, in no way constituting paragraphs, chapters, propositions, and syllogisms, we should begin with the following questions: (1) Can we show that no external, formal pattern governed the formulation of sentences? It would then follow that the sentences were made up with no interest in composing a stylistically balanced and formally cogent paragraph or chapter. (2) Can we demonstrate that no single issue or problem occupied the mind of the authors of the sentences at hand? It would then follow that the compilation of sentences in no way flowed from a single generative problematic or addressed a cogent problem or proposition. On that basis, we should stand on firm ground in alleging that at hand was a topical anthology, a compilation of this-and-that and not a sustained and cogent composition.
\nTrue, someone made the compilation as we have it. No one alleges that, crawling on their own across the far reaches of rabbinical tradents, random sentences somehow made their way to a given pericope on their own. Every document reached closure and entered circulation in something very like the condition in which we now have it (making provision for enormous variations in the wording of sentences). But the person who made the compilation followed a simple principle in selecting the aggregation of materials that he gave us: shared topic, common theme. Whether or not through the shared topic he wished to deliver anything more than simply the aggregation of sentences, in no clear logical order and making no obvious single point, we cannot say, because the parts do not add up to more than the sum of the whole. The decisive criterion is simple: the order of sentences of such an anthology makes no intelligible difference, because one could have arranged the sentences in any other sequence and gained as little, or as much, meaning from the compilation as a whole.
\nThe positive: beginning the account of the criteria by which we identify a composition as distinct from a compilation, a purposeful essay in contrast to an anthology on a single topic, we start with this same point, the order of sentences. In a syllogistic paragraph, the order of sentences matters a great deal. It would not be possible to arrange matters other than in the sequence in which they occur, for each sentence depends upon the other for sense and meaning, one standing fore, the other aft, of the statement at hand. Such an orderly composition in no way serves as a mere anthology of diverse sayings on a single topic. Quite the opposite, the sentences gain their full sense and meaning only in the order dictated by the logic of the syllogism at hand.
\nIn the rabbinic canon, moreover, sentences that are meant to be coherent with one another very commonly follow a single syntactic formula and resort to shared forms of rhetoric. The Mishnah, I have demonstrated, joins form to meaning. When a given topic is at hand, the sentences that spell out the rules on that topic will prove cogent not only in theme and even in detailed principle but also in syntax and rhetoric. When, then, the subject changes, the syntactical and rhetorical pattern and form will also change. So we shall talk about one thing in some one way, then the next thing in some other.
\nWhile the logic of a syllogism therefore comes to detailed expression in both aesthetic, or formal, and literary ways, and also in intellectual, or substantive, ones, the shortest path into the center of a syllogism lies through form. This is because, in the literature at hand, if we discern patterns of formal expression, we may reasonably look for patterns of substantive discourse as well. If we find no effort at formalization, we may find it more difficult, also, to demonstrate the intent of delivering cogent and substantive propositions. (It is self-evident that repeated recourse to a single form may also produce gibberish, as in the Hekhalot writings. But that fact is inconsequential in this context, since I make no claim that patterned language all by itself also proves we have in hand syllogistic propositions.) So the way forward lies through the discovery of the logic of Leviticus Rabbah, logic of expression, logic of composition, logic of proposition.
\nLet me now link what has been said about formal cogency to the larger claim that Leviticus Rabbah expresses a cogent logic, a logic of form (as I shall suggest in Chapter 2), and a logic of substance (as I shall propose in Chapter 3), and a logic of context as well (as I shall postulate in Chapter 4). What has formal cogency to do with logic? The question may be reframed as follows: How shall we recognize\u2014and so demonstrate the presence of\u2014logic? Since logic constitutes what orders and renders intelligible a set of sentences or propositions, so laying down the principle of composition for discourse and the rules by which discourse takes place, we look throughout for regularities. Our perception of order emerges from our discovery of repeated choices, first of form and only second of proposition. If we can demonstrate a single program of formal choices, we also may try to show that the author or authors of the document\u2014the people who in the end made it what it now is\u2014did some one thing rather than some other. Then through systematic classification we may describe what they chose to do. That taxonomic description constitutes the statement of the formal logic of the document as a whole.
\nBy contrast, if we can discover in a text of the character of this one no repeated patterns in the way people express their ideas\u2014no sustained logic of rhetoric and syntax, for example\u2014we have slight warrant for supposing that in substance or in topical program we deal with a composition, a proportioned statement, a cogent syllogism. We then shall have to concede that what we have in hand is what people generally suppose we have\u2014a composite, not a composition. We shall have to agree that Leviticus Rabbah is a collection of diverse and episodic sentences, this-and-that about what-not, not a coherent syllogism, a statement and intelligible judgment addressed to the age in which the composition reached closure. I shall argue that Leviticus Rabbah, located by the scholarly consensus at circa A.D. 400\u2013450, contends with the context of its age, addresses Israel\u2019s condition with syllogisms of substance and meaning, not merely with ad hoc sayings equally relevant\u2014because of their very discrete and episodic character\u2014everywhere but also nowhere in particular.
\nI have now to introduce an important qualification, although the data emerge only in the next two chapters. Leviticus Rabbah consists of two types of materials: those that appear for the first time in the rabbinic canon in the document at hand; and those that appear first in some prior or contemporary document, such as the Mishnah and Tosefta, on the one hand, or Genesis Rabbah and the Talmud of the Land of Israel, on the other. I think it very likely that what is new here also was made up by the framers of the document. But that is beside the point. The main thing is that when I claim that \u201csentences\u201d cohere, I refer to \u201csentence\u201d only as a metaphor for the smallest possible completed unit of thought, which I call \u201cparagraph of thought.\u201d
\nIn Leviticus Rabbah we have a composition in which outsiders, not the authors but other people, provided \u201ccompleted units of thought,\u201d whole paragraphs, and in which the authors also provided \u201ccompleted units of thought,\u201d also whole paragraphs. When we speak of these \u201ccompleted units of thought\u201d and invoke the analogy of the sentence, therefore, in fact we refer not to atomic but to molecular units of thought, that is to say, composites which, all together, make a single point or statement.
\nWhat then forms the arena for analysis, and where do I claim to locate the boundaries of discourse? The answer is simple. I speak of the parashah as the proposition. Then there are thirty-seven of them. My entire mode of analysis is to claim that each parashah constitutes not merely an assembly of relevant materials about a topic but something much more cogent and purposive, that is, a composition that makes a specific, polemical point about a topic. That is the burden of Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I move on to propose to prove that the main points of the polemic on the bulk, though not all, of the parashiyyot and their topics cohere and add up to a single proposition concerning Israel\u2019s salvation. So the parts make points and the whole makes a point. And, in the nature of things (since I claim to contribute to the study of the history of the formation of the ideas of Judaism), the point that is made concerns the world to which the framers speak.
\nIn this regard I follow up on my findings about the Mishnah. There I was able to demonstrate that a tractate constituted not a collection of facts about a topic but a purposive judgment and proposition about a topic. A tractate provided information, but it also (in most, though not all, cases) made a particular point about the topic at hand. That is so, also, in Leviticus Rabbah: so I claim to demonstrate.
\nIf the reader in the end sees the thirty-seven parashiyyot as anthologies of completed materials about a stated subject, then the reader will reject the fundamental proposition of this book. If, on the other hand, I am able to demonstrate that the framers, only secondarily through their selection and arrangement of existing materials, but primarily through their formation and statement of (apparently) new materials, wish to make important statements about the subject at hand, then the reader must view this composition as I do.
\nStill more, if I am able to persuade the reader that the framers of Leviticus Rabbah wished to make what turns out to be a small number of comprehensive and cogent statements\u2014that is to say, wish to say some one thing through many things\u2014then the reader will want to read in a new way each book of the formative period of the rabbinic canon. The documents individually will demand attention on their own, not merely as vessels containing diverse interesting sayings. They also will claim to be interpreted as singular and considerable statements of propositions, each document making its own statement both (secondarily) out of what its authors found available and (primarily) through what they themselves made up. My claim in Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishnah, volume 35, Introduction: Taxonomy, and in Judaism in Society: The Evidence of the Yerushalmi, not to mention even in A History of the Mishnaic Law of Purities, volume 6, Negaim: Sifra (1976), remains uniform: (1) each book must be read on its own, not solely as part of a larger construct, and (2) each book also must be read as a distinctive component of a larger construct. Neither sort of reading of the several compositions of the rabbinic canon has taken place before this time. My hope is that, afterward, what now is fresh will become commonplace.
\nTo return to the main point, the burden of proof lies on the one who alleges we deal with a composition and not a composite. Either a document is exegetical and so depends upon some other for its cogency and order, or it is syllogistic and therefore provides its own inner connections and relations.
\nThe former sort of document, by definition, constitutes a timeless exegesis out of all distinctive historical and social context. It depends upon, therefore it meant to amplify, some other document, of some other age; hence it provides an exegesis of something other than itself.
\nThe latter sort of document, by definition, constitutes a timely syllogism, a freestanding statement made intelligible in two complementary ways. These are, first, by its own inner correspondences and proportions, a set of relationships joined from within; and, second, by a socially defined logic, a cogent address directed to a given world by a specific intellect and therefore meant to be intelligible at some one time (if, also, for all time too).
\nI wish then to demonstrate that Leviticus Rabbah falls into the classification not of exegesis but of syllogism. I begin with the externals, the obvious and gross traits of rhetoric and syntax. Do we find repeated use of a limited program of organizing and expressing ideas, and does that program govern the composition of each principal unit of sustained and continuous thought\u2014each parashah\u2014beginning to end? The following chapters respond to these questions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
2<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Plan of Leviticus Rabbah: (1) The Formal Program<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Single Intelligible Statement: The Logic of Form<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The issue before us is simple. Did someone make up Leviticus Rabbah, or did it just grow? If we uncover marks of regularity, signs of a plan governing the classification and order of successive units of the document, we have on the face of it reason to suppose that someone (or coherent group) made the document up. Then it is a composition. If we see no indications of a plan and a program, then the document \u201cjust grew.\u201d Quite how and where we do not know. But we may be sure that no single hand imposed a cogent and coherent plan\u2014whether not formal, therefore also not substantive\u2014on the work. Then it is a compilation.
\nIn the present chapter we consider the evidence that Leviticus Rabbah\u2019s framers followed a careful plan in making up the bulk of the individual paragraphs of thought (though bits and pieces of some of them derive from other constituents of the rabbinic canon). We shall find it possible to categorize within a few rather gross classifications of form the vast majority of the paragraphs of thought. I shall further demonstrate that not only the types but also the arrangement of paragraphs of thought divided among the several forms is not random. The arrangers of the document uniformly exhibited a preference for starting with a paragraph of a single type and ending with a paragraph of a quite different type. These facts then will prove that from a literary and redactional perspective Leviticus Rabbah follows a coherent program and a plan and disprove that it just grew. Settling the question of the logic of the forms, these facts of consistent classification and logical arrangement thus prepare the way for the more difficult matter, which we take up in Chapter 3, of the topical and substantive logic: whether Leviticus Rabbah makes a cogent statement, and, if so, how the contents of that statement relate to the context from which that statement came forth.
\nSince we speak of sustained intelligible discourse, we have to find out how the framers repeatedly undertake to frame and deliver or organize their messages. Clearly, if they select some few ways in which to cast sentences and organize paragraphs\u2014that is, to make formally patterned intelligible statements\u2014we may conclude that they had chosen a particular mode of expression. The fact of choice further testifies to the presupposition of intelligibility. The opposite, the goal of total unintelligibility, in the context of Leviticus Rabbah, which is no mishmash of nonsense sentences, is impossible. That is, by saying things in one way rather than in some other way, the authors indicate their theory that the way chosen will best convey their message.
\nLet me spell out the negative argument. If we find no sustained pattern of intelligible discourse, then we hardly can maintain that the document as a whole, and not only its bits and pieces, served to deliver a single, cogent message. The absence of cogent rhetoric and redaction hardly suggests that in hand we have that syllogistic composition, coherent and whole. To state the contrary, positive argument, if I can show recurrent recourse to some few modes of organization and expression of ideas, then I shall have laid down a prima facie case in favor of the proposition that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes a whole composition, not merely a random collection or compilation of parts, and that that whole is purposive, capable of sustaining propositions. The point, then, is that the logic that joins and proportions the parts into a pleasing, comprehensible composition will derive as much from the sustained and systematic principles of formal expression, organization, and redaction as it will from the just fit of the things that are said in these particular forms, in this distinctive order, and through these demonstrated techniques of redaction.
\nI will now discuss the proposition that the document exhibits the evidences of a cogent plan of organization of its components, on the one side, and of the composition of those components within a severely circumscribed set of arrangements, on the other. Specifically, I wish to show that we can classify the bulk of the components of the documents into a narrow set of categories. I furthermore can show that each large-scale discussion (\u201ctractate,\u201d in the Mishnah\u2019s language, \u201cparashah\u201d in that of Leviticus Rabbah) will lay out the types of components in a consistent order\u2014first a passage that falls into one type, at the end, a passage that falls into a radically different type, and, in the middle, two or more passages that fall into only one of two other types\u2014an amazingly economical taxonomic range. So, in a word, we shall see that the framers of the text chose a very limited number of types of components and arranged those components in a consistent order, by type. I can think of no more solid evidence that a document in its formal and aesthetic character follows a set of rules, hence expresses a deep logic of discursive and formal expression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Building Blocks of Discourse<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The broadly theoretical remarks now completed dictate the analytical procedures before us. We have to approach Leviticus Rabbah from the outside, working our way toward its core. What we see when we contemplate the document from a distance is a sequence of perfectly self-evident facts.
\nThe most distant imaginable perspective places us at the outer boundary of the rabbinic canon, from which we see Leviticus Rabbah in relationship to the antecedent documents. The sight to the naked eye is obvious. Is Leviticus Rabbah like, or not like, the prior compositions and compilations by rabbis? First, the document has nothing in common with the Mishnah, on which it does not serve as a commentary; or with the Tosefta, or the Talmud of the Land of Israel, for the same reason. More important, second, it has little in common with the earlier compilation (or composition) of exegetical remarks on a scriptural book, Genesis Rabbah, or with Sifra, on Leviticus, or with the two Sifres, on Numbers and Deuteronomy. These books, as I have emphasized, present a verse-by-verse account of Scripture. They say whatever they wish by hanging their ideas on the exegesis of a verse. Leviticus Rabbah does not do so. Accordingly, when we see Leviticus Rabbah as a mountain among mountains, all of them viewed from afar, we see that it is not like the other mountains of its range at all. But since the bulk of its authorities bears names familiar from other texts of the Land of Israel, particularly Genesis Rabbah and the Talmud of the Land of Israel, we need not expend effort in proving that Leviticus Rabbah falls within that same range. All of this is obvious and requires no further exposition or proof.
\nAs we come closer, we ask about the principal traits of the document. We first turn to its primary divisions, the thirty-seven chapters, or parashiyyot, each of substantial length. If\u2014to repeat a familiar exercise\u2014we were to stretch out the entire contents of Leviticus Rabbah, from beginning to end, how should we know that one body of undifferentiated words and sentences was to be separated from some other, fore and aft? The answer is that, if we begin at the beginning and read consecutively, we know that the first sustained discussion ends and the next begins because the subject changes. First we talk about one thing, then we talk about some other. The changing of the subject will be signified, of course, by the introduction of a new verse, selected from the book of Leviticus, later in sequence than the paramount one in what has preceded. This rather tedious statement serves to point to the obvious. Viewed from afar, the dividing lines of our document turn up at the boundaries of substantive, topical discussion. Just as the Mishnah is divided by its subject matter, so is Leviticus Rabbah. That means each major subdivision of the document constitutes an essay of some sort on a particular topic, and that the division into parashiyyot\u2014thirty-seven in all\u2014is intrinsic to the formulation of the document and not imposed after the fact by copyists and printers.
\nThe thirty-seven parashiyyot take up thirty-seven topics, as we shall see in Chapter 3. But\u2014and now we come to the crux of the matter\u2014these parashiyyot do not consist of a single, sustained discourse. They are themselves composed of smaller whole units of discourse, subsections numbering from five to fifteen, depending on the parashah. So the smallest whole units of discourse\u2014that is, discussions of a given idea that reach completion and mark a conclusion on their stated topic\u2014constitute the subdivisions of the parashah. With some license, we may call these subsets \u201cparagraphs of thought.\u201d In Margulies\u2019s text these are marked off and numbered, thus I:I, I:II, and so on. I have further broken them down by Arabic numerals, 1, 2, 3, and each of the subdivisions is further divided into sentences (complete, simple, and irreducible whole units of thought), marked A, B, C, and so on.
\nTo summarize, like the tractates of the Mishnah, each parashah takes up its own subject. Like the chapters of the tractates of the Mishnah, each subdivision of a parashah, that is, each sustained paragraph of thought, likewise exhibits a point of departure and reaches a point of conclusion. It is still possible to further subdivide the paragraphs of thought. But even as they are they exhibit the marks of difference from one another. Accordingly, if the printers had not marked off one paragraph of thought from the next, we could do so, more or less following the exact lines now drawn in the printed editions. We should simply look for propositions that start at some one point and proceed to another; exegeses of a given verse that exhibit a beginning, middle, and end; statements in the name of a given authority that make a single point; and other indications of inner coherence, on the one side, and difference from other contiguous and internally equally cogent passages, on the other.
\nAnalysis rests upon differentiating one genus of the same species from another, then comparing and contrasting the two. In the present case we have first to effect a system of classification. Only then shall we be able to classify the building blocks of discourse in such a way as to ask whether they follow rules of organization, and, if so, what these rules might be. I cannot differentiate one parashah from the other, except by topic (as in Chapter 3) because I see no other points of differentiation. By this I mean, in all formal respects, if we have analyzed what differentiates one parashah from any other, we have analyzed them all. All of them follow a single pattern, which I shall lay out in a moment.
\nIn a formal way, therefore, the parashiyyot prove undifferentiable. All of them consist of paragraphs of thought, as I said, varying not only in character but in size, from briefer parashiyyot, with five such paragraphs, to longer ones, of ten or more. If, then, we take up one parashah and describe its components\u2014its paragraphs of thought\u2014we find ourselves attempting to distinguish one large-building block from another by comparing and contrasting not the whole of the one to the whole of the next. Rather we have to compare the components of which the one is constructed with the parts of the next. That fact requires us to turn immediately to these building blocks shared in common among the large units of construction. These components of the largest units, of the parashiyyot, have to be distinguished from one another and classified by the differences from one another, since, while the parashiyyot prove to be uniform, the paragraphs of thought do not.
\nThat is why, starting from the document as a whole and unpeeling its layers, we find ourselves confronting points of differentiation only at the third level of analysis. After seeing Leviticus Rabbah as a whole in its largest perspective, and after briefly examining its thirty-seven parashiyyot as a group, when we proceed to the next layer down, reaching the components of the parashiyyot, we come to the point at which important differences make their appearance. Once these differences have been described, we may differentiate one type of paragraph of thought from another. That is now our task.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Types of Paragraphs of Thought: Differentiation and Comparison<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Persuasively to differentiate one means of expressing an idea from some other, we have to look for obvious traits, which will characterize one type of paragraph of thought and not some other. Since the document at hand contains numerous references to Scripture, the point of differentiation should emerge among diverse ways in which verses of Scripture occur or are utilized in different types of paragraphs of thought. I can think of nothing more fundamental to the character of the whole, nothing more suggestive of differences among the parts. For our first principal exercise of differentiation, therefore, I have called into service the following simple question: What is the function of a verse of Scripture in the construction (the paragraph) at hand?
\nThere are two possible answers to that question: (1) The entire construction will serve to expound a single verse and its meaning. (2) The entire construction will propose to expound an idea autonomous of any single verse, and therefore will make use of verses of Scripture only to prove the proposition (or some element of the proposition) at hand.
\nThere are three types of paragraphs of thought:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:III. 1 Chron. 4:17 to show the many names of Moses.
\nI:IX. God called many, e.g., Adam, Noah, but he called and spoke to Moses, Lev. 1:1.
\nI:XI. The theme of the tent of meeting is explained by reference to Deut. 5:23; 4:33; Lev. 1:1.
\nI:XII. As above, the theme is expounded and proof texts adduced.
\nI:XIII. Proof texts are compared to make a point about the difference between Balaam and Moses.
\nI:XIV. Proof texts support proposition that Moses differed from all other prophets.
\nII:VI. Scripture varies its language according to context. Diverse examples.
\nIII:IV. The base verse\u2019s details are shown to prove that what is stolen cannot be offered up.
\nIII:V. The base verse provides for an offering that a poor person can afford.
\nIII:VI. Systematic exegesis of Lev. 2:1\u20132.
\nIII:VI.5\u20137. Phrase-by-phrase exegesis of Mal. 2:5\u20137.
\n[IV:II. Works through Qoh. 6:7. I see little contact with the base verse. But the intent must be to regain that point of departure.]
\nIV:VII. Exegesis of use of word \u201csoul\u201d at Ps. 103.
\nV:I.3\u20134. Job 21:11.
\nV:II. Job 34:29; 28:5\u20137.
\nV:III. Job 34:29; Amos 6:1\u20136. The latter passage is worked out in detail, as an illustration of the former.
\nV:IV. Prov. 18:16 is amplified through examples.
\nV:V. Is. 22:15\u201319. The anointed priest who sinned is exemplified by Shebna.
\nV:VI. Lev. 4:3\u20134 expounded clause by clause. Some illustrative material.
\nV:VIII. 1.G\u2013R. Explanation of how Ps. 19 shows the proper way to seek divine grace.
\nVI:III. Zech. 5:1\u20135 on false oaths.
\nVI:IV. Lev. 5:1 and Num. 5:13ff. are intertwined with one another.
\nVI:V. Lev. 5:1 read into Israel\u2019s oath at Sinai, Deut. 4:35; 9:16; 5:21; Ex. 24:6\u20137, etc. The theme of Lev. 5:1 dictates choice of other verses, as at the foregoing.
\nVI:VI. Exegesis of Is. 8:18\u201319. No contact with Lev. 5:1.
\nVII:II. Systematic work on Ps. 51:15\u201319, applies its reference to the cult, to those who are penitent, etc.
\nVII:III. Job 1:4\u20135 extensively amplified.
\nVII:V. Lev. 6:2 explained.
\nVIII:II. Judges 14:14; 13:25; 14:5\u20136, etc. The story of Samson extensively glossed.
\nIX:II. Systematic account of Achan, Josh. 7:19, etc. Connected to Ps. 50:23.
\nIX:III. Prov. 31:23 given various applications.
\nIX:V. Prov. 14:9 spelled out in terms of various offerings.
\nX:VII. 1 Sam. 17:49 spelled out in light of other verses.
\nX:IX. Exegesis of Lev. 8:2 and 3.
\n[XI:I\u2013IV. Exegeses of Prov. 9:1\u20136 are systematic and independent of one another. But the whole is a single, matched construction; leading in order to Lev. 9:1.]
\nXI:V. Phrase-by-phrase illustration of Ps. 18:26\u201327 in terms of the life of Abraham, then Moses.
\n[XII:I. The systematic work on Prov. 23:32 intersects at only one point with Lev. 10:9. But the constructions of intersecting verses commonly include autonomous treatments of the same verses as intersect with the base one.]
\nXII:V.2. Hos. 13:1 and Prov. 31:4 spelled out.
\n[XIII:I. Lev. 10:12, on death of Aaron\u2019s sons, is spelled out. Note that Prov. 15:31\u201332 comes as an intersecting verse first. But then Lev. 10:12 is carefully worked out on its own.]
\nXIII:V.2. Systematic exegesis of Gen. 2:10ff.; Gen. 15:12ff.; Dan. 7:3\u20137; Deut. 14:7ff.
\nXIV:II. Exegesis of language of Job 36:3. Diverse meanings imputed to its several elements.
\nXIV:III. Job 10:12. Various examples of God\u2019s grace in creations linked to the cited verse.
\nXIV:IV. Job 38:8\u201311.
\nXIV:V. Ps. 51:5.
\nXIV:VI. Ps. 139:3.
\nXIV:VII. Qoh. 11:2.
\nXV:V. Prov. 19:29 nicely explained.
\nXV:V. Lev. 12:2 and 13:2: the juxtaposition yields a lesson.
\nXV:VI, VII. Lev. 12:8 and 13:2 as above (and Num. 15:20 and 22).
\nXVI:II. Prov. 31:13. The theme of the parashah, gossip, leads to the exegesis of relevant verses.
\nXVI:III. Job 20:6\u20137 read in reference to the leper.
\nXVI:IV. Ps. 50:16\u201318.
\nXVI:V. Qoh. 5:5 applied to various sins committed through speech.
\nXVI:IX. Is. 57:18ff. spelled out.
\n[XVII:I.2. Ps. 73:2ff. worked out. But at the end, Ps. 73:5 intersects with Lev. 14:33.]
\nXVII:IV. Exposition of Job 1:14\u201316.
\nXVII:VII. Lev. 14:34 and the house of the sanctuary.
\nXVIII:II. This composition focuses upon Hab. 1:7, even though some elements are aimed at a generalization autonomous of Hab. 1:7. Thus we have an explanation to Adam and Eve, Esau, etc.
\nXVIII:III. Is. 17:11. The exegesis of the elements of this verse is extended and systematic.
\nXIX:V. Is. 35:3\u20134 and 2 Chron. 15:3.
\nXX:IV. Job 38:27\u201329. This verse is given several applications, mainly in connection with the high priesthood.
\nXX:VI. Prov. 17:26 applied to Aaron and his sons.
\nXX:X\u2013XI. Num. 3:4.
\nXXI:V. Item-by-item exegesis of Prov. 6:17\u201319 in terms of religious duties that are counterparts and remedies. This forms part of the larger construct of XXI:V\u2013VI and fits well.
\nXXI:IX. \u201cWith this\u201d means 410 years.
\n[XXI:XI. Lev. 16:3\u2019s young bull and ram are shown to symbolize merit of Abraham, Isaac, etc. This is not precisely an exegesis of Lev. 16:3 but a propositional interpretation to make a point.]
\nXXI:XII. Lev. 16:4: disposition of garments. Lev. 16:16: priest goes into inner sanctum alone. These verses are amplified.
\nXXII:I\u2013IV. Qoh. 5:8 is explained in various ways, without a clear intersection with the base verse.
\nXXII:VI. Is. 66:3 is amplified.
\nXXII:X. Ps. 146:7 is worked out.
\nXXIII:VIII. Job 37:21 expounded.
\nXXIII:IX. Lev. 18:3 expounded in its own terms.
\nXXV:IV. Qoh. 2:24 read as God\u2019s apologia to the patriarchs.
\nXXV:VII. Ez. 16:26; Josh. 5:3.
\nXXV:VIII. Song 5:15. Juxtaposition of Lev. 19:23 to Lev. 19:20\u201322, 26 yields various lessons.
\nXXVI:II. Ps. 57:4.
\nXXVI:IV. Ps. 19:3. Relationship of day and night.
\nXXVI:V. Why Lev. 21:1 refers to speech two times.
\nXXVI:VII. Juxtaposition of Lev. 20:27; 21:1. Exposition of 1 Sam. 28:7ff.
\nXXVI:VIII. Various verses that refer two times to speaking.
\nXXVII:IX. Lev. 22:27: why a bull, sheep, goat.
\nXXVII:X. Lev. 22:27: why the offspring stays with the ram for seven days.
\nXXVII:XI. Lev. 22:28 exemplifies God\u2019s mercy and Prov. 12:10. This is not built as an intersecting verse\/base verse construction.
\nXXVIII:IV. Exposition of Job 5:5.
\nXXIX:II. Jer. 30:10\u201311 read in terms of Jacob\u2019s life.
\nXXIX:IV. Reference to shofar at Ps. 89:16 is spelled out.
\nXXIX:V. Prov. 15:24.
\nXXIX:VI. Ps. 81:4.
\nXXIX:VII. Is. 48:17.
\nXXIX:VIII. Ps. 62:9.
\nXXIX:VIII.B. Lev. 23:24\u2014the month of Tishri is full of religious duties.
\nXXX:III. Ps. 102:18.
\nXXX:IV. Ps. 96:12\u201313.
\nXXX:V. Ps. 26:6\u20137.
\nXXX:VI. Lev. 23:40.
\nXXX:VII. Lev. 23:40.
\nXXX:VIII. Lev. 23:40.
\n[XXX:IX\u2013XII. Lev. 23:40. Traits of lulab and what they symbolize.]
\nXXX:XV. Solomon and Lev. 23:40.
\nXXXI:IV. Song 7:5 systematically applied.
\nXXXI:V. Prov. 21:22.
\nXXXI:VI. Job 25:3.
\nXXXII:II. Qoh. 10:20.
\n[XXXII:III. Lev. 24:10\u2014amplification of the exclusion.]
\n[XXXII:IV. Lev. 24:10\u2014amplification of how the Egyptian fathered the Israelite woman\u2019s son. Not really exegetical.]
\nXXXII:V. Song 4:12 simplified in terms of Israel\u2019s sexual purity.
\nXXXII:VIII. Qoh. 4:1 speaks of mamzers.
\nXXXIII:III. Amos 9:1. Robbery as wronging one\u2019s neighbor.
\nXXXIII:IV. Num. 2:34\u2014wronging one\u2019s neighbor through humiliating him.
\nXXXIII:V. 2 Chron. 13:17. As above.
\nXXXIII:VI. Dan. 3:16\u201318; Qoh. 8:2.
\nXXXIV:III. Prov. 11:17.
\nXXXIV:IV. Prov. 29:13, 22:2.
\nXXXIV:V. Prov. 7:14.
\nXXXIV:VI. Ps. 106:43.
\nXXXIV:XI\u2013XVI. Is. 58:7\u201314 systematically expounded.
\nXXXV:VII. Lev. 26:3\u20134.
\n[XXXV:VIII. Lev. 26:4 expanded. But the expansion is secondary to an autonomous proposition.]
\n[XXXV:IX\u2013XII. Lev. 26:4\u2014the right time for rain. As above.]
\n[XXXVI:IV. Is. 43:1. Jacob sayings as above.]
\nXXXVI:V. Why does Lev. 26:42 reverse the order of the patriarchs?
\n[XXXVII:II. This is not a composition on Job 34:11 in particular.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:III. Moses had many names. The proof texts all are read to make this point, which is primary to Parashah One.
\nI:VII. Moses built the tabernacle as God commanded, so God called him (in Lev. 1:1) (+ I:VIII.1).
\nI:VIII.2.3. God singled out Moses by calling to him.
\nI:IX. God called Adam, Noah, but he called and spoke only to Moses, as Lev. 1:1 specifies.
\nI:X. The tent of meeting is the theme at hand, subjected to exegesis.
\nI:XI The theme of the tent of meeting is worked out.
\nI:XII. Exegesis of Song 3:4 as a proof text on the tent of meeting.
\nI:XIII. Comparison of Balaam and Moses through citation of Lev. 1:1; Num. 23:16, etc.
\nI:XIV. Moses saw visions directly, all others did not + proof texts.
\nII:VI. Scripture chooses words to honor Israel + proof texts to show diverse wordings.
\nII:VII. The \u201cman\u201d of Lev. 1:2 is compared to the first man, so too the offerings. The exegesis remains within the limit of Lev. 1:2.
\nIII:IV. Lev. 1:16 proves that what is stolen cannot be offered up.
\nIII:V. Lev. 1:17 proves that a bird may be offered up, so as to allow for a poor man\u2019s offering.
\nIV:VI. Proof texts merely illustrate the parables, or the parables clarify texts, as at No. 2.
\nIV:VIII. Proof texts are used to validate factual assertions of a prior program of exposition.
\nV:IV. Prov. 18:16 is repeatedly illustrated.
\nV:VI.5. Explanation of Lev. 4:4.
\nV:VII. Contrast of Israel and the nations involves numerous proof texts, but the construction is prior to its verses. The same word is honorable for Israel and disgraceful for the nations.
\nVII:IV. God prefers Israel\u2019s offerings to those of the nations. This is spelled out by a parable, which bears proof texts important to the application of the parable.
\nVII:VI. Whoever boasts is burned + various examples from Scripture, proof texts serving to supply facts for the stated proposition.
\nVIII:II. Proofs that the offering of the princes is as precious as various treasures.
\nVIII:IV. God is careful not to waste Israel\u2019s resources. Various texts supply facts in this connection.
\nIX:VI. Sorts of offerings of children of Noah. The issue at hand is not the exegesis of the cited verses.
\nIX:VII. Thanksgiving offering will go on in the world to come.
\nIX:IX. Various proofs of the greatness of peace.
\nX:V. Prayer averts the evil decree of death, and so does repentence. Various examples, e.g., Cain, Hezekiah, Jeconiah, Aaron. But there is no systematic exegesis of the verses, which supply proofs of propositions framed not for exegetical purposes.
\nX:VI. The garments of the high priest effect atonement, each for a particular sin. Various proof texts link each garment to a distinct sin.
\nX:VIII. Miracles done with anointing oil: long list, with proof texts.
\nX:IX. Instances in which what is less is able to contain what is more. Proof texts are subordinate to, and illustrate, the basic point.
\nXI:I\u2013IV. The various proof texts embedded in this exemplary construction serve only to prove the basic proposition of the construction in which they occur.
\nXI:VII. A catalogue of passages in which certain phrases bear consistent meanings. While the proof texts are integral, they serve to prove a proposition external to themselves.
\nXI:VIII. Various compositions on the theme of the elders of Israel (Lev. 9:1) use proof texts to support propositions.
\nXII:II. Aaron\u2019s sons died to sanctify the name of Heaven, not drunk. This way accepted by Aaron, so he was recognized by the formulation of Lev. 10:8\u20139. Proof texts are secondary to this main point.
\nXII:III. Words of Torah are a crown for the head, etc. + proof texts for each item.
\n[XII:IV\u2013V. These composites on wine drinking are mostly sayings autonomous of proof texts.]
\nXIII:III. The main point throughout these materials is external to the proof texts. That point is consistently expressed throughout.
\nXIII:IV. This miscellany makes its own points, utilizing proof texts along the way.
\nXIII:V. All the prophets foresaw what the pagans would do to Israel + cases and proof texts.
\nXIV:I. The expositions of Ps. 139:5, etc., tend to focus on propositions, for which the verse supplies proof rather than on clause-by-clause interpretations of the verse itself.
\nXIV:VIII. The sex of the male child is determined by the woman, the female by the man + proof texts.
\nXIV:IX. Creation of the fetus in the world to come is different from this world + proof texts.
\nXV:IX. The forms of the skin disease of Lev. 13:2 symbolize Babylonia, Media, Greece, and Rome. The proof texts are secondary to this basic proposition.
\nXVI:VI. Whoever gossips violates the whole Torah + proof.
\nXVI:VII. Gossiper is like a bird.
\nXVI:VIII. A sick people are punished for specific sins.
\nXVI:IX. Once smitten and healed, the leper need not fear recurrence.
\nXVI:IX. Sinners who return to their sin are condemned.
\nXVII:I.1. The proof texts make the point that God is good to the good and deserving.
\nXVII:II. The point is to explain why a house is smitten, which is on account of the owner\u2019s ungenerosity. The proof texts are secondary to the autonomous exposition. But Job 20:28\u201329 is not itself expanded.
\nXVII:III. The disease is on account of ten sins, plus full catalogue and proof texts.
\n[XVII:IV. God punishes property, then person. But the proof texts and their exposition form the center of the construction.]
\nXVII:V. Why the land bears Canaan\u2019s name.
\nXVII:VI. Canaanites had valuables in houses, and the disease caused the Israelites to tear down the houses and find the valuables. Story.
\n[XVIII:II. The exegesis of Hab. 1:7 is not secondary to the sustained point, relevant to Lev. 15:1\u20132, that one\u2019s own body produces the punishment for his sin.]
\nXVIII:IV. Skin disease and discharge punish violation of the Torah. Proof texts are decidedly subordinate.
\nXVIII:V. Comparison of mortal king\u2019s actions and God\u2019s actions. The proof texts are secondary to the proposition.
\nXIX:V.5. \u201cMany days\u201d may be only a few, but they seem many because of anguish. Various examples.
\nXIX:VI. The long account of Jeconiah is primary, the proof texts secondary to the narrative.
\nXX:II. Mourning ruins a day of rejoicing. Various examples. Ps. 75:4 is the main verse, but the exegesis of the verse does not dominate discourse. Rather, there are several examples of the same proposition.
\nXX:III. As above. Qoh. 2:2.
\nXX:V. Titus survived what killed Aaron\u2019s sons, a paradox.
\nXX:VII. Disciple may not teach in his master\u2019s presence.
\nXX:VIII. Four reasons Aaron\u2019s sons died, with proof texts.
\nXX:IX. As above.
\nXX:X. Why Aaron\u2019s sons had not married. They were snooty. Survey of references to their deaths. [Systematic treatment of Num. 3:4 starts here and runs through XX:XI.]
\nXX:XII. Juxtaposition of various stories is explained. Death of righteous produces atonement.
\nXXI:VII\u2013VIII. Meaning of word \u201ctime\u201d at Lev. 16:2. Aaron may enter whenever he wishes, but must wear bells.
\nXXI:X. Why the high priest serves in eight garments.
\nXXI:XI. Lev. 16:3, young bull, ram symbolize merit of ancestors. The proposition is that Aaron comes armed with merit of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and of matriarchs.
\nXXII:V. Sacrifice only in the tent of meeting: how things were done before Lev. 17:3\u20135 was decreed.
\nXXII:VII\u2013VIII. Whether sacrifice outside of the tent of meeting had formerly been prohibited.
\nXXII:IX. Only a prophet could release the prevailing prohibition.
\nXXII:X. Something is at one point forbidden, but compensated by remission at some other.
\nXXIII:X. God rewarded Joseph, Jael, and Palti for avoiding transgression.
\nXXIII:XI. Joseph, David, Boaz resisted sexual desire.
\nXXIII:XII. Adultery and its evils. Various proof texts.
\nXXIII:XIII. Reward of chaste use of eyes.
\nXXIV:I. God\u2019s name is magnified when wicked are judged justly.
\nXXIV:II. God is praised whether he regards someone as guilty or innocent.
\nXXIV:IV. Whatever good God gives will come from Zion + diverse proof texts.
\nXXIV:V. Lev. 19:2 was stated on the occasion of the gathering of the entire assembly. The chapter contains the principles of the Torah as a whole. Ten commandments shown to be present.
\nXXIV:VI. Juxtaposition of Lev. 18 + 19 indicates holiness requires sexual purity.
\nXXIV:VII. Israel must be holy because God is in their midst. Stories and proof texts.
\nXXIV:IX. God is holier than Israel. This is part of a larger propositional construction on the use of \u201conly\u201d as limiting and exclusionary.
\nXXV:II. God will provide for those who carry out religious duties as much as for those who study Torah. Various proof texts and tales.
\nXXV:III. To imitate God, one is to plant a tree.
\nXXV:V. Israel had to replace the manna of the wilderness by planting trees.
\nXXV:VI. Anthology on the theme of circumcision and Abraham.
\nXXVI:I. Scripture uses circumlocutions to avoid unseemly statements.
\nXXVI:II. The evils of slander.
\nXXVI:VI. Lev. 21:1ff. was handed over to Aaron because he was God-fearing.
\n[XXVI:VII. Anthology on Saul and the medium.]
\nXXVI:VIII. When we find \u201cspeaking\u201d stated twice, we must explain the duplication. Various examples.
\nXXVII:II. The basis proposition is primary, the proof texts secondary, so far as I can see.
\n[XXVII:IV\u2013V. The propositions are primary, the exegeses secondary. But the construction as a whole is made up of the intersecting verse and its route back to the base verse.]
\nXXVII:VIII. Why the bull is listed first: to show the golden calf was forgiven.
\nXXVII:XII. = IX:VII.
\nXXVIII:II. Anthology on bringing the sheaf of first grain.
\nXXVIII:III. Proposition not tied to proof text.
\nXXVIII:VI. Rewards for offering the sheaf of first grain.
\nXXIX:I. Adam created, judged, banished all on one day.
\nXXIX:III. Shofar on New Year.
\nXXIX:IX. In Tishri Abraham got God\u2019s oath to redeem his sons.
\nXXIX:X. Binding of Isaac, details of.
\nXXIX:XI. Seven is a favored number.
\nXXX:IX\u2013XII. Traits of lulab are shown to symbolize God, Israel, etc. The proof texts here are secondary to the prevailing thesis.
\nXXX:XIII. Through acts of \u201ctaking,\u201d Israel attains merit.
\nXXX:XIV. Lulab symbolizes human skeleton.
\nXXX:XVI. Merit of Festival brings messiah.
\nXXXI:III. God wants the light Israel provides.
\nXXXI:IV. God rewards kindling the light.
\nXXXI:VII. The light that came from the sanctuary. Proof texts distinctly secondary.
\nXXXI:VIII. God does not really need Israel\u2019s light.
\nXXXI:IX. Polemic against sun worship.
\nXXXI:X. What oil is used.
\nXXXI:XI. Reward for lamp.
\nXXXII:VI. That some are explicitly named is a blessing, for some it is a curse.
\nXXXIV:II. God pays back one who helps the poor. Diverse expressions of this position.
\nXXXIV:VI. Poor is called by seven names.
\nXXXIV:VII. Common speech about charity reflects knowledge of Torah.
\nXXXIV:VIII. Four examples of showing kindness.
\nXXXIV:IX. Miscellanies on poverty are prior to proof texts.
\nXXXIV:X. People who falsely claim to be poor.
\nXXXIV:XI. Reward for helping poor.
\nXXXV:IV. \u201cStatutes\u201d defined through various texts.
\nXXXV:V. As above.
\nXXXV:VI. As above.
\nXXXV:VIII. Three gifts from heaven.
\nXXXV:IX\u2013XII. The right circumstances for rain. Other propositions on rain.
\nXXXVI:I. Various important things are equivalent to one another.
\nXXXVI:III. Ahaz.
\nXXXVI:IV. Jacob anthology, to which exposition of verses is instrumental.
\nXXXVI:VI. How long the merit of the ptriarchs endures.
\nXXXVII:II. Generosity: a story.
\nXXXVII:IV. Releasing vows properly and improperly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:I. (+ opened) Ps. 103:20.
\n[I:II. (+ opened) Hos. 14:7. But there is no base verse.]
\nI:IV. (+ opened) Ps. 89:20.
\nI:V. (+ opened) Prov. 25:7.
\nI:VI. (+ opened) Prov. 20:15.
\nII:I. Jer. 31:20. [But the cited verse is not expounded; it serves as a proof text.]
\nII:II. Here Jer. 31:20 is subjected to further exposition, as a proof text.
\nII:III. Now Jer. 31:20\u2019s concluding clause leads us squarely back to Lev. 1:1. [Henceforward this type of construction is listed without differentiation, as I\u2013III.]
\nIII:I. (+ opened) Qoh. 4:6.
\nIII:II. Ps. 22:23\u201325 is given several applications, ending with Lev. 1:2.
\nIII:III. Is. 55:7 is interpreted to apply to, among other things, the meal offering.
\n[III:VI.3. Ps. 17:14 is interwoven with Lev. 2:3. This does not correspond to the other examples given here.]
\nIV:I. Qoh. 3:16 is subjected to several applications, in which Israel and the Holy Spirit conduct a colloquy. The contact with Lev. 4:1 is minimal.
\nIV:III. Prov. 19:2. Unwitting sin, Lev 4:2, is prevented through knowledge. Here the intersecting verse bears close thematic ties to the base verse, as shown at IV:III.5.
\nV:I\u2013III. Lev. 4:3 and Job 34:29\u201330. The intersecting verse is worked out in diverse ways, only at the end reacting to the base verse.
\n[V:IV. Prov. 18:16 is not an intersecting verse here.]
\nVI:I. Lev. 5:1 and Prov. 24:28. The two verses illuminate one another, dealing with the simple theme of testimony. The aim is to broaden the issue from individual to societal-national dimension.
\nVII:I. Lev. 6:9; Prov. 10:12. Aaron and his sons were forgiven for making the golden calf, because \u201clove covers all offenses.\u201d The intersecting text speaks to the issue of God\u2019s forgiveness then exemplified by Aaron\u2019s priesthood, to which Lev. 6:2 [English: 6:9] refers. Here the intersecting verse does broaden and deepen the meaning of the base verse.
\nVIII:I. Lev. 6:19 and Ps. 75:6.
\nIX:I\u2013III. Lev. 7:11 and Ps. 50:23.
\nX:I. Lev. 8:2 and Ps. 45:7. The anointing oil and Abraham.
\nX:II. Ps. 45:7 and Is. 6:8.
\nX:III. Lev. 8:2 and Ps. 45:7. Aaron now is the focus of the group.
\n[X:IV. Prov. 24:11 and Lev. 8:2. But this composition is not much like the foregoing.]
\nXI:I\u2013IV. Lev. 9:1 and Prov. 9:1\u20136. The unity of the whole is achieved both in form and in thematic proposition.
\n[XI:V. The interweaving of Ps. 18:26\u201327 events in the life of Abraham and Moses is not precisely the construction of intersecting verses catalogued here.]
\nXII:I. Lev. 10:9 and Prov. 23:31\u201332.
\n[XII:II. Lev. 10:9 and Jer. 15:16\u201317. But this is undeveloped.]
\n[XIII:I. Prov. 15:31\u201332 and Lev. 10:13. Death of Aaron\u2019s sons.]
\nXIII:II. [Note that XIII:I continues XII\u2019s theme, so the new parashah opens only at II.] Hab. 3:6; Lev. 11:1\u20132. Here the points made in exegesis of Hab. 3:6 relate in principle, but not in detail, to the point relevant to the food taboos. This is more cogent than usual.
\nXIV:I. Lev. 12:1\u20132; Ps. 139:5. This is more a formal than a substantive intersection.
\nXV:I\u2013III. Lev. 13:1\u20133; Job 28:25\u201327. The intersections at II and III are rather casual. In the former case it is a play on words, and in the latter a pun.
\nXVI:I. Lev. 14:2; Prov. 6:16\u201319. The choice of the intersecting verse is for substantive reasons. The theme is gossip, and the verse chosen speaks of the ill effects of bad use of the tongue. The exposition of the intersecting verse is systematic.
\nXVII:I.2. Lev. 14:33 and Ps. 73:5. The intersecting verse reaches the base verse through a long and circuitous route. There is no close relationship.
\nXVIII:I. Lev. 15:1\u20132 and Qoh. 12:1\u20137. The intersecting verses in no way bear upon the theme of the base verse.
\nXIX:I\u2013III. Lev. 15:25 and Song 5:11. Only at the end does the theme of Torah, read into Song 5:11, return to Lev. 15:25. The intersection seems casual.
\nXIX:IV. Lev. 15:25 and Qoh. 10:18. After three applications of the intersecting verse, the base verse is introduced. This seems more tightly joined than the foregoing. It is uncommon for the base verse to be served by two distinct intersecting verses, each one fully expounded.
\nXX:I. Lev. 16:1 and Qoh. 9:2. This is a credible match, since the message of the intersecting verse is directly pertinent to the base verse.
\nXXI:I\u2013IV. Lev. 16:3 and Ps. 27:1\u20133. Various interpretations, ending with Day of Atonement (= Lev. 16). No connection to that specific theme is indicated prior to its occurrence at the conclusion. But the general theme is salvation.
\nXXI:IV\u2013V. Lev. 16:2 and Prov. 24:6.
\nXXII:I\u2013V. Qoh. 5:8. But there is no clear reversion to the base verse, Lev. 17:3\u20135.
\nXXIII:I\u2013VII. Lev. 18:1\u20133 and Song 2:2. Applied to Rebecca, those who left Egypt, Israel at Sinai, acts of loving-kindness, Israel among nations. The intersecting verse does augment the base verse, pointing out Israel\u2019s distinction from the gentiles.
\nXXIII:VIII. Lev. 18:3 and Ez. 23:2.
\nXXIV:I. Lev. 19:2 and Is. 5:16. But the remainder assembles proof texts for a secondary proposition. Note that Is. 5:16 then plays no role at XXIV:IIff.
\nXXV:I\u2013II. Lev. 19:23\u201325; Prov. 3:18. Torah as tree of life.
\nXXVI:I\u2013III. Lev. 21:1 and Ps. 12:6\u20137. Here the intersecting verse and base verse talk about the same thing, namely, divine speech.
\nXXVII:I. Lev. 22:7; Ps. 36:6\u20137.
\nXXVII:II. Lev. 22:7; Job 41:11.
\nXXVII:III. Lev. 22:7; Ez. 29:16.
\nXXVII:IV\u2013V. Lev. 22:7; Qoh. 3:15.
\nXXVII:VI. Lev. 22:7; Mic. 6:3.
\nXXVII:VII. Lev. 22:7; Is. 41:24.
\nXXVIII:I. Lev. 23:10; Qoh. 1:3.
\nXXIX:I. Lev. 23:24; Ps. 119:89.
\nXXX:I. Lev. 23:39\u201340; Prov. 8:10.
\nXXX:II. Lev. 23:39\u201340; Ps. 16:11. This is a classic example of the genre.
\nXXXI:I. Lev. 24:1\u20132; Ps. 71:19.
\nXXXI:II. Lev. 24:1\u20132; Ps. 119:140.
\nXXXII:I. Lev. 24:10\u201313; Ps. 12:8.
\nXXXIII:I. Lev. 25:14; Prov. 18:21. Acts of speech that injure. The intersecting verse makes the same point as the base verse.
\nXXXIII:II. Lev. 25:14; Amos 7:7\u20138. Shared word.
\nXXXIV:I. Lev. 25:25; Ps. 41:1\u20132. Poverty. I do not see how the further passages conform to the present pattern. Rather, they provide extensive exegeses of the cited verse, not the base verse.
\nXXXV:I. Lev. 26:3; Ps. 119:59.
\nXXXV:II. Lev. 26:3; Prov. 8:32.
\nXXXVI:II. Lev. 26:42; Ps. 80:8\u201310. This parashah does not commence with the construction catalogued here.
\nXXXVI:III. Lev. 26:42; Prov. 11:21.
\nXXXVII:I. Lev. 27:2; Qoh. 5:5.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Arrangement of Types of Paragraphs of Thought: Pattern and Variation<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Having classified the bulk of the paragraphs of thought among three clearly distinguished classifications, each defined by the way in which verses of Scripture are treated, we proceed to ask about the implications of the fact just now established. Let me begin with a claim I regard as overstated. If I were to argue that the possibility of classifying the types of paragraphs of thought served, by itself, to prove that the document as a whole follows rules that we can discern, the reader would readily object because the facts at hand may be explained in more than a single way. And the explanation that resort to a single limited range of types of paragraphs of thought indicates a single plan and program for the document competes with other explanations. For example, one might argue that the sources upon which the framer of the document drew presented him with a number of possibilities. Available to him were diverse, completed paragraphs (a fact that will occupy us in due course). Some had taken shape in one way, some in another. Accordingly, all we prove by classifying the paragraphs of thought is that it is possible to classify the paragraphs of thought. The facts at hand would not validate any further claim that the document as a whole exhibits sufficient consistency to permit us to see it, whole and not only in its parts, as an intelligible and coherent statement.
\nIn order to show that the Leviticus Rabbah in fact conforms to rules governing its formal-redactional character, which is the first, but giant, step to the destination announced at the outset, I have to show something more than that a small number of types of paragraphs of thought dictates the formal-discursive character of the document as a whole. That further fact is simple. The types of paragraphs of thought do not appear thrown about at random. We discern a carefully defined and readily demonstrable plan operative throughout. That a plan governs throughout validates the view that we deal with a single, whole, cogent document. Leviticus Rabbah is not merely a scrap book of paragraphs, not merely an anthology of anthological (or well-composed) paragraphs.
\nTo state the important fact: when a framer of a parashah wished to start his work, he invariably chose one type of paragraphs of thought and only one. When he wished to pursue his idea\u2014that is, the exposition of the paramount theme of the parashah introduced at the outset at hand\u2014he would choose one of the two other types\u2014discursive syllogism or exposition of a verse\u2014and, in sequence, he would then choose the other type. Finally, he would end up with some sort of thematic anthology. Accordingly, every parashah but one commences with the base verse\/intersecting verse construction (whether or not involving the use of \u201cRabbi X commenced discourse by citing the following verse,\u201d a formula of no important formal implications in this book).
\nWhat follows is either the systematic exposition of a single, relevant verse carrying forward and expanding discourse on the theme at hand, or systematic exposition of a proposition, resorting to diverse proof texts, again advancing discussion of the stated established theme. At the end, in the closing paragraphs of thought of a parashah, we find such miscellanies as anthologies on the theme, lacking the unifying power of either a single verse of a paramount critical proposition. In some, parashiyyot exposition of an idea takes precedence over exposition of a verse. But in none does an anthology or miscellany come before the end, nor does a base verse\/intersecting verse composition ever come after the beginning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I
\nII
\nIII
\nParashah
\nBase-Verse\/Intersecting-Verse Construction
\nExegetical Composition
\nSyllogistic Proof Text Composition
\n I
\n I, II, IV, V, VI
\n II, IX, XI\u2013XIV
\n II, VII\u2013XII
\n II
\n I\u2013III
\n VI
\n VI\u2013VII
\n III
\n I\u2013III
\n IV\u2013VI
\n IV\u2013V
\n IV
\n I, III
\n II, VII
\n VI, VIII
\n V
\n I\u2013III
\n II\u2013VI, VIII
\n IV\u2013VII
\n VI
\n I
\n III\u2013VI
\n \u2026
\n VII
\n I
\n II\u2013III, V
\n IV, VI
\n VIII
\n I
\n II
\n II, IV
\n IX
\n I\u2013III
\n V
\n VI\u2013VII, IX
\n X
\n I\u2013III
\n VII, IX
\n V\u2013VI, VIII\u2013IX
\n XI
\n I\u2013IV
\n V
\n [I\u2013IV] VII\u2013VIII
\n XII
\n I\u2013II
\n V
\n II\u2013V
\n XIII
\n I\u2013II
\n V
\n III\u2013V
\n XIV
\n I
\n II\u2013VII
\n [I] VIII\u2013IX
\n XV
\n I
\n V\u2013VII
\n IX
\n XVI
\n I
\n II\u2013V, IX
\n VI\u2013IX
\n XVII
\n I
\n IV, VII
\n I\u2013VI
\n XVIII
\n I
\n II\u2013III
\n IV\u2013V
\n XIX
\n I\u2013IV
\n V
\n V\u2013VI
\n XX
\n I
\n IV, VI, X\u2013XI
\n II, III, V, VII\u2013X, XII
\n XXI
\n I\u2013IV, V\u2013VI
\n IX, XII
\n VII\u2013VIII, X\u2013XI
\n XXII
\n [I\u2013V]
\n VI, X
\n V, VII\u2013X
\n XXIII
\n I\u2013VII
\n VIII\u2013IX
\n X\u2013XIII
\n XXIV
\n I
\n \u2026
\n I\u2013II, IV\u2013VII, IX
\n XXV
\n I\u2013II
\n IV, VII\u2013VIII
\n II\u2013III, V\u2013VI
\n XXVI
\n I\u2013III
\n II, IV\u2013V, VII\u2013VIII
\n I\u2013II, VI\u2013VIII
\n XXVII
\n I\u2013VII
\n IX\u2013XI
\n II, (IV\u2013V), VIII, XII
\n XXVIII
\n I
\n IV
\n II\u2013III, VI
\n XXIX
\n I
\n II, IV\u2013VIII
\n I, III, IX\u2013XI
\n XXX
\n I\u2013II
\n III\u2013XII, XV
\n IX\u2013XIV, XVI
\n XXXI
\n I\u2013II
\n IV\u2013VI
\n III\u2013IV, VII\u2013XI
\n XXXII
\n I
\n II\u2013V, VIII
\n VI
\n XXXIII
\n I\u2013II
\n III\u2013VI
\n \u2026
\n XXXIV
\n I
\n III\u2013VI, XI\u2013XVI
\n II, VI\u2013XI
\n XXXV
\n I\u2013II
\n VII\u2013XII
\n IV\u2013VI, VIII\u2013XII
\n XXXVI
\n II\u2013III
\n VI\u2013V
\n I, III\u2013IV, VI
\n XXXVII
\n I
\n II
\n II, IV<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To substantiate the statement at hand, I compare the relative positions, in a given parashah, of the base verse\/intersecting verse construction, the exegesis of a single-verse composition, and the propositional syllogistic composition. We survey all thirty-seven parashiyyot, following the results of the catalogues of the preceding section. The reader will observe that some paragraphs of thought occur in more than a single classification; this is because these paragraphs include diverse types of subunits.
\nLet us now list those parashiyyot that exhibit regularity in the order in which types of paragraphs of thought occur.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A
\nB
\n Base verse\/intersecting verse, followed by exegetical composition, then syllogistic proposition in which verses serve as proof texts = 16
\n Base verse\/intersecting verse, followed by syllogistic proposition, then exegetical composition = 11
\n II, III, VII, VIII, XI, XIV, XV, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXII, XXIII, XXX, XXXII, XXXIV, XXXVII
\n V, X, XII, XIII, XVII, XIX, XXI, XXV, XXVIII, XXIX, XXXV<\/p>\n\n\n\n
C
\nD
\n Base verse\/intersecting verse, followed by exegetical composition (no syllogistic proposition) = 2
\n Base verse\/intersecting verse, followed by syllogistic proposition (no exegetical composition) = 2
\n VI, XXXIII
\n IX, XXIV<\/p>\n\n\n\n
E
\n Base verse\/intersecting verse and no decisive order thereafter = 8
\n I, IV, XVII, XX, XXVI, XXVII, XXXI, XXXVI<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What we see is a pronounced tendency to order the types of paragraphs of thought. That is, twenty-nine out of thirty-seven (78%) show a clear-cut order, though some instances are slightly flawed. That is the most important result. There is a slight tendency to favor type A (+ C) over type B (+ D), that is, eighteen over thirteen (48% of the whole, 35% of the whole).
\nSince thirty-six of the thirty-seven parashiyyot (97%) begin with a clearly demarcated base-verse\/intersecting-verse construction, that construction defines what is fundamental to the document as a whole. It therefore tells us what the redactors chose as their program of themes. To state matters in terms introduced in Chapter 1, the topos of the document is consistently defined by the theme of the base verse\/intersecting verse. In due course we shall ask whether not only the theme but the proposition concerning that theme emerges from that same construction. To signal the answer in advance\u2014it surely does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unclassified Paragraphs of Thought<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To assess the value of the system of classification worked out above, we have to review the few paragraphs of thought that do not fall within its categories (here and in the following unit). In no parashah do we find the primary message carried by the items listed here. In none do items outside of the proposed exegetical classification scheme constitute even a sizable proportion of the whole.
\nBy definition, what follows is a catalogue of paragraphs of thought (or major components thereof) that are essentially nonexegetical. That is to say, the exegesis of Scripture, the use of verses of Scripture for proof texts, and the construction of large-scale discourse based upon constant recourse to verses of Scripture do not characterize these items. The first list simply compiles those entire paragraphs of thought that do not take shape around the recourse to verses of Scripture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Exposition of a Story or a Principle Without Substantial Recourse to Proof Texts<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IV:VI. Apart from the base verse, Lev. 4:1, this statement is a simple declarative sentence.
\nV:VIII. Several stories illustrate the right and wrong ways to ask for a favor.
\nVI:II. A story is told to illustrate Prov. 29:24, and another to illustrate Lev. 5:1. The stories unfold without proof texts.
\nVI:III.2. Story about how one should not take an oath even about what he believes to be true.
\nVII:III. When people study laws of sacrifice, it is as if they kept them. Two statements of the same view.
\nXII:IV. Sayings on wine, vine, wine drinking. Few proof texts.
\nXII:V. Same as above.
\nXXI:VIII. Story on not entering a home without warning.
\nXXIV:III. Story about friendly shade.
\nXXV:V. Story about Hadrian and the old man who planted a tree.
\nXXVIII:II. Most of the anthology on the sheaf of first fruits ignores proof texts.
\nXXVIII:V. How the sheaf is waved.
\nXXIX:VII. The same object has three names.
\nXXIX:XII. Exposition of M. R.H. 4:1.
\nXXXII:VII. Anthology on mamzers.
\nXXXIII:I. Tabi and Gamaliel story.
\nXXXIV:III. Stories about Hillel.
\nXXXIV:XII. Story about Simeon b. Yohai.
\nXXXIV:XVI. Story of Tarfon and Aqiba.
\nXXXV:VII.2. Keeping and doing and studying the Torah.
\nXXXVII:II. Story about generosity and niggardliness.
\nXXXVII:III. Gamaliel story.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To analyze the exact character of the items just listed, we move to a further stage of differentiation. Specifically, we ask, what are the sorts of completed units of thought that will omit all reference (or all considerable reference) to Scripture? I now list the subunits of paragraphs of thought, those that bear Arabic numerals after the Roman numerals in the translation that follows.
\nTo dismiss two items at the outset, there is only one syllogistic statement of a proposition that is fairly autonomous of exegetical materials, at IV:IV.1, \u201cTen things serve the soul.\u201d This is shared with a prior document. There also is only one utterly nonexegetical anthology, XVI:VII.2, on the causes of death, also shared with another earlier document.
\nWhen, by contrast, we compose a list of extended tales\u2014stories about people, tales about exemplary events\u2014that lack substantial reference to verses of Scripture, the list is respectable in size. It includes many entries shared with other, earlier documents but some distinctive to Leviticus Rabbah. (See section on \u201cThe Formation of Leviticus Rabbah,\u201d as to whether that fact matters for our analysis of Leviticus Rabbah.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Extended Stories Lacking Important Exegetical Components<\/p>\n\n\n\n
III:V.2. Agrippa\u2019s offerings and those of the poor man.
\nIII:V.3. The ox that did not wish to be slaughtered.
\nIII:V.4. Priest ridicules poor woman\u2019s offering.
\nV:I.5. Asmodeus.
\nV:IV.2. Abba Yudan.
\nV:VI.4. Butcher in Sepphoris.
\nV:VIII.1. Woman who knows how to borrow things.
\nVI:II.1. Governor of Caesarea.
\nVI:III.2. Woman who took an oath.
\nVIII:I.2. Making matches.
\nIX:III.1. Yannai and the honorable ignoramus.
\nIX:IX.7. Meir and the accused wife.
\nX:IV.1. Antonius and Rabbi.
\nXII:I.3, 7. Stories of drunkards.
\nXIII:V.12. Alexander of Macedon.
\nXVI:VIII.3. Antoninus and Rabbi.
\nXVIII:I.8. Hadrian and Joshua.
\nXVIII:I.10. Simeon b. Halputa on old age.
\nXIX:IV.5. Tabitha and Gamaliel.
\nXIX:VI.2. Nebuchadnezzar and Jehoiakim. [Proof texts clearly secondary here.]
\nXX:II.1. Story of groom\u2019s death.
\nXX:VI.2. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus: disciple not to teach before his master.
\nXX:XI.3. Qimhit\u2019s sons as high priests.
\nXXI:III.1. Hananiah b. Hakhinai and Simeon b. Yoha\u00ef.
\nXXI:XII.3. Simeon the Righteous.
\nXXII:III.2. Death of Titus.
\nXXII:IV.2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Phineas, Yannai, Eleazar, etc., re animals doing God\u2019s will. Stories.
\nXXIII:IV.2. Eleazer Hisma.
\nXXIV:III.1. Story of good spirit at the town well.
\nXXV:V.2. Hadrian and the old man.
\nXXVII:I.8. Alexander of Macedonia and the King of Kasia.
\nXXVIII:II.6. Bar Qappara and Simeon, Rabbi\u2019s son.
\nXXX:I.4. Yohanan and his estate.
\nXXXII:VII.2. Story about Babylonian mamzer.
\nXXXIII:I.2. Gamaliel and Tabi.
\nXXXIV:I.2. Jonah and the poor man.
\nXXXIV:III.1. Hillel (2\u00d7).
\nXXXIV:V. Tanhum bar Hiyya and the poor.
\nXXXIV:X.2. Yohanan Simeon b. Laqish, and the poor man.
\nXXXIV:XII. Simeon b. Yohai and his nephews.
\nXXXIV:XIV.4. Yose the Galilean and his ex-wife.
\nXXXIV:XIV.5. Tanhum prays for rain.
\nXXXIV:XVI.1. Tarfon, Aqiba, and supporting Torah students.
\nXXXIV:XVI.5. Pious man on the Sabbath.
\nXXXIV:XVI.7. Simeon b. Yohai and his mother.
\nXXXV:X.2. Rain in Alexandria\u2019s time.
\nXXXVII:II.1. Story of miracles done for generous man.
\nXXXVII:III.1. Gamaliel en route to Akhzib.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fact is that, where Leviticus Rabbah presents materials of an essentially other-than-exegetical character, they involve only one kind of composition, and that is a tale or a story. That type of composition demands analysis in its own terms but not for our purposes. For what we see is a genre of rabbinic composition not linked to a particular mode of expression, the exegetical, that is characteristic of the document at hand. It also is not particular to the exegetical procedures applied in the Talmuds to the Mishnah, as I have shown at some length elsewhere (in my Talmud of the Land of Israel, volume 35, Introduction: Taxonomy). Exactly where and how these stories were made up we do not now know. We may be certain that they were not composed with the particular interests of Leviticus Rabbah in mind, since a fair number of these stories make appearances, pretty much in the wording before us, in other rabbinic documents, from Tosefta onward. Among the genres of the documents in the rabbinic canon, none serves only or mainly to compile stories about rabbis and other exemplary figures, on the one side. None composes such stories into sustained statements about their heroes or about the values of the rabbinic movement, on the other. So we have neither a gospel of a rabbi nor a storybook of tales about rabbis that express rabbinic beliefs. We cannot stop here and speculate about why that should be the case. We observe the simple fact that, like many other documents of the rabbinic canon, Leviticus Rabbah contains a number of stories that stand entirely outside of its otherwise paramount rules of composition and expression.
\nThe important point should not be missed. Stories and tales of various kinds at no point define a topic of discourse. They never form a fundamental element in the exposition of such a topic. They always provide mere illustration of an established proposition, critical to the redactional logic at hand. Sometimes exactly what tales illustrate does not emerge clearly.
\nSo the use of stories and tales turns out to be markedly secondary to the realization of the purposes of the framers of Leviticus Rabbah. They draw on stories sometimes, it seems, for filler, but at other points with considerable effect. But they do not resort to the use of narratives of any kind when they wish to establish a program of argument or even define a theme for sustained discussion. We shall now see that the other sort of narrative\u2014the parable\u2014serves in exactly the same essentially peripheral and subordinate role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parables in Leviticus Rabbah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Smaller in size and in number than stories, parables with some frequency appear in our document. They never fill up so much as a complete unit of discourse (an Arabic-numeral passage), all the more so an entire paragraph of thought. They normally serve the subordinate purpose of illustration rather than the definitive one of exposition of a major topic. So they cannot be regarded as building blocks in the document as a whole. Rather they decorate and illustrate a point. But the main point of a passage that resorts to a parable emerges through either syllogistic discourse, appealing to parables and also to exegeses of proof texts, or, somewhat less commonly, through sustained exegesis of a verse or group of contiguous verses. In this regard the parables at hand differ from those familiar from the Gospels, which tend on their own to bear the burden of the message. The fact is that some of the parables at hand serve to prove more than a single point, or, more precisely, illustrate more than a single proposition. Others do not make any single point at all. Once more, we begin with a rather general list of large items. We then proceed to differentiate in a more refined way. We start with parables that play a major role in a given paragraph of thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parables (Selected List)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:VII. God called = invited Moses. King\u2019s architect put king\u2019s name everywhere, so king invited architect into the palace. Thus Lev. 1:1.
\nI:VIII.2\u20133. God called Moses, so singling him out like a king who pays attention to one courtier among many.
\nI:X. The tent of meeting is the point at which the people became liable. Comparable to the public reading of a royal decree.
\nI:XIII.4. God speaks to Israel by day, nations by night, as king walks with his wife by day, his concubine by night.
\nII:IV. God is close to Israel because Israel cleaves to God, as a king gives orders for special care for the garments closest to his heart.
\nII:V. God is like a solicitous king, giving instructions about his son.
\nIV:V. Comparisons of soul and body and why they share guilt.
\nIV:VI. One sins but all suffer: like sheep, like people in a boat.
\nV:VIII. The three stories are not labeled parables but in fact serve as such.
\nIX:IV. The priority of the thanksgiving offering is explained through a parable of a king and his tenant farmers.
\nIX:VIII. Parable about how, by watching one\u2019s step, one avoids king\u2019s thugs.
\nXI:VII. Various king parables to illustrate exegetical propositions.
\nXII:IV. The parable of the king\u2019s preference and how he shows it tells us how God shows he prefers the burnt offering.
\nXIV:XIII. Parables to explain opposites, why each gender parent creates the opposite gender child.
\nXV:IV. Parable to explain that nations but not Israel suffer from the skin disease.
\nXIX:II. Parables to compare the fool and the wise person, vis-\u00e0-vis learning Torah patiently.
\nXXII:IV\u2013V. Parables re \u201crose among thorns.\u201d
\nXXIII:VII. Israel not to be like Egypt or Canaan: parable of king\u2019s daughter.
\nXXIV:VII. Parable about sanctification of Israel.
\nXXIV:VIII. Parables about how if a task is harder, the reward is greater.
\nXXV:I. Torah compared to amulet.
\nXXVI:I. Mortal king dies, but God as king is reliable.
\nXXVI:V. Physician prescribes more medicine for the weaker patient.
\nXXVII:X. King decrees people see the queen before they see him.
\nXXX:VI. One who uses stolen lulab compared to mugger who robs a government official.
\nXXX:VII. Parable on king\u2019s forgiveness.
\nXXXI:IV. Parables to explain why Scripture states explicitly why Moses did not enter the land.
\nXXXIII:III. Parables on which sin is worst.
\nXXXV:III. God keeps his own decrees. Parable comparing king to God.
\nXXXV:V. Torah and impulse to do evil are like a rock. Parable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We now differentiate among the parables, both those of a sizable dimension as well as brief allusions. Among all of the parables I am able to catalogue, the following bear the main point of the passage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Syllogistic Parables, External to Contextual Discourse, Sustained Stories That Make Their Own Point<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IV:V.2.3. Soul and body compared to blind lame guards; two wives.
\nIX:IV:1. Priority of thanksgiving offering explained. This point is distinct from exegesis of a given verse and illustrates the virtue of doing what is not required.
\nXXX:VI.2. Parable to illustrate point that one cannot do a religious duty by committing a transgression. The point is blatant in the parable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The foregoing list is brief indeed. What follows is a list of those parables that are contextual. That is, they are integral to the discourse of which they form a part, because they illustrate the point of an exegetical composition or of a syllogistic one. In these instances, therefore, the parable serves much as does a proof text.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Contextual Parables
\n I:VIII.1.
\n I:VIII.1\u20133.
\n I:X.1.
\n I:XIII.4.
\n I:XIV.2.
\n II:IV.1.(2\u00d7)
\n II:V.1, 2.
\n IV:VI.2.
\n IV:VI.2.
\n V:VI.3.
\n V:VI.5.
\n V:VIII.1.
\n VII:IV.2.
\n IX:VIII.1.
\n X:III.3.
\n XI:VII.4, 5, 6.
\n XII:V.1.
\n XIII:II.3, 4.
\n XVIII:I.11.
\n XVIII:I.14.
\n XX:X.6.
\n XXIII:VII.2.
\n XXIV:XII.4.
\n XXIV:VII.1 = II.IV.1.
\n XXIV:VIII.1, 2.
\n XXV:I.2.
\n XXV:VII.2.
\n XXVI:I.1.
\n XXVI:V.1.
\n XXVII:VI.3, 4, 5.
\n XXVII:VIII.1.
\n XXVII:X.3.
\n XXX:VII.1.
\n XXXI:II.1.
\n XXXI:IV.5, 6.
\n XXXI:VII.2.
\n XXXI:X.2.
\n XXXIII:III.2.(2\u00d7).
\n XXXV:III.1.
\n XXXV:V.1.
\n XXXVI:I.1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We see that where parables are used, it usually is in much the same way that scriptural verses serve, namely, as proof texts or as other forms of illustration for the main pont at hand. So in Leviticus Rabbah the parable is a species of proof text, nothing more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Paragraphs of Thought Shared with Earlier Compositions or Compilations of the Rabbinic Canon<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The final analytical exercise returns us to the question of how to determine the status of materials shared by Leviticus Rabbah with some other, earlier document in the rabbinic canon. We rapidly survey the facts of the matter, then interpret their meaning for the particular inquiry at hand.
\nIn his introductory volume, Midrash Wayyikra Rabbah, vol. 5, Introduction, Supplements and Indices (Jerusalem, 1960), IX\u2013XXVI, M. Margulies provides a thorough account of the relationship of materials in this composition to other documents in the larger setting of the rabbinical exegetical compilations that contain those same materials. He points out that when Genesis Rabbah and Leviticus Rabbah share materials, some of these are rearranged to suit the purposes of the framers of the latter, while, in most other aspects, the materials are pretty much identical. A later compilation, Pesiqta de Rab Kahana, stands still closer to our composition, with the former drawing heavily upon the latter. Five entire parashiyyot of Leviticus Rabbah (XX, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX) occur verbatim in the later collection. Margulies, however, sees the two documents as \u201ctwins\u201d and does not discern important distinctions between them. He further surveys still later compilations and compositions, reviewing the points in common between Leviticus Rabbah and successive exegetical documents, as well as scholarly opinion.
\nOf greater interest here, he places great emphasis on the question of points in common between the earlier exegetical collections, including Leviticus Rabbah, and the Talmud of the Land of Israel. Margulies persuasively argues that no evidence requires us to assign priority in the formation and composition of shared materials to the framers of the Yerushalmi. We cannot regard the Yerushalmi as the source for the materials now occuring also in our composition. Rather, he argues, both the framers of Leviticus Rabbah and those of the Talmud of the Land of Israel drew upon a common core of materials (p. xxi), which were being framed at pretty much the same time in the decades prior to the closure of both documents. I believe that, as in so many other ways, Margulies\u2019s judgment must define the state of the question.
\nTo what Margulies tells us I can add only some minor points. First of all, where a type of paragraph appears both here and elsewhere, if it does not share the prevailing formal preferences of the framers of Genesis Rabbah and Leviticus Rabbah, we can show easily that it does conform to the style selected by the framers of some other document\u2014the Mishnah, Tosefta, Sifra, or the two Sifres. We therefore are on firm ground in assigning authorship of that paragraph to the framers of that other document. Then we cannot say that it expresses, to begin with, the viewpoint of the authors of Leviticus Rabbah at its very beginning stages, but it probably does so later on.
\nSecond, the Talmud of the Land of Israel shares with Leviticus Rabbah a number of important passages, some of them even nearly of the dimensions of a paragraph of thought. Some of these shared units clearly originate in circles preparing materials for the Talmud of the Land of Israel. They pursue its larger interests and follow its established modes of expression and arrangement. In such cases exegesis of verses takes a subordinate role beneath analytical questions, even dialectical argument. These passages are not many. In others, for example, those which state a proposition and work out proof texts from a variety of biblical books, one may make a perfectly credible case that the passage at hand serves the interest of the Talmud of the Land of Israel at least as well as it does those of Leviticus Rabbah or vice versa. In those cases I cannot claim that the passages at hand have been made up with our composition in mind.
\nIn order to find out the extent to which our document makes use of materials that occur also in some other, earlier document, we proceed with a very brief probe. We deal only with the first three parashiyyot in order to see how important a proportion of Leviticus Rabbah derives from materials not distinctive to that composition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mishnah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
III:I.4. M. Abot 4:17. Cited verbatim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Tosefta<\/p>\n\n\n\n
No citations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sifra<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:XI.2. = Sifra Debura dinedabah 2:10. Attributed to Hiyya and clearly primary to Sifra.
\nIII:VI.1. = Sifra Nedabah 9:10. Exegesis of a phrase in Lev. 2:1\u20132.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sifre Num. and Deut.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:II.4. Sifre Deut. 6; 28. Based on Deut. 3:25, thus primary to Sifre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Genesis Rabbah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:XIII.1. Gen. R. 52:5.
\nI:XIII.4. Gen. R. 74:7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Talmud of the Land of Israel<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:VIII.1. Y. Ber. 4:3. Does not refer to Lev. 1:1ff. The paragraph is propositional and in no way particular to this setting.
\nIII:II.2. Y. Meg. 1:10. Allusion not spelled out. Therefore primary to the Yerushalmi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This brief probe turns out to provide rather paltry evidence. The upshot is very simple. While one may readily cross-reference our text with other, earlier ones, in fact few entire paragraphs of thought, and not a single complete parashah, is shared with some other, prior document. Quite to the contrary, a random survey of the first three parashiyyot yields two simple facts. One is that the use of materials from other compositions, except for Genesis Rabbah, is episodic and brief. The volume of what is shared with other documents is slight. The place of the shared materials in the larger constructions of Leviticus Rabbah proves to be trivial.
\nThe second fact, indicated at the outset, is that the materials from other collections, again excepting Genesis Rabbah, invariably exhibit traits of formulation and expression primary to those other documents and decidedly secondary to this one. Where the Mishnah, Tosefta, Sifra, or the two Sifres do contribute to Leviticus Rabbah, we find no difficulty in picking out the formulary and redactional characteristics particular to those other collections and, except for the passage used in Leviticus Rabbah, not commonplace, or not used at all, in Leviticus Rabbah. A citation of a passage of the Mishnah and of Tosefta always stands out, for example, because it lacks an exegetical dimension. But where we find a statement that occurs, also, in Sifra or one of the two Sifres (usually: Sifre Deut.), it usually conducts that word-by-word exegesis that otherwise in the present composition proves very rare indeed. I take this to mean that the redactors\u2014wherever and whenever they flourished\u2014made use of bits and pieces of the other documents in the construction of their paragraphs of thought. The completed work\u2014the paragraphs of discourse\u2014then came into the hands of the framers of our document.
\nGenesis Rabbah presents a different set of facts. Here we do find fairly sizable passages that occur, verbatim or nearly so, in both Genesis Rabbah and Leviticus Rabbah. Where we do find such shared materials, we may readily assign to one or the other of the two collections the principal and primary venue. Where, for instance, a figure from Genesis is at the heart of matters, a sustained discussion\u2014for example, Abraham, Noah, Joseph, or Jacob\u2014we may suppose that the framer of Genesis Rabbah\u2019s paragraphs of thought made up the passage. It was then borrowed, whole and complete, by the final redactor of Leviticus Rabbah. Where the contrary is the case, for instance, a paragraph of thought focuses upon a passage of Leviticus that, in addition, somehow relates to an interest in Genesis, there the original point of origination will have been among framers of paragraphs of thought for Leviticus Rabbah. Overall, the former sort of material predominates. But here too the volume of shared materials is not great. As Margulies shows, Leviticus Rabbah contributed materials to numerous later compilations and compositions, beginning with the two Pesiqtas. But the later history of the materials that make their first appearance in the work at hand produces nothing of consequence for our study.
\nThe more interesting question is what we learn from the use of materials original to some earlier compilation, or shared with some contemporary one, about the larger logical and topical program of Leviticus Rabbah. Specifically, what do we know, that we otherwise would not know, in particular about Leviticus Rabbah, from the fact that a passage in a given construction first appeared in the Mishnah, Tosefta, or other prior compositions, or nearly simultaneously. Apart from the advantage gained by several versions of the wording of essentially the same passage, which permits us to compare wordings of a passage common to the several works, I perceive no important fact for our study. If we seek a thesis on the underlying logic of the document\u2014what holds it together, its viewpoint and statement upon its own day\u2014then knowledge that prior materials served the purposes of the framer at best proves interesting. What we learn is that the framer selected a few available passages. That yields an important fact, but one that we knew before, namely, that the redactors made choices. Therefore what they did signifies the presence of topos and logos, to revert to the original formulation. So the well-known habit of borrowing sayings and stories and compositions from earlier texts testifies to the basic proposition of this book, that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes a composition, not merely a compilation. But what was chosen from other places now takes its natural place in what was made up for the purposes of Leviticus Rabbah alone. The whole is what matters, not the origin of some of the parts.
\nThese observations bear a consequence for the classification of the components of the rabbinic writings in ancient times. When we classify the materials out of which a given composition or compilation is constructed, we have to distinguish units of thought composed for that document in particular from those that serve a number of documents in general. The former exhibit the formulary and redactional traits particular to the document in which they occur. The latter, of course, do not. What occurs in an already-redacted document will be cited pretty much verbatim, with little substantial revision; the Mishnah\u2019s paragraphs occurring in any later document show that fact.
\nWhen we wish to speculate about the formulation of the components of the ancient rabbinic collections as a whole, therefore, we must do so in two distinct exercises. In the one we focus upon a single document and the constituents of that document that do not appear elsewhere. If these same distinctive constituents also exhibit uniform formulary and redactional traits, we may propose that it was for use in the document at hand that they were written down in the form in which we now have them. The formative period of that document then defines the age to which those stories and sayings testify. In the other, we study units of thought that circulated among a number of compilations. We are able to see what changes these units exhibit as they pass from here to there, how a given redactional process for one document involved changes or did not impose revision. Since, by definition, it was not for use in any one document that the shared passages were written down, we may be considerably less certain about the period to which these materials originally testify. But they give us fairly substantial information on redactors\u2019 processes of revision\u2014and the severe limitations within which they went on. My best guess is that the shared materials will be of a particular type or group of types. I should single out those materials for which a distinctive redactional vehicle did not exist\u2014whether (1) law essays, grouped in the Talmuds, or (2) exegetical essays, shared between the Talmuds and the constructions of exegeses; or (3) exegetical compositions on single topics, distinctive to exegetical constructions. These materials, with a home nowhere, equally well served compilers everywhere. So far as I can observe, stories about persons, either specific or exemplary, fall into the present category. Further work on categorization of types of materials that float and those that remain anchored, of course, will refine these speculations, which have carried us far afield. We return to the main point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Formation of Leviticus Rabbah: Indeterminate and Determinate Stages<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the surface, Leviticus Rabbah yields ample evidence of having reached its present condition through what was at least a two-stage process of formulation. By this I mean that numerous units of the parashiyyot were made up and reached closure before they were included in their present place in the final composition. When I speak of a two-stage process, of course, I compress what must have been one of many layers. Before proceeding to point to stages we can, and cannot, identify and differentiate, let me spell out the kinds of data we perceive even with the naked eye.
\nBefore we proceed, an important qualification is in order. Every construction of base verse\/intersecting verse exhibits exactly the same trait. The exegesis of the intersecting verse is extensive and detailed; it runs on utterly autonomous of the base verse. Only in the final exegetical exercise on the intersecting verse will the base verse make its appearance. An important distinction therefore is in order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Passages Which Give Evidence of a Two- (or More) Stage Process of Formation<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:I. Lev. 1:1 and Ps. 103:20. Ps. 103:20 speaks of this-worldly creatures. Prophets are called messengers. Ps. 103:20 speaks of Israel. Ps. 103:20 speaks of Moses. Only at I:I.6 do we revert to Lev. 1:1. The intervening units speak of Ps. 103:20 alone. Only by adding No. 6 do we regain access to Lev. 1:1.
\nI:II. This unit is complete without reference to Lev. 1:1.
\nI:IV. The intersecting verse, Ps. 89:20, is systematically applied to Abraham, David, Moses. The basic idea is that God spoke to all three in both speech and vision. But, at I:IV.5, Moses alone is specified as receiving speech, in line with Lev. 1:1. This contradicts the exegesis of Ps. 89:20 and hence was added to join to the base verse the available intersecting verse and its exegesis.
\nI:V. Prov. 25:7 is read to speak of Moses\u2019 humility. No. 1 of the construction is a potpourri of materials on humility. No. 2 reads Prov. 25:7 solely in terms of Moses. No. 1 can have been assembled independent of Lev. 1:1. No. 2 needs Prov. 25:7 in the context of Lev. 1:1.
\nI:VI. As above, No. 1 explains the intersecting verse without reference to the base verse, then No. 2 systematically reads the former in line with the latter.
\nII:I. Lev. 1:2 + Jer. 31:20. The intersecting verse serves as a proof text for the basic notion that Israel, among ten things, is precious to God. But there is no clear return to Jer. 31:20, so it does not support an elaborate construction. Formally, however, the sequence of Lev. 1:2 and Jer. 31:20 demands classification here.
\nII:II. Jer 31:20 is expounded, still as one proof text in a sequence, now of thirteen items.
\nII:III. Jer. 31:20 is further expounded. This now leads right to Lev. 1:1. The bulk of the materials does not.
\nII:IV, V. The parables make a general point, not distinctive to Lev. 1:1\u20132, which does not occur at II:IV\u2013V at all.
\nII:VI. A whole series of verses makes a single point, among them Lev. 1:2. The construction does not focus on Lev. 1:2.
\nIII:I. Qoh. 4:6 is given a sequence of systematic exegeses. Only the last one interacts with Lev. 1:2. The others in no way repeat the point made in regard to Lev. 1:2.
\nIII:II. Ps. 22:23\u201325 is treated as above.
\nIII:III. Is. 55:7, as above.
\nIII:V. We have a set of completed materials, all on one theme, but complete in themselves.
\nIII:VI. As above.
\nIV:I. The exegesis of Qoh 3:16 scarcely touches Lev. 4:1. The work on Qoh 3:16 is thematically unrelated to Lev. 4:1.
\nV:I\u2013III. The work on Job 34:29\u201330 ignores the base verse.
\nV:III. There can be no doubt that the sustained exegesis of Amos 6:1\u20137, Nos. 2\u20139, was complete and inserted whole, since it interrupts the flow from V:III. 1 to V:III. 10.
\nV:IV. Prov. 18:16 is the focus, and insertion at Lev. 4:3 is an afterthought.
\nV:V. The sustained exegesis of Is. 22:15\u201319 was complete prior to its use as an illustration of Lev. 4:3.
\nV:VI. The illustrative materials are assembled and inserted without alteration.
\nV:VIII. The entire construction makes its own point and is only tangentially relevant to Lev. 4\u2019s interest in unwitting sin.
\nVII:I. The exegesis of Prov. 10:12 is woven through Ex. 20:9. No reference to Lev. 6:2 is relevant. No. 2 then reads the intersecting verse in this other connection.
\nVII:III. The extensive amplification of Job 1:4\u20135 has nothing to do with Lev. 6:2. The entire composition was completed prior to insertion here.
\nVIII:II. The composition on Samson is linked to Lev. 6:19 by a single trivial observation.
\nVIII:III. The entire construction is realized without dealing with Lev. 6:13\u201319.
\nIX:I. Surely this construction aims at Gen. 15:1, not Lev. 8:2, except as it is set in a new context.
\nIX:III. The long story about Yannai is inserted whole and is unrelated to its context, except that it cites the prevalent proof text.
\nIX:VI. The entire construction is indifferent to Lev. 7:11\u201312.
\nIX:IX. The composition on peace was made up of available passages. In no way was it put together to highlight Lev. 7:11\u201312, 37, except for placing at the penultimate position (prior to the messianic finis) reference to those verses.
\nX:V. A large construction, with its own interests, is inserted because of a concluding unit relevant to the redactors\u2019 purpose.
\nX:VI. The whole serves a Mishnah passage. It is included only because it mentions a priestly garment listed at Lev. 8:1\u20133.
\nXI:I\u2013IV. Each interpretation of Prov. 9:1\u20136 is an independent construction.
\nXI:V\u2013VI. Most of this construction is totally irrelevant, but it was complete and so inserted whole on account of the portion that does belong.
\nXI:VII. This enormous construction makes its own point and was inserted whole.
\nXII:I. The application of Prov. 23:31\u201332 to various cases is autonomous of the setting. All the redactor contributes is the order, ending with Aaron and his sons.
\nXII:IV, V. These anthologies on wine are composites.
\n[XIII:II. The several exegeses of Hab. 3:6 are irrelevant to Lev. 11:1\u20132. Only at the end does the composite make contact with its present setting. But the entire set expresses a single overall principle, so, as I explained, it does not belong on this list.]
\n[XIII:V. The exegesis of Gen. 2:10ff.; 15:12ff., etc., is totally autonomous of its setting, interwoven with various proof texts. But the entire structure consists of matching elements, with the climactic one very much relevant to this setting.]
\nXIV:II. The exegesis of Job 36:3 is joined to Lev. 12:1ff. only artificially and as an afterthought.
\nXIV:II\u2013VI. All of these compositions on verses in Job are forced into the context of Lev. 12:1ff. through a tacked-on subscription.
\nXIV:VII\u2013IX. The anthologies are made up of completed units, which are strung together because of a general theme.
\nXV:I\u2013III. The exegesis of Job 28:25\u201327 is forced into relationship with Lev. 13:2. There is no natural connection.
\nXV:IV.2. The long passage of Y. Shab. 16:1 is inserted whole, merely to accompany Ps. 32:10, used as a proof text at No. 1. There is no redactional interest in Lev. 13:2 on the part of the framer of the entire complex.
\nXV:VI. The set was assembled on its own before inclusion here. Its principle of aggregation extends beyond the case of Lev. 13:2.
\nXVI:II\u2013V. The exegeses of the several cited verses are worked out in their own terms and not generated by the definitive theme of the gossip.
\nXVI:VIII. The proposition is prior to the proof texts and only casually intersects with the present passage. The principle is shared.
\nXVII:I. The exegesis of Ps. 73:5 at Nos. 2\u20137 was joined to the propositional construction at No. 1 prior to inclusion of the whole at Lev. 14:33. There is no reason for Nos. 1\u20132 to be here at all, and little enough for No. 3.
\nXVII:IV. The exposition of Job 1:14\u201316 is completely autonomous of its setting.
\nXVIII:I. Qoh. 12:1\u20137 is worked out in its own terms. There is no substantive link to Lev. 15:1. The exegesis deals with old age.
\nXIX:I\u2013III. As usual, the exegesis of the intersecting verse, Song 5:11, is fully exposed before the base verse is reached. At some points the intersecting verse relates in theme to the base verse. Here it does not.
\nXIX:V. The exegesis of Is. 35:4 is the centerpiece. The secondary exposition of 2 Chron. 15:3 leads to a generalization on a clause, \u201cmany days.\u201d As an illustration of the generalization, Lev. 15:25 is adduced in evidence. So the entire mass is introduced.
\nXX:XII. The materials are rearranged to suit the present setting.
\n[XXI:I\u2013IV. These several comments on intersecting verses do appear to be aimed at the base verse, in form and in theme.]
\nXXI:V[\u2013VI]. The phrase-by-phrase exegesis of Prov. 6:17\u201319 is autonomous of its setting but fits very well.
\nXXI:VIII. Story completely irrelevant to the context.
\nXXII:I\u2013IV. The work on Qoh. 5:8 never reverts to the base verse. Numerous elements are autonomous, e.g., XXII:III.2 and IV\u2019s stories.
\nXXII:VII\u2013X. Works out its own interests on the theme of how what is prohibited is balanced by what is permitted.
\nXXIII:II. The secondary expansion was complete before the whole was included here, since No. 3 is entirely irrelevant.
\nXXIV:I. 1.C\u2013L is framed independent of 1.A\u2013B and inserted to amplify its point. It is separate from the intersecting base verse construction.
\nXXIV:III\u2013IV. The exegeses attached to Ps. 20:2 were in place before association of the whole with Lev. 19:2, which is tacked on at the end.
\nXXIV:VIII\u2013IX. This set was framed for purposes autonomous of Lev. 19:2\u2019s exposition.
\nXXV:VI. The anthology on circumcision is composed of ready-made materials.
\nXXV:VIII. The composition on Saul is inserted whole.
\nXXVI:II. The exegesis of Ps. 57:4 is inserted whole.
\nXXVI:VII. The exposition of 1 Sam. 28:7ff. is inserted whole. In no way does it augment the discussion of the base verse.
\nXXVI:VII.3. This whole set is interpolated as well.
\nXXVI:VIII.2. Secondary exposition of Ez. 10:7 impedes the basic exposition.
\nXXVII:I. It is difficult to see that Lev. 22:26\u201327 makes any mark on the vast repertoire devoted to Ps. 36:6\u20137. Much of the material clearly was in order before its association with Ps. 36:6\u20137, all the more so with Lev. 22:26\u201327.
\nXXVII:IV. Job 5:5 was fully expounded without detailed attention to Lev. 23:10.
\nXXIX:II. The work on Jer. 30:10\u201311 was complete before inclusion here was made possible by the introduction of Lev. 23:23\u201324.
\nXXX:III. The exegesis of Ps. 17\u201318 is complete before insertion here.
\nXXXI:II, V, VI. The exegesis of the cited verses was complete before the connection to the present context was established.
\nXXXII:VIII. The exegesis of Zech. 4:3 was completed before the whole construction was inserted here. No. 2 is totally irrelevant.
\nXXXIII:II. The exegesis of Amos 7:7\u20138 surely is separate from its linkage to Lev. 25:14.
\nXXXIV:I. The intersecting verse is fully expounded. Its contact with the base verse is solely in the shared theme.
\nXXXIV:II\u2013XVI. All of these compositions are linked to Lev. 25:5 only by the appended subscript. Certainly the exposition of Is. 58:7\u201314 can have been accomplished without Lev. 25:5 in mind (!).
\nXXXVI:I. The work was complete prior to insertion, since Lev. 26:42 appears only as a tangential proof text
\nXXXVI.III. The discourse on Ahaz is interpolated.
\nXXXVII.II. The aggregation around Job 34:11 is prior to inclusion here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From this rapid survey of details, let us turn forthwith to the main point. The work of creating Leviticus Rabbah divides into two stages, one indeterminate, the other final and conclusive. Let me define the latter first of all.
\nWe know as fact that at some point (we assume ca. 400\u2013450) the document reached closure. Accordingly, some group of people bears responsibility for the arrangement and ordering of the materials of the document. As I have shown, those people followed rules. It follows that, whether they did their work on one afternoon or in fifty years, the work accorded with a clear-cut program of redaction and selection. (1) Given types of paragraphs of thought always appear in one position in the formation and redaction of a parashah. (2) Given types of paragraphs of thought predominate among the materials chosen for inclusion to begin with, and at least some of these types were worked out with Leviticus Rabbah in mind. (3) Finally, some of the actual paragraphs of thought were made up for the purposes of this, and no other, composition.
\nAll of this work of selection, formation, and redaction, marked the final, determinate stage. In that stage the final framers of our composition selected or made up materials, and they also ordered them in the way in which we now know them. Since we know that they made use of sentences and brief paragraphs in the Mishnah, Tosefta, Sifra, two Sifres, and Genesis Rabbah, we may demonstrate that the ultimate process of selection ranged widely over accessible rabbinic writings from before the period at hand. Since, moreover, some important compositions are shared with the Talmud of the Land of Israel, we may further postulate (4) that the process of selection worked its way through compositions\u2014paragraphs of thought, for Leviticus Rabbah, units of discourse for the Talmud of the Land of Israel\u2014that people even at the time were writing or constructing. More important, large tracts of Leviticus Rabbah belong only to that collection.
\nShall we identify the redactors of the final document with the authors of those passages? We cannot be certain. While the ultimate compositors also may have served as the prior authors of individual paragraphs of thought, the preceding catalogue provides ample reason to postulate at least two stages in the formation of Leviticus Rabbah. The former was that indeterminate stage in which\u2014by whom, where, when, we do not know\u2014diverse paragraphs of thought were written up, some in one setting, some in another. The latter, as is clear, was that final and determinate stage at which the available materials were chosen and arranged in the final work of redaction and closure.
\nWe cannot leave without further analyzing the question of that indeterminate stage of formulation, formation, and composition. For it is during that presently indefinable stage that much of the material at hand was worked out. While a single set of rules may have governed the making up of the redactionally definitive set of materials (the base-verse\/intersecting-verse composition), diverse rules, not all of them accessible, governed the creation of the bulk of what we now have. We know that because we cannot define a set of rules that explain how the rest of the types of paragraphs of thought were made up. That is the case of anthologies\u2014by definition. But it also is so for the speculative syllogistic propositions, on the one side, and the systematic exegeses of a given verse in various other terms, on the other. In the latter type of paragraph of thought, we do see patterns. But where we see rules, they do not apply to our document alone.
\nAccordingly, we do not know the history of the formation of the several paragraphs of thought. We take for granted the process was diverse, with some passages emerging from one sort of formative setting and hand, and other passages from a different one. Once we recognize that a determinate and final process of redaction stands behind the document as we know it, however, we do have a right to see the document as a whole. Obviously, Leviticus Rabbah states the tastes and judgments of those who carried out that process: this is what they chose, this is how they arranged their selections. But what of the materials that they used? These speak for diverse groups, at any number of places, in a range of times.
\nWe know that Mishnah closed at circa A.D. 200, and the other documents of which the final redactors made use reached closure still later. But that fact is trivial. Why? The bulk of the materials at hand come from the hands of people who did not write for Leviticus Rabbah in particular. The catalogues just now reviewed tells us that they did not. Much of the material used in the composition at hand hardly serves the book of Leviticus at all. It must be deemed a fact, therefore, that, in the wide ranges of the rabbinical estate of the Land of Israel, various people worked out framing their ideas in various ways, some as exegeses of Scripture, others as topical-logical exercises, and still others as propositional syllogistic essays richly embellished with proof texts. We cannot say where or when the work was done. It may be assumed to have filled the bulk of the two centuries at hand from the closure of the Mishnah to the redaction of Leviticus Rabbah, not to mention to the Talmud of the Land of Israel. (Nor may we take for granted that nothing in Sifra and the two Sifres goes back to the period before circa A.D. 200.) Because of these facts we have to declare indeterminate the boundaries of the processes of the formation of the paragraphs of thought now located in Leviticus Rabbah. Specific and clear lines mark out the range of ultimate redaction, meaning (1) the composition of some materials, (2) the selection of some materials, (3) the closure and arrangement of all materials. A fair guess places that determinate process in the half century before ultimate closure, that is to say, fifty years before circa A.D. 400\u2013450. But I suppose that, if people really worked hard, they could have done it all in two days.
\nHaving distinguished the two stages, we have now to ask what difference it makes. It is to permit us to identify those who speak through Leviticus Rabbah, as well as their approximate age. The message is carried by the end product. That alone tells us what the ultimate framers chose to say to us and how they chose to present it. Theirs is a creativity comparable to that of the artists who create through collage, arranging bits and pieces of this and that to make a remarkably coherent composition. True, the ultimate authors did not make up everything (though I see no reason to deny that they made up some things). But they did choose and they did arrange everything. So the whole carries their message. The parts that they chose speak also for other times and other places. True, we do not know when, or where, or for whom. But, for the analysis of Leviticus Rabbah in its context, for the discovery of its logic, its topical program, its message in its age, that information in any event proves useless. The upshot is that when we speak of Leviticus Rabbah, we address the whole of it. But we do not make much of the parts, except as part of the whole. The onion leaves matter only when they form the onion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Voice of Leviticus Rabbah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What facts have I discovered? Let me now review the whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
3<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Plan of Leviticus Rabbah (2) The Topical Program<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Outline of the Contents of Leviticus Rabbah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We begin with a simple outline of the contents of the document, on the basis of which the remainder of this chapter and the rest of the chapters take shape. The purpose of the outline is to lay out the topics presented in the parashiyyot and to specify the main ideas about those topics that are expressed in the several paragraphs of thought of which the parashiyyot are constructed. In presenting this outline I mean to state the question of this chapter. It is, Does Leviticus Rabbah, seen as a whole, make a coherent statement? Does it deal with a particular group of topics, and does it lay down, on these topics, a judgment that we can identify and specify? The upshot of the outline at hand may be stated very simply. Just as Leviticus Rabbah exhibits traits of formal and redactional order, so that we may say it does follow a logic of form, so also it exhibits substantive cogency. It talks about some few things. It makes polemical points on these selected topics. We can discern these main theorems. Accordingly, the outline lays the groundwork for the analysis at hand. It does so by establishing at the outset that the search for logic, including topical logic, rests upon a solid foundation in fact. The outline states that fact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah One. Lev. 1:1. Topic: The greatness of Moses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I.I. Lev. 1:1; Ps. 103:20: Moses as Messenger.
\nI:II. Lev. 1:1; Hos. 14:7. The righteous proselyte.
\nI:III. Moses had ten names.
\nI:IV. God spoke to Abraham, David, and Moses in speech and in vision, but in speech only to Moses.
\nI:V. Moses was humble and God had repeatedly to single him out.
\nI:VI. Moses\u2019 contribution to the altar was greater than anyone else\u2019s. It was delivery of God\u2019s instructions.
\nI:VII. Moses put God\u2019s name all over the tabernacle, so God called him into it. (+ I:VIII.1.)
\nI:VIII.2\u20133. God singled out Moses by calling to him.
\nI:IX. God called many, but called and spoke with Moses in particular.
\nI:X. Israel became liable to the Torah only when it was repeated in the tent of meeting.
\nI:XI. The nations should have known how valuable was the tent of meeting.
\nI:XII. After the tent was set up, the nations lost the gift of prophecy. Balaam no exception.
\nI:XIII. Comparison of Balaam and Moses. [Note: I:X\u2013XII are joined to and set the stage for I:XIII. I:X\u2013XIII should be regarded as a single purposeful construction.]
\nI:XIV. Comparison of Moses and all prophets. Thus: returning to the theme of the opening unit, Moses as singular.
\nI:XIV.2. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Two. Lev. 1:1\u20132. Topic: The children of Israel are precious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
II:I. Ten are precious, including Israel.
\nII:II. Israel, among thirteen other things, will never be moved.
\nII:III. God\u2019s speech is with Israel.
\nII:IV. Israel is singled out because they cleave to God. That is why they are spoken to.
\nII:V. God gives instructions to Israel as a mark of concern.
\nII:VI. Scripture paid honor to Israel.
\nII:VI. \u201cWhen a man brings an offering\u201d is so phrased as to honor Israel. Scripture chooses its words to show respect to Israel.
\nII:VII. Adam\u2019s offering (a man, so Lev. 1:2) is in the model of the first man\u2019s offering. Must belong to the sacrificer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Three. Lev. 2:1\u20132. Topic: A modest offering suffices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
III:I. God prefers a modest meal offering, which expiates sin, to an expensive incense offering, which does not.
\nIII:II. The offering of a poor man is accepted, as much as his prayer.
\nIII:III. The meal offering atones for sin through what in fact belongs to God. Expensive sacrifices do no better.
\nIII:IV. What is stolen cannot be offered up. Relevant to Lev. 1:16\u201317, not to 1:2, except by indirection. But the polemic is consistent with what has gone before.
\nIII:V. A bird produces a bad smell, but it is accepted on the altar so that a poor man can make an offering.
\nIII:VI. Priests must show respect to the poor person\u2019s offering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Four. Lev. 4:1\u20132. Topic: Sin done by the soul is what causes Israel\u2019s condition. Collective responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IV:I. The paradox of wickedness in the place of justice is explained as a result of Israel\u2019s sin. The issue is double jeopardy for the sinner. This is justified.
\nIV:II. Everything was created for the soul, but it sins. The soul is never satisfied.
\nIV:III. Unwitting sin can be avoided through foreknowledge.
\nIV:IV. The soul is exalted, yet sins.
\nIV:V. The soul is punished for its guilt, even inadvertent. It is equally guilty with the body.
\nIV:VI. Collective responsibility for the individual\u2019s sin.
\n[IV:VII. Materials on use of the word soul. Not relevant in any specific way.]
\n[IV:VIII. As above, soul sayings.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Five. Lev. 4:3. Topic: Sin of the anointed priest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
V:I\u2013III. The ordinary Israelite and the high priest are equal. That is the main point, but along the way there are others. The main one is that God may give prosperity to the wicked, but in the end he exacts punishment.
\n[V:IV. The gift of a donor makes a place for him. The relevance to Lev. 4 is in the reference to the sacrifices of the high priest, community, and ruler. The main point is not relevant to Lev. 4 but to Prov. 18:16.]
\nV:V. The anointed priest who sinned (Lev. 4:3) is illustrated by Shebna.
\nV:VI. Lev. 4:3\u20134 systematically explained.
\n[V:VII. Play on the words \u201clay hands\u201d = sustain. No particular relevance to Lev. 4:13\u201315, the base verse, which serves only as a proof text. Basic point is contrast of Israel and the nations. What is a compliment to Israel becomes a humiliation of the nations.]
\n[V:VIII. You have to know how to get on the good side of God. Tangentially, unwitting sins are mentioned (Ps. 19:13)\u2014the point of contact with Lev. 4. This again is a flimsy connection.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Six. Lev. 5:1. Topic: Oaths and testimony.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
VI:I. One is obligated to give honest testimony when called upon. Israel once bore witness and then reneged. This second proposition reads the first in a completely new dimension.
\nVI:II. The fence is guiltier than the thief. The post facto accomplice, who does not testify (contrary to Lev. 5:1), bears guilt too.
\nVI:III. Exposition of Zech. 5:1\u20134, on false oaths.
\nVI:IV. Lev. 5:1 applied to accused wife\u2019s oath, Num. 5:21.
\nVI:V. Lev. 5:1 applied to Israel\u2019s oath at Sinai. The archetypal oath is Israel\u2019s to God.
\n[VI:VI. Continues a minor allusion at VI:V to Is. 8:18\u201319.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Seven. Lev. 6:2 [RSV:6:9]. Topic: Aaron and his sons and the burnt offering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XII:I. Prov. 10:12 says love covers all offenses, thus even that of Aaron and the golden calf. God loves and forgives Israel.
\nVII:II. The burnt offering and the offering of the broken heart. When Israel repents, God will restore the sacrifices.
\nVII:III. A burnt offering is brought on account of what stirs up the heart to sin + Job. (When people study the laws of sacrifice, it is as if they kept them.)
\nVII:IV. God prefers the burnt offering of Israel to that of Noah (= the nations).
\nVII:V. The altar on which the burnt offering is burned itself burned.
\n[VII:VI. Whoever is boastful is punished by fire (as the burnt offering is burned). But the discourse contrasts the nations arrogance with Israel\u2019s humility. The burnt offering does not appear. \u201cFine\u201d is the sole connection. The messianic finis also ignores the cult.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Eight. Lev. 6:13 [RSV:6:19]. Topic: The offering of Aaron on the day on which the priest is anointed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
VIII:I. With the \u201cthis\u201d of \u201cThis is the offering\u201d God raised up Aaron, Ps. 75:6.
\nVIII:II. There is a paradox that the one who eats the sacrifices offers a sacrifice. The bulk deals with Samson.
\nVIII:III. The offering of the princes and the offering of Aaron compared.
\nVIII:IV. The tenth ephah of fine flour is integral to the consecration of Aaron and his sons.
\nVIII:V. God is concerned not to waste Israel\u2019s resources. The disposition of the inexpensive meal offering is one example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Nine. Lev. 7:11\u201312, 37. Topic: The thanksgiving offering and other offerings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IX:I. Peace offering brought as an act of thanksgiving (re Lev. 7:12).
\nIX:II. Various interpretations of Ps. 50:23: thanksgiving offerings in ordinary life.
\n[IX:III. Further comment on Ps. 50:23 leads to inclusion of a long, irrelevant story in which Ps. 50:23 is cited.]
\nIX:IV. Priority of the thanksgiving offering, because it is totally gratuitous.
\nIX:V. Bringing a guilt or sin offering is no honor, but thanksgiving offering is, in line with Prov. 14:9.
\n[IX:VI. Theme of various offerings, including peace offerings. No close tie to this context.]
\nIX:VII. The thanksgiving offering will continue in the age to come.
\nIX:VIII. If Israel watches their step, they will not have to bring the penalty offerings.
\nIX:IX. Long exercise on peace in general. Ends with Lev. 7:37: peace offerings are the climax. Messianic conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Ten. Lev. 8:2. Topic: Anointing of Aaron.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
X:I. The anointing oil. This construction serves Gen. 15:1, Abraham.
\nX:II. Lev. 8:2 is referred to Isaiah, Is. 6:8, etc.
\nX:III. Lev. 8:2 and Ps. 45:7 now refer to Aaron.
\nX:IV. Two of Aaron\u2019s sons survived and were anointed, so Lev. 8:2, and two died. [But most of this passage is irrelevant to that thesis.]
\nX:V. Why two sons survived, which is through prayer and repentance.
\nX:VI. Just as sacrifice effects atonement, so the garment of Lev. 8:2 effects atonement.
\n[X:VII. David and Goliath. Continues a minor allusion of X:VI.]
\nX:VIII. Miracles done with the anointing oil.
\nX:IX. Lev. 8:2: The bull of the sin offering and the two rams. [But the bulk of this passage is irrelevant to that detail and makes its own point.] Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Eleven. Lev. 9:1. Topic: The consecration of Aaron as high priest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XI:I. Lev. 9:1 and Prov. 9:1\u20136. The creation of the world.
\nXI:II. Prov. 9:1\u20136 and the rebuilding of the Temple.
\nXI:III. Prov. 9:1\u20136 and the Torah.
\nXI:IV. Prov. 9:1\u20136 and the tent of meeting. The point of the whole is to run through the themes of creation, destruction, and restoration of the cult.
\nXI:V\u2013VI. After showing Ps. 18:26\u201327 to speak of Abraham, Moses, the framer proceeds to Moses\u2019 relation to the high priesthood. He had been equal to Aaron, but in the end God selected Aaron and consecrated him. [XI:V is irrelevant and traveled with the complex of XI:VI.]
\nXI:VII. Any passage beginning, as does Lev. 9:1, \u201cand it came to pass,\u201d relates to misfortune. Among the catalogued items is Lev. 9:1, for on that day Nahab and Abihu died, Lev. 16:1.
\nXI:VIII\u2013IX. Lev. 9:1\u2019s reference to the elders of Israel justifies including an anthology on that theme. VIII ends with the allusion to God\u2019s participating in court, and XI:IX has God lead the dance in the age to come. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twelve. Lev. 10:9. Topic: Wine drinking and the death of Aaron\u2019s sons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XII:I. Lev. 10:9 and Prov. 23:31\u201332. The theme of the base and the intersecting verses is the same. The application to Israelite history ends with Aaron and his sons. The sons of Aaron who died, Lev. 10:2, did so because they were drunk in the tent of meeting, Lev. 10:8\u20139.
\nXII:II. Lev. 10:9 and Jer. 15:16\u201317. The death of Aaron\u2019s sons was to sanctify the name of Heaven.
\nXII:III. Death of Aaron\u2019s sons incidental to No. 1 of this construction. No. 2 again stresses the special regard shown by Scripture to Aaron and his sons.
\nXII:IV. Sayings on wine drinking.
\nXII:V. Sayings and stories on wine drinking. Ends with death of Aaron\u2019s sons for coming drunk to the Sanctuary. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirteen (I). Lev. 10:12 and Prov. 15:31\u201332. This continues the theme of the foregoing, the death of Aaron\u2019s sons. The new theme commences at XIII:II.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirteen (II ff.). Lev. 11:1\u20132. Topic: Food rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XIII:II. Lev. 11:1\u20132; Hab. 3:6. Israel is subject to food restrictions, the nations are not. Why this is so.
\nXIII:III. In the world to come, food restrictions will be null.
\nXIII:IV\u2013V. Relationship of food taboos and Israel\u2019s fate among the nations. While this point is subordinate to the apocalyptic-historical picture, the construction is unitary and integral. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Fourteen. Lev. 12:1ff. Topic: The creation of a human being. Florilegium of verses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XIV:I. Lev. 12:1\u20132; Ps. 139:5. People had best be humble, because the creation of the human being came at the end of the process of creation. The intersecting verse contributes the theme but no illumination of the base verse (and vice versa).
\nXIV:II. Job 36:3. The relevant point is that God as Creator of the human being is to be praised.
\nXIV:III. Job 10:12. [The connection to Lev. 12:1ff. is forced and purely formal.]
\nXIV:IV. Job 38:8\u201311. [As above.]
\nXIV:V. Ps. 51:5. [As above.]
\nXIV:VI. Ps. 139:3.
\nXIV:VII. Qoh. 11:2 and Lev. 12:3. The \u201ceight\u201d in both verses is linked.
\nXIV:VIII. The sex of the male child derives from the woman, the female from the man. Various materials on male, female fetus. No link to Lev. 12:1\u20132.
\nXIV:IX. Further anthology on creation of the foetus. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Fifteen. Lev. 13:1\u20133. Topic: The skin disease and its signification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XV:I\u2013III. Lev. 13:1\u20133 and Job 28:25\u201327. The base verse is reached at II and III. The skin disease is a mark of punishment for sin or the absence of merit.
\nXV:IV. The skin disease punishes gentiles, not Israelites.
\nXV:V. Relationship of Lev. 12:2 and 13:2. A woman who does not take precautions for menstrual uncleanness produces a baby sick with the skin disease.
\nXV:VI. Relationship of Lev. 12:8 to Lev. 13:2. Failure to carry out the former leads to the punishment of the latter.
\n[XV:VII. Deut. 25:13\u201314. Completely irrelevant to Lev. 13:2. Perhaps tied to XV:VI before the whole was inserted.]
\nXV:VIII. How priests examine the skin disease. [No exegesis to speak of. Borrowed from Sifra M. Neg. 2:5.]
\nXV:IX. The forms of the skin disease stand for Babylonia, Media, Greece, Rome. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Sixteen. Lev. 14:2. Topic: The sin of the leper, gossip.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XVI:I. Lev. 14:2 and Prov. 6:16\u201319. Bad effects of gossip. Gossipers are smitten with leprosy.
\nXVI:II. Verses referring to lips, etc., now cited. Prov. 31:12. Formulaic subscript.
\nXVI:III. Job 20:6\u20137. The skin disease produces a stink. Formulaic subscript.
\nXVI:IV. Ps. 50:16\u201318. Formulaic subscript.
\nXVI:V. Qoh. 5:5. As above. Gossip is only one kind of sin committed through speech.
\nXVI:VI. Gossiper violates the whole Torah.
\nXVI:VII. Birds chirp, so symbolize the gossip, and Lev. 14:4.
\nXVI:VIII. People cause their own ailments through their sins.
\nXVI:IX. Purification rite: interpretation of details. The sinner should not revert to his sin. The healing of the leper. Is. 57:17\u201319.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Seventeen. Lev. 14:33\u201334. Topic: Sins that bring the disease.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XVII:I. God favors those who merit it. The relevant proposition for Lev. 14:33 is at the very end. Israel alone suffers the skin disease.
\nXVII:II. The disease afflicts a house because the owner is not generous. + Formulaic subscript.
\nXVII:III. The disease comes for ten reasons, i.e., sins.
\nXVII:IV. God punishes the sinner\u2019s property, then his person. Various examples conclude with the affliction of the house, then the person.
\nXVII:V. If Israel sins, the land is cursed, just as it was on account of Canaan. Formulaic subscript.
\nXVII:VI. Disease forced tearing down house and discovery of hidden treasure there.
\nXVII:VII. Exposition of Lev. 14:34 in terms of the destruction of the Temple. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Eighteen. Lev. 15:1\u20132. Topic: The discharge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XVIII:I. Lev. 15:1\u20132 and Qoh. 12:1\u20137. Old age carries punishment for sin. In youth the punishment is the discharge. [This point is minor in the vast exegesis of Qoh. 12:1\u20137.] Formulaic subscript.
\nXVIII:II. Punishment for sin comes out of one\u2019s own body, as with the discharge.
\nXVIII:III. On the occasion on which Israel received the Torah, they sinned, so at that very moment they became subject to the discharge. Formulaic subscript.
\nXVIII:IV. The skin disease and discharge came upon Israel only after they violated the Torah. Chief sin is gossip.
\nXVIII:V. How the decrees of God are like those of a king, with application to the skin disease and the discharge. But while a king wounds with a scalpel and heals with a salve, God heals with that with which he wounds. The discharge is healed from the sufferer\u2019s own body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Nineteen. Lev. 15:25. Topic: A woman\u2019s discharge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XIX:I\u2013III. Lev. 15:25 and Song 5:11. The rules of the male and female are stated separately, so as to dwell on the matter of the discharge.
\nXIX:IV. Discharge comes about because of failure to observe menstrual taboo. Lev. 15:25 and Qoh. 10:18.
\nXIX:V. \u201cMany days\u201d are few but anguished. The point applies, also, to Lev. 15:25.
\nXIX:VI. Who carried out the religious duty of observing flux uncleanness? Jeconiah. Observing the taboo will bring the Messiah. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty. Lev. 16:1. Topic: Death of Aaron\u2019s sons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XX:I. Lev. 16:1 and Qoh. 9:2. The good and the evil die in exactly the same way.
\nXX:II. Aaron\u2019s rejoicing at his consecration turned to mourning at the death of his sons on the same day. Ps. 75:4 is the basic verse treated here.
\nXX:III. As above. Qoh. 2:2.
\nXX:IV. Job 38:27\u201329 applied to the high priesthood, ending with Lev. 16:1\u20132.
\nXX:V. Job 37:1. Paradox that sons of Aaron died in inner sanctum, while Titus survived.
\nXX:VI. Prov. 17:26. Why Aaron\u2019s sons died. Their sin was teaching in the presence of their master.
\nXX:VII. Continuation of foregoing.
\nXX:VIII. Why Aaron\u2019s sons died: because of drawing near the holy place, offering strange fire, and not taking counsel with one another.
\nXX:IX. Continuation of same topic.
\nXX:X. Aaron\u2019s sons did not marry out of snootiness. Other sins they committed.
\nXX:XI. Num. 3:4. Exegesis of its elements.
\nXX:XII. Death of sons of Aaron achieved atonement for Israel as much as Day of Atonement did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-One. Lev. 16:3. Topic: Aaron\u2019s atonement on Day of Atonement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXI:I. Lev. 16:3 and Ps. 27:1. The exegesis of Ps. 27:1\u20133 pertains to salvation at the sea.
\nXXI:II. Ps. 27:1\u20133 and the victory over the Philistines.
\nXXI:III. Ps. 27:1\u20133 and the victory over Amalek.
\nXXI:IV. Ps. 27:1\u20133 and New Year, Day of Atonement. Base verse now occurs.
\nXXI:V\u2013VI. Lev. 16:2 and Prov. 24:6. Prov. 6:17\u201319 is given a phrase-by-phrase interpretation along the way, but the main point is the intersection of Prov. 24:6 and Lev. 16:2. The former speaks of the high priest on the Day of Atonement, to which the latter refers. Then the reference to \u201cthis\u201d of Lev. 16:2 is joined to various other allusions to \u201cthis\u201d in connection with merit, so \u201cwith this\u201d tells us the merit of the high priest on the Day of Atonement. The unity of XXI:V\u2013VI is substantive, not merely formal.
\nXXI:VII. Moses comforted Aaron when his sons died. He may come into inner sanctum whenever he wishes, but must do so properly, with bells.
\nXXI:VIII. Priest wears bells when he goes into inner sanctum. Story entirely irrelevant to the larger composition.
\nXXI:IX. \u201cWith this\u201d means Aaron will live 410 years. History of cult.
\n[XXI:X. Why the high priest serves in eight garments. Not relevant to Lev. 16:3. Should go after XXI:XI.]
\nXXI:XI. Meaning of young bull and ram of Lev. 16:3: merit of patriarchs and matriarchs.
\nXXI:XII. Lev. 16:4: garments and their meaning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-Two. Lev. 17:3\u20135. Topic: Sacrifice in the cult to yield meat for everyday use.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[XXII:I\u2013IV. Qoh. 5:8. Fine interpretations of the notion that nothing is superfluous. No point of return to Lev. 17:3\u20135.]
\nXXII:V. Sacrifice only in the tent of meeting, as at Lev. 17:3.
\nXXII:VI. Is. 66:3 is explained to mean that people treat sacrifice as more important than it is.
\nXXII:VII. Lev. 17:3\u20135 permits what had been generally prohibited, or vice versa.
\nXXII:VIII. Allowing sacrifice any time prevented sinning.
\nXXII:IX. A prophet alone could allow what had been permitted.
\nXXII:X. Ps. 146:7. What is forbidden is compensated by what is permitted. No point of contact with Lev. 17:3\u20135. But the sequence, XXII:VII\u2013X, clearly forms a simple essay on the shift represented by Lev. 17:3\u20135. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-Three. Lev. 18:1\u20133. Topic: Not imitating the sexual sins of the nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXIII:I\u2013VII. Lev. 18:1\u20133 and Song 2:2. Various applications of the symbol of \u201ca rose among thorns.\u201d Pertinent to the base verse is Israel among the nations, to which several of the exegeses of Song 2:2 apply the verse.
\nXXIII:VII. Lev. 18:3 and Ez. 23:2. Israel is not to imitate either Egypt or Canaan.
\n[XXIII:VIII. Job 37:21. Not relevant.]
\nXXIII:IX. The Lord is truly God when Israel does not imitate Egypt or Canaan, particularly their sexual practices. Joseph, Joel, Palti are models.
\nXXIII:X. God rewarded Joseph, Joel, and Palti for avoiding sexual misconduct (continues foregoing).
\nXXIII:XI. Joseph, David, and Boaz resisted sexual desire.
\nXXIII:XII. Job 24:15: Even committing adultery with the eyes is an act of adultery. This is no longer particular to Lev. 18:1\u20133.
\nXXIII:XIII. He who is modest with his eyes will see God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-Four. Lev. 19:9. Topic: Israel\u2019s and God\u2019s holiness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXIV:I. Lev. 19:2; Is. 5:16. God is shown holy through righteousness.
\nXXIV:II. Ps. 92:8\u20139. God is praised whatever his decision. When he elevates the priest, king, and nation, it is forever.
\nXXIV:III. Ps. 20:2: God sends help from the sanctuary. Story marginally relevant to that verse.
\nXXIV:IV. Ps. 20:2 expounded. Whatever God gives comes from Zion.
\nXXIV:V. Lev. 19:2 was stated on the occasion of the gathering of the entire assembly. The chapter encompasses the basic principles of the Torah.
\nXXIV:VI. Holiness requires sexual purity, which is why Lev. 18 and 19 are juxtaposed.
\nXXIV:VII. The sanctification of Israel is so that God will remain in Israel\u2019s midst.
\nXXIV:VIII. Israel has to make special efforts to be holy, but gets a special reward. This explains why Lev. 19:2; 20:7 refer to Israel\u2019s being holy.
\nXXIV:IX. God\u2019s level of holiness is higher than Israel\u2019s. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-Five. Lev. 19:23\u201325. Topic: Planting trees in accord with the Torah (circumcision).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXV:I. Torah as tree of life. Lev. 19:23\u201325; Prov. 3:18. Even those who merely support disciples of Torah gain merit.
\nXXV:II. Same point as above.
\nXXV:III Imitation of God includes the planting of trees.
\nXXV:IV. God did what he promised to the patriarchs, including the provision of trees in the land + Qoh. 2:24.
\nXXV:V. God provided for Israel in the wilderness, but they had to plant their own trees in the land.
\nXXV:VI. Abraham\u2019s interpretation of Lev. 19:23. Stories about Abraham, circumcision.
\nXXV:VII. Various verses that refer to circumcision.
\nXXV:VIII. Lessons of the juxtaposition of Lev. 19:23 and Lev. 19:20\u201322; 19:26 about lying with a slave girl. Connection of these two verses is to link sexual or dietary misconduct to the matter at hand. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-Six. Lev. 21:1. Topic: God\u2019s speech (\u201cSpeak to the Priests\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXVI:I. Lev. 21:1 and Ps. 12:6\u20137. Purity of divine speech.
\nXXVI:II. Exegesis of Ps. 12:7 in terms of disciples of Torah in David\u2019s time and how they fell in war. The evils of slander.
\nXXVI:III. Two passages that Moses gave in writing are about purity in line with Ps. 12:6.
\nXXVI:IV. Ps. 19:3. The speech of the heavens.
\nXXVI:V. God speaks only once to heavens but twice to mortals.
\nXXVI:VI. Because Aaron was God-fearing, Lev. 21:1ff. was handed over to him.
\nXXVI:VII. Lev. 20:27; 21:1, re those who consult dead, which priests cannot do. Story of Saul and witch of Endor.
\nXXVI:VIII. Lev. 21:1 twice refers to speaking. This requires exposition. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-Seven. Lev. 22:27. Topic: Sacrifice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXVII:I. Lev. 22:7; Ps. 36:6\u20137. God\u2019s judgment is just, for both man and beast.
\nXXVII:II. Job 41:11; Lev. 22:27. One can make an offering only by God\u2019s grace. One should do his religious duties even before he is obligated to do so.
\nXXVII:III. Lev. 22:7; Ez. 29:16. Sacrifice atones for the sin of the golden calf.
\nXXVII:IV\u2013V. Qoh. 3:15; Lev. 22:7. God favors pursued over pursuer. That explains choice of beasts at Lev. 22:7. [But several other propositions on the intersecting verse are introduced, and to these the base verse is irrelevant.]
\nXXVII:VI. Mic. 6:3; Lev. 22:7. God asks only for beasts that are conveniently available to Israel.
\nXXVII:VII. Is. 41:24; Lev. 22:7. The very abomination of the golden calf is turned into what Israel is to sacrifice.
\nXXVII:VIII. Why does the bull come first at Lev. 22:27? To show God forgave Israel for the golden calf.
\nXXVII:IX. The bull for Abraham, sheep for Isaac, goat for Jacob.
\nXXVII:X. Why the offspring stays with the dam for seven days.
\nXXVII:XI. Lev. 22:28. Why one cannot slaughter her and her young on one day. An example of God\u2019s mercy. This is expressed through Prov. 12:10. Messianic finis.
\n[XXVII:XII. The thanksgiving sacrifice will continue in the age to come. Repeated from IX:VII and should be deleted.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-Eight. Lev. 23:10. Topic: The sheaf of first fruits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXVIII:I. Lev. 23:10; Qoh. 1:3. The sole true gain comes from labor in the Torah.
\nXXVIII:II. How the sheaf is gathered and presented.
\nXXVIII:III. God gives much and asks little.
\nXXVIII:IV. Job 5:5 applied to Abraham, Moses, Sihon and Og, Canaanites, Sisera, Sennacherib, Haman. God has thus fed Israel the harvest of the kingdoms and asks only the sheaf of first fruits. The sheaf secures the land.
\nXXVIII:V. How you wave the sheaf (Lev. 23:11).
\nXXVIII:VI. The religious duty at hand brings various rewards and blessings, e.g., inheriting the land. The main point is that keeping this commandment will save Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Twenty-Nine. Lev. 23:24. Topic: The New Year and judgment. The shofar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXIX:I. Lev. 23:24; Ps. 119:89. Creation and God\u2019s mercy.
\nXXIX:II. Jer. 30:10\u201311 expounded in terms of Jacob\u2019s life.
\nXXIX:III. Ps. 47:5. Shofar statement.
\nXXIX:IV. Ps. 89:16. Shofar statement.
\nXXIX:V. Prov. 15:24.
\nXXIX:VI. Ps. 81:4. Shofar verse.
\nXXIX:VII. Is. 48:17. Divine judgment. The merit of the patriarchs.
\nXXIX:VIII. Ps. 62:9. Divine judgment.
\nXXIX:VIII.B. Religious duties of Tishri.
\nXXIX:IX. Seventh month commemorates the binding of Isaac, on which account God forgives Israel\u2019s sins.
\nXXIX:X. Same theme as above. Shofar will redeem children of Abraham.
\nXXIX:XI. Seven is favored number.
\nXXIX:XII. Exposition of M. R.H. 4:1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirty. Lev. 23:40. Topic: The Festival (Tabernacles).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXX:I. Lev. 23:39\u201340; Prov. 8:10. The passage works out the intersection of Prov. 8:10 and Is. 55:2 and stresses the theme of study of Torah and its rewards. The contact between Lev. 23:39 and Prov. 8:10 is in the common use of the word \u201ctake.\u201d This entire passage, therefore, cannot serve as a thematic exposition in topical context.
\nXXX:II. Lev. 23:39\u201340; Ps. 16:11. The various religious duties connected with the Festival. This is a better opening.
\n[XXX:III. Ps. 102:17\u201318 is systematically expounded, mostly with reference to prayer. The link to Lev. 23:40\u2014taking the lulab\u2014is an afterthought.]
\nXXX:IV. Ps. 96:12\u201313. Reference to trees invokes boughs of leafy trees, etc.: lulab.
\nXXX:V. Ps. 26:6\u20137. Stolen lulab may not be used. Messianic association of Hallel Psalms.
\nXXX:VI. Stolen lulab not to be used + Lev. 23:40, parable.
\nXXX:VII. Lev. 23:40 calls the fifteenth of Tishri the first. Why? Forgiveness on account of doing religious deeds.
\nXXX:VIII. Lev. 23:40. By day, not by night. Composition of the four species derived from exegesis.
\nXXX:IX. Lev. 23:40 linked to traits of God. Symbolism of lulab defined, IX\u2013XII.
\nXXX:X. Lev. 23:40 linked to patriarchs.
\nXXX:XI. Lev. 23:40 linked to Israel\u2019s governing institutions.
\nXXX:XII. Lev. 23:40 linked to traits of Israel.
\nXXX:XIII. Prov. 4:10 on acts of taking.
\nXXX:XIV. Ps. 35:10: Lulab symbolizes body of human being.
\nXXX:XV. Solomon could not interpret Lev. 23:40. Only sages could state decisively what species Lev. 23:40 required.
\nXXX:XVI. Merit of observing Festival brings Messiah. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirty-One. Lev. 24:1\u20132. Topic: The eternal light.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXXI:I. Lev. 24:1\u20132; Ps. 71:19. God wants Israel\u2019s light.
\nXXXI:II. Lev. 24:1\u20132; Ps. 119:140.
\nXXXI:III. God wants the light that Israel provides.
\nXXXI:IV. Ps. 18:29, etc. God rewards kindling the light. Why Moses gives commands.
\nXXXI:V. Prov. 21:22. Why Moses gives commands.
\nXXXI:VI. Job 25:3. God wants Israel\u2019s light.
\nXXXI:VII. The light that came from the sanctuary.
\nXXXI:VIII. God controls the light, yet wants Israel\u2019s light.
\nXXXI:IX. Polemic against sun worship.
\nXXXI:X. Oil used in the lamp defined. Why the oil.
\nXXXI:XI. Merit accruing on account of keeping the lamp lit. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirty-Two. Lev. 24:10\u201313. Topic: The blasphemer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXXII:I. Lev. 24:10\u201313; Ps. 12:8. The reviled ends up exalted. The vile are exposed.
\nXXXII:II. Exegesis of Qoh. 10:20: do not curse the king. Various applications. God tells Moses to bring the one who cursed outside of the camp.
\nXXXII:III. Lev. 24:10. The exclusion of the Egyptian\u2019s son, who cursed.
\nXXXII:IV. Lev. 24:10. How the Egyptian fathered the son of the Israelite woman.
\nXXXII:V. Song 4:12. Israel\u2019s sexual purity. The Israelite woman who sinned is identified.
\nXXXII:VI. Mentioning the name may be a good sign or a bad one. The woman is named and cursed. [The anthology on mamzers is relevant only in theme.]
\n[XXXII:VII. Anthology on mamzers.]
\n[XXXII:VIII. Qoh. 4:1 speaks of mamzers. Messianic finis.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirty-Three. Lev. 25:14. Topic: Injury to one\u2019s neighbor through acts of speech.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXXIII:I. Lev. 25:14; Prov. 18:21. Examples of how speech governs life or death.
\nXXXIII:II. Lev. 25:14; Amos 7:7\u20138. The sense of \u2019WRY\/\u2019NK.
\nXXXIII:III. Lev. 25:14; Amos 9:1. Acts of robbery to which Lev. 25:14 alludes are exemplified at Amos 9:1.
\nXXXIII:IV. Acts of humiliating one\u2019s neighbor.
\nXXXIII:V. As above.
\nXXXIII:VI. \u201cIf you sell,\u201d Lev. 25:14, may be read, \u201cIf you are sold to the nations.\u201d Nebuchadnezzar and the Jewish martyrs, Dan. 3:16\u201318. Messianic finis on Qoh. 8:2.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirty-Four. Lev. 25:25. Topic: Poverty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXXIV:I. Lev. 25:25; Ps. 41:1\u20132. The theme of poverty is what joins the intersecting verse to the base verse, but no detail of the base verse is subject to discussion.
\nXXXIV:II. Prov. 19:17; Lev. 25:25. God pays back one who helps the poor.
\nXXXIV:III. Prov. 11:17. Stories about Hillel and other illustrative materials.
\nXXXIV:IV. Prov. 29:13, 22:2.
\nXXXIV:V. Prov. 7:14.
\nXXXIV:VI. Ps. 106:43. Poor bears seven names.
\nXXXIV:VII. People\u2019s common speech indicates knowledge of Torah, including usage on charity.
\nXXXIV:VIII. Four examples of showing kindness. All prove how God rewards philanthropy.
\nXXXIV:IX. God is with the poor man. Miscellanies.
\nXXXIV:X. The role of people who pretend to be poor.
\nXXXIV:XI. Reward for helping the poor. Is. 58:7\u201314.
\nXXXIV:XII. Illustration for XI.
\nXXXIV:XIII\u2013XVI. Systematic exposition of Is. 58:7\u201314.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirty-Five. Lev. 26:3\u20134. Topic: \u201cIf you walk in my statutes.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXXV:I. Lev. 26:3; Ps. 119:59. Walking in God\u2019s ways\u2014rewards and punishments. The intersecting verse speaks of \u201cways,\u201d so it does make contact with the base verse.
\nXXXV:II. Lev. 26:3; Prov. 8:32. Keeping God\u2019s ways. Scripture speaks of Jacob.
\n[XXXV:III. God keeps his own laws. Not clearly tied to Lev. 26:3.]
\nXXXV:IV. The statutes as described at Jer. 33:25; 31:35, etc.
\nXXXV:V. The meaning of the word statute.
\nXXXV:VI. As above.
\nXXXV:VII. Lev. 26:3\u20134. If Israel keeps statutes, Lev. 26:3, God will give rain, Lev. 26:4.
\nXXXV:VIII. Lev. 26:4: gifts from heaven.
\nXXXV:IX. Lev. 26:4. When is the best time for rain?
\nXXXV:X. As above.
\nXXXV:XI. Rain and drought.
\nXXXV:XII. How much rain. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Thirty-Six. Lev. 26:42. Topic: The covenant with Jacob.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[XXXVI:I. Various important things are equivalent to one another. This is not the usual way for starting a parashah, since it is propositional, not primarily exegetical. The expected start is at XXXVI:II. There is no clear tie to the topic at hand. Lev. 26:42 serves merely as a proof text.]
\nXXXVI:II. Lev. 26:42; Ps. 80:8\u201310. Israel compared to vine and vineyard. Israel depends on the merit of Jacob.
\nXXXVI:III. Prov. 11:21; Lev. 26:42. Founding fathers left merit for their children.
\nXXXVI:IV. Is. 43:1. Jacob sayings.
\nXXXVI:V. Why Lev. 26:42 reverses the order of the patriarchs [see XXXVI:I].
\nXXXVI:VI. How long the merit of the patriarchs endures. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah XXXVII. Lev. 27:2. Topic: Vowing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XXXVII:I. Lev. 27:2; Qoh. 5:5.
\n[XXXVII:II.1. Generous contributions to charity. Not relevant to vowing. The whole is organized to illustrate Job 34:11.]
\nXXXVII:II.2. Distinguishing age groups, as at Lev. 27:1\u20135.
\nXXXVII:III. Story about Gamaliel\u2019s releasing vows, among other decisions of his.
\nXXXVII:IV. Releasing vows. Relevant only in theme. Messianic finis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Mode of Thought of Leviticus Rabbah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If the contents of Leviticus Rabbah truly cohere in form, then we should find that our document expresses in detail a deep logic at its base as well. I have shown a deep cogency to the formulary and redactional systems. What of that logic\u2014that mode of thought, of formulating and answering questions, of deciding what is fit and right and proportionate\u2014that inheres in the whole and emerges in each of the parts? Surely we have reason to ask whether the formal traits of discourse correspond to the substantive purposes. So far as style and aesthetic dictate one mode rather than some other, of saying what the author wants, do they also signal limits to what one may appropriately say in that mode? I ask the question, but in phrasing matters this way I also dictate the selection of data to lead us to the answer of a still more encompassing inquiry into the mode of thought, the manner of the construction, in mind, of reality out there. Accordingly, in this section and the next I shall try to find a route to the fundamental layers of the intellect that animates and generates the accessible layers of formal expression of doctrine and deliberation.
\nSince I hypothesize that form and substance cohere, I start back with the points of formal cogency of the document. It is there, at the repeated literary structures, that I should be able to point to the evidences of a fundamentally coherent way of seeing things, a mode of thought expressed thoughout. What people wished to say and the way in which they chose to say it together constituted the document as we now know it. So, as is clear, we turn to the one to teach us how to analyze the other.
\nWe begin, then, once more with the paramount and dominant exegetical construction, the base verse\/intersecting verse exegesis. In such an exercise, what in fact do we do? We read one thing in terms of something else. To begin with, it is the base verse in terms of the intersecting verse. But, as the reader will observe in the text itself, it also is the intersecting verse in other terms as well\u2014a multiple layered construction of analogy and parable. The intersecting verse\u2019s elements always turn out to stand for, to signify, to speak of something other than that to which they openly refer. If water stands for Torah, the skin disease for evil speech, the reference to something for some other thing entirely, then the mode of thought at hand is simple. One thing symbolizes another, speaks not of itself but of some other thing entirely.
\nHow shall we describe this mode of thought? It seems to me we may call it an as-if way of seeing things. That is to say, it is as if a common object or symbol really represented an uncommon one. Nothing says what it means. Everything important speaks metonymically, elliptically, parabolically, symbolically. All statements carry deeper meaning, which inheres in other statements altogether. The profound sense, then, of the base verse emerges only through restatement within and through the intersecting verse\u2014as if the base verse spoke of things that, on the surface, we do not see at all.
\nAccordingly, if we ask the single prevalent literary construction to testify to the prevailing frame of mind, its message is that things are never what they seem. All things demand interpretation. Interpretation begins in the search for analogy, for that to which the thing is likened, hence the deep sense in which all exegesis at hand is parabolic. It is a quest for that for which the thing in its deepest structure stands.
\nExegesis as we know it in Leviticus Rabbah (and not only there) consists in an exercise in analogical thinking\u2014something is like something else, stands for, evokes, or symbolizes that which is quite outside itself. It may be the opposite of something else, in which case it conforms to the exact opposite of the rules that govern that something else. The reasoning is analogical or it is contrastive, and the fundamental logic is taxonomic. The taxonomy rests on those comparisons and contrasts we should call, as I said, metonymic and parabolic. In that case what lies on the surface misleads. What lies beneath or beyond the surface\u2014there is the true reality, the world of truth and meaning. To revert to the issue of taxonomy, the tracts that allow classification serve only for that purpose. They signify nothing more than that something more.
\nHow shall we characterize people who see things this way? They constitute the opposite of those who call a thing as it is. Self-evidently, they have become accustomed to perceiving more\u2014or less\u2014than is at hand. Perhaps that is a natural mode of thought for the Jews of this period (and not them alone), so long used to calling themselves God\u2019s first love, yet now seeing others with greater worldly reason claiming that same advantaged relationship. Not in mind only but, still more, in the politics of the world, the people that remembered its origins along with the very creation of the world and founding of humanity, that recalled how it alone served, and serves, the one and only God, for more than three hundred years had confronted a quite different existence. The radical disjuncture between the way things were and the way Scripture said things were supposed to be\u2014and in actuality would some day become\u2014surely imposed an unbearable tension. It was one thing for the slave born to slavery to endure. It was another for the free man sold into slavery to accept that same condition. The vanquished people, the nation that had lost its city and its temple, that had, moreover, produced another nation from its midst to take over its Scripture and much else, could not bear too much reality. That defeated people then will have found refuge in a mode of thought that trained vision to see things otherwise than as the eyes perceived them. Among the diverse ways by which the weak and subordinated accommodate to their circumstance, the one of iron-willed pretense in life is most likely to yield the mode of thought at hand: things never are, because they cannot be, what they seem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Role of Scripture in Leviticus Rabbah: Renewal and Reconstruction<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Everyone has always known that Jews read Scripture. Every system of Judaism has done so. But why did they do so? What place did Scripture take in the larger systems of reality presented by various Judaisms? Why one part of Scripture rather than some other, and why read it in one way rather than another? These questions do not find ready answers in the mere observation that Jews read Scripture and construct Judaisms out of it. Nor is that observation one of a predictable and necessary pattern, since some of the documents of the rabbinic canon did not focus upon Scripture or even find it necessary to quote Scripture a great deal. The Mishnah, Tosefta, and important units of discourse of both Talmuds, for example, did not express their ideas in the way in which people who \u201cread Scripture\u201d ought to. They make use of Scripture sparingly, only with restraint adducing proofs for propositions even when these are based upon scriptural statements. So the paramount and dominant place accorded to Scripture in Leviticus Rabbah and documents like it cannot pass without comment and explanation.
\nExactly what can we say for the position of Scripture in this composition in particular, and what did Scripture contribute? This question is to be raised in two contexts, first here, then in the following chapter. In the present setting we ask about the use of Scripture in the mode of thought at hand: where, why, and how did Scripture find its central place in the minds of people who thought in the way in which the framers of our document did? In the later setting we ask the same question\u2014the role of Scripture in the definition of the Judaism at hand\u2014and produce a quite different answer when we compare the contribution of Scripture to the contributions of other sources of facts.
\nThe present answer is that Scripture contributed that other world that underlay this one. From Scripture came that other set of realities to be discovered in the ordinary affairs of the day. Scripture defined the inner being, the mythic life, that sustained Israel. The world is to be confronted as if things are not as they seem, because it is Scripture that tells us how things always are\u2014not one-time, in the past only, not one-time, in the future only, but now and always. So the key to the system is what happens to, and through, Scripture. The lock that is opened is the deciphering of the code by which people were guided in their denial of one thing and recognition and affirmation of the presence of some other. It was not general, therefore mere lunacy, but specific, therefore culture.
\nTo spell this out: the mode of thought pertained to a particular set of ideas. People did not engage ubiquitously and individually in an ongoing pretense that things always had to be other than they seemed. Had they done so, the Jewish nation would have disintegrated into a collectivity of pure insanity. The insistence on the as-if character of reality collectively focused upon one, and only one, alternative existence. All parties (so far as we know) entered into and shared that same and single interior universe. It was the one framed by Scripture.
\nWhat happens in Leviticus Rabbah (and, self-evidently, in other documents of the same sort)? Reading one thing in terms of something else, the builders of the document systematically adopted for themselves the reality of the Scripture, its history and doctrines. They transformed that history from a sequence of one-time events, leading from one place to some other, into an ever-present mythic world. No longer was there one Moses, one David, one set of happenings of a distinctive and never-to-be-repeated character. Now whatever happens, of which the thinkers propose to take account, must enter and be absorbed into that established and ubiquitous pattern and structure founded in Scripture. It is not that biblical history repeats itself. Rather, biblical history no longer constitutes history as a story of things that happened once, long ago, and pointed to some one moment in the future. Rather it becomes an account of things that happen every day\u2014hence, an ever-present mythic world, as I said.
\nA rapid glance at Leviticus Rabbah (and its fellows) tells us that Scripture supplies the document with its structure, its content, its facts, its everything. But a deeper analysis also demonstrates that Scripture never provides the document with that structure, contents, and facts that it now exhibits. Everything is reshaped and reframed. Whence the paradox?
\nScripture as a whole does not dictate the order of discourse, let alone its character. Just as the Talmudic authors destroyed the wholeness of the Mishnah and chose to take up its bits and pieces, so the exegetical writers did the same to Scripture. In our document they chose in Leviticus itself a verse here, a phrase there. These then presented the pretext for propositional discourse commonly quite out of phase with the cited passage. Verses that are quoted ordinarily shift from the meanings they convey to the implications they contain, speaking\u2014as I have made clear\u2014about something, anything, other than what they seem to be saying. So the as-if frame of mind brought to Scripture brings renewal to Scripture, seeing everything with fresh eyes.
\nAnd the result of the new vision was a reimagining of the social world envisioned by the document at hand, I mean, the everyday world of Israel in its Land in that difficult time. For what the sages now proposed was a reconstruction of existence along the lines of the ancient design of Scripture as they read it. What that meant was that, from a sequence of one-time and linear events, everything that happened was turned into a repetition of known and already experienced paradigms, hence, once more, a mythic being. The source and core of the myth, of course, derive from Scripture\u2014Scripture reread, renewed, reconstructed along with the society that revered Scripture.
\nSo, to summarize, the mode of thought that dictated the issues and the logic of the document, telling the thinkers to see one thing in terms of something else, addressed Scripture in particular and collectively. And thinking as they did, the framers of the document saw Scripture in a new way, just as they saw their own circumstance afresh, rejecting their world in favor of Scripture\u2019s, reliving Scripture\u2019s world in their own terms.
\nThat, incidentally, is why they did not write history, an account of what was happening and what it meant. It was not that they did not recognize or appreciate important changes and trends reshaping their nation\u2019s life. They could not deny that reality. In their apocalyptic reading of the dietary and leprosy laws, they made explicit their close encounter with the history of the world as they knew it. But they had another mode of responding to history. It was to treat history as if it were already known and readily understood. Whatever happened had already happened. Scripture dictated the contents of history, laying forth the structures of time, the rules that prevailed and were made known in events. Self-evidently, these same thinkers projected into Scripture\u2019s day the realities of their own, turning Moses and David into rabbis, for example. But that is how people think in that mythic, enchanted world in which, to begin with, reality blends with dream, and hope projects onto future and past alike how people want things to be.
\nLet us turn, now, from these somewhat abstract observations to a concrete account of what happened, in particular, when the thinkers at hand undertook to reimagine reality\u2014both their own and Scripture\u2019s. Exactly how did they think about one thing in terms of another, and what did they choose, in particular, to recognize in this rather complex process of juggling unpalatable present and unattainable myth? We turn to the specifics by reverting to the tried and true method of listing all the data and classifying them. Exactly what did the framers of Leviticus Rabbah learn when they opened the book of Leviticus? To state the answer in advance, when they read the rules of sanctification of the priesthood, they heard the message of the salvation of all Israel. Leviticus became the story of how Israel, purified from social sin and sanctified, would be saved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Substance of Comparison and Contrast<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When the thinkers of Leviticus Rabbah maintained that something really stands for something else, they appealed to a program, a construct, and a set of symbols that, they maintained, conveyed and evoked the reality beyond and within that which they affirmed. If the one thing is as if it were some other, then it is that other that tells what truly matters. Along these same lines, if one thing serves as a parable for another, if one verse is to be read as if it speaks of some other verse, on the one side, or of a cognate scriptural concept, exemplary hero, value, or symbol, on the other, it is that other that matters. There we find the definition of the world that governs the work of reimagination, the world that is not as if but simply is. When the philosophers treat the Scriptures as if they define mythic being, therefore, we may reasonably seek access to the dimensions and structure of that which is subject to definition.
\nWe look for the traits, one by one, of that mythic being. These we should then hope to classify and ultimately characterize. When we shall have systematically catalogued and classified the object, the referent of Scripture\u2014that true being that defines the logic of the world\u2014we also gain access to the logic of our document as well, that is to say, its evidence of a Judaism or, in our special case, its testimony to the place and use of Scripture in Judaism.
\nSo back to the parashiyyot. I begin with a simple account, following the base verse\/intersecting verse constructions in particular, of the symbols or exemplary figures into which the base verse\/intersecting verse translates the symbols or exemplary figures at hand. This is my question: When in Leviticus Rabbah one thing is compared to some other, what is that other?
\nI seek to discern any patterns by which, overall, we may predict that a given symbol or set of symbols or hero or value will recur under a defined set of conditions. For example, do allusions in the intersecting verse derive from biblical materials? If that is the case, then the literary form expresses a clear notion of the expansion of the biblical symbolic corpus into a system everywhere paramount. Do we find a limited and also systemically distinctive symbolic vocabulary? In that case, we may describe and analyze precisely what autonomous set of values now finds its topos within the document\u2019s authors\u2019 disposition of biblical statements. In the former case, therefore, we should conclude that the function of Scripture, overall, is to define a whole system, in the latter, to supply mere proof texts for positions adopted on other grounds entirely. I put forward these two possibilities (there are others) to indicate what is at stake in the list that follows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:I. Ps. 103:20 speaks of mortal messengers, Moses. Ps. 103:20 speaks of heroes who observe the Seventh Year. Ps. 103:20 speaks of Israel at Sinai.
\nI:II. Hos. 14:7 refers to sincere proselytes. Hos. 14:7 refers to Torah-students.
\nI:IV. Ps. 89:20 refers to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, David, Moses.
\nI:VI. Prov. 20:15 refers to gifts to the Temple, Moses\u2019 above all.
\nII:VII. Lev. 1:2 refers to Adam\u2019s offering, as paradigm.
\nIII:I. Qoh. 4:6 refers to study of Torah, Sabbath, world to come, tribes of Reuben and God, handful of meal offering.
\nIII:II. Ps. 22:23\u201324 refers to God-fearers, ten tribes.
\nIV:I. Qoh. 3:16 presents a colloquy among Nebuchadnezzar, the Holy Spirit, etc. [Also: Israel and the Holy Spirit; Sodomites; the incident at Shittim.]
\nV:I\u2013III. Job 34:29\u201330 speaks of the generation of the flood, Sodom, ten tribes.
\nVI:I. Prov. 24:28ff. speaks for Israel, God.
\nVI:V. Lev. 5:1 speaks of Israel at Sinai.
\nVII:I. Prov. 10:12 speaks of Israel and God (golden calf).
\nIX:I. Ps. 50:23 refers to Achan; Mishnah teachers, etc.
\nIX:VI. Song 4:16 refers to offerings in the Temple.
\nX:I\u2013III. Ps. 45:7 speaks of Abraham, Isaiah, Aaron.
\nXI:I\u2013IV. Prov. 9:1\u20136 speaks of creation of the world, God in the world to come, the Torah, the tent of meeting.
\nXI:V. Ps. 18:26\u201327 refers to Abraham, Moses.
\nXII:III. Ps. 19:7\u20139 speaks of words of Torah, sons of Aaron.
\nXIII:I. Prov. 15:31\u201332 refers to sons of Aaron.
\nXIII:V. Gen. 2:10ff. refers to the four kingdoms. Gen. 15:12 refers to the four kingdoms, so too Dan. 7:3ff.; Deut. 14:7; Lev. 11:4\u20138.
\nXIV:III. Job 10:12 speaks for the fetus.
\nXV:IX. Lev. 13:2ff. refers to four kingdoms.
\nXVI:V. Qoh. 5:5 speaks of people who do not pay their pledges, to Torah students, to gossipers, people who make vows, Miriam.
\nXVII:VII. Lev. 14:34 refers to the Temple.
\nXVIII:II. Hab. 1:7 refers to Adam, Esau, Obadiah, Sennacherib, Hiram, Nebuchadnezzar, Evil Merodach, Israel.
\nXIX:I\u2013III. Song 5:11 refers to Torah, disciples of sages.
\nXX:I. Qoh. 9:2 refers to Noah, Moses, Aaron, spies, Ahab, Josiah, etc.
\nXX:II. Ps. 75:4 speaks of Adam, Abraham, Israel, Elisheba.
\nXX:IV. Job 38:27\u201329 is God\u2019s statement to Aaron.
\nXXI:I\u2013IV. Ps. 27:1 speaks of Israel at the Red Sea, the Philistines, Amalekites, New Year and Day of Atonement.
\nXXI:VI. Prov. 24:6 speaks of the high priest on the Day of Atonement.
\nXXI:XI. Lev. 16:3 refers to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and their merit.
\nXXII:X. Ps. 46:7 refers to Israel.
\nXXIII:I. Song 2:2 speaks of Rebecca, those who came out of Egypt, Israel at Sinai, acts of loving kindness, the current generations, Israel.
\nXXV:IV. Qoh. 2:24 speaks for God.
\nXXV:VIII. Song 5:15 speaks of the world, Torah.
\nXXVII:I. Ps. 36:6 speaks of study of Torah, righteous deeds.
\nXXVII:II. Job 41:11 refers to a bachelor who helps pay teachers, or someone who carries out the law before he has to.
\nXXVII:V. Qoh. 3:15 speaks of Cain and Abel, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Israel among nations.
\nXXVIII:IV. Job 5:5 refers to four kingdoms, Abraham; Pharaoh and Moses; Og and Moses, Canaanites and Joshua, Sisera, Deborah and Barak, Sennacherib and Hezekiah, Haman and Mordecai.
\nXXIX:II. Jer. 30:10 refers to Jacob and the nations of the world, Gen. 28:12, four kingdoms in particular.
\nXXIX:V. Prov. 15:24 refers to Torah, religious duties.
\nXXIX:X. Gen. 22:13 refers to Israel among the nations.
\nXXX:I. Prov. 8:10 refers to study of Torah.
\nXXX:III. Ps. 102:1 speaks of David, a field worker, the generation of Mordecai, etc.
\nXXX:IV. Ps. 96:12\u201313 refers to the world.
\nXXX:IX\u2013XII. Lev. 23:40\u2014symbolism of lulab, etc. pertains to God; Abraham, Isaac, Jacob; Sarah, Rebecca, Leah, Rachel; Sanhedrin, disciples of sages; Israel.
\nXXXI:IV. Song 7:5 speaks of Israel, God.
\nXXXI:V. Prov. 21:22 refers to Torah.
\nXXXII:II. Qoh. 10:20 refers to God, man; king who came before you, the king in your own time; Moses.
\nXXXII:V. Song 4:12 speaks of Israel.
\nXXXII:VIII. Qoh. 4:1 speaks of mamzers.
\nXXXIV:I. Ps. 41:1\u20132 refers to one who overcomes his impulse to do evil, to one who gives to the poor, visits the sick, buries neglected corpse.
\nXXXIV:IV. Prov. 20:13 refers to someone poor in knowledge of Torah, etc.
\nXXXV:II. Prov. 8:32 speaks of Jacob.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Having reviewed those passages in which one verse is made to speak in terms of an intersecting one, or in which a verse is asked to refer to something quite outside its subject matter as seen by the naked eye, we come up with nothing, no system, no pattern. How so? First of all, we see that, when an intersecting verse approaches a base verse, the outcome of the meeting will not be repeated reference to a limited and clearly accessible set of symbols, heroes, or values other than absolute commonplaces. True enough, we find the patriarchs (occasionally, matriarchs too). We see numerous efforts to relate a reference to \u201cIsrael\u201d or to God or to Israel under specific circumstances, for example, the golden calf. These references do reach a limit in biblical materials. The four kingdoms do not really move out beyond the biblical framework. So, in general, the exegetes did wish to expand the framework of discourse within the Scriptures by making each passage address all others. In this manner what is concrete and specific in the text turns out to be general and universal in application, to stand for something much beyond itself and to serve as a provocative symbol.
But if the list reveals a circumscribed symbolic vocabulary, one that is both repeatedly invoked and highly suggestive, I cannot define its distinctive traits. That is to say, I find routine and commonplace the various allusions to Torah study, helping to pay teachers, or the typical good deeds\u2014giving to the poor, visiting the sick, burying the dead. These do not tell me that the framers of Leviticus Rabbah chose to express a distinctive system of their own, particular to their document and its statement. What I discern, therefore, is nothing more than bits and pieces of a prevailing symbolic structure. It is, of course, the well-known rabbinic one, documented, to begin with, in the Talmud of the Land of Israel, yet, as I have shown elsewhere, in Judaism in Society, clearly prior also to that document and taken for granted in it.
So, to return to the exemplary questions with which I began, the allusions in the intersecting verses do derive from biblical materials. But no limited biblical system is under construction here. On the contrary, the clear effort is to broaden and expand the range of biblical discourse. On the other hand, the restricted symbolic vocabulary at hand in no way allows us to describe that prior, whole system to be given proof texts here as everywhere else. Such a system is taken for granted, to be sure. But it is not expressed as a whole, so far as I am able to tell, in the passages we have reviewed. What we have is a familiar fact. In postbiblical times Jewish, as well as Christian, writers made catalogues of biblical heroes and their virtues, as in the case of the Ben Sira 44\u201350 and Letter to the Hebrews; or they made lists of biblical events and suggested their counterparts in ordinary life or of the virtues to be emulated under prevailing circumstances. This they did for their own purposes.
The upshot is that the mode of thought revealed by the literary construction under discussion constitutes a rather specific expression of a far more general and prevailing way of seeing things. The literary form in concrete ways says that the entirety of the biblical narrative speaks to each circumstance, that the system of Scripture as a whole not only governs, but comes prior to, any concrete circumstance of that same Scripture. Everything in Scripture is relevant everywhere else in Scripture. It must follow, the Torah (to use the mythic language of the system at hand) defines reality under all specific circumstances. Obviously we did not have to come to the specific literary traits of the document at hand to discover those prevailing characteristics of contemporary and later documents of the rabbinic canon. True, every exercise in referring one biblical passage to another expands the range of discourse to encompass much beyond the original referent. But that is a commonplace in the exegesis of Scripture, familiar wherever midrash exegesis was undertaken, in no way particular to rabbinic writings.
That is not to suggest we find in literary conventions no pertinent evidence of a prevailing and unifying statement. On the contrary, the following catalogue proves that one characteristic, though not ubiquitous, literary convention also testifies to a singular polemic. These parashiyyot conclude with an explicitly eschatological exercise (e.g., reference to Messiah, world to come, this age and the coming age, and the like): I, VII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XXII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII\u2014that is to say, twenty-five out of thirty-seven parashiyyot, or 67%. (If I were to catalogue the number of paragraphs of thought containing eschatological references of some kind or other, the percentage would be still higher.) Here we speak not of content but only of what appears to be literary convention. Framers, or arrangers, of the parashiyyot exhibit a pronounced preference for concluding their constructions <\/p>\n\n\n\n
with some kind of eschatological climax and promise. The next section shows that the doctrine of Leviticus Rabbah conforms to the form.
\nLet us now separate the two strands of inquiry. First, we ask whether the literary forms testify to an underlying mode of thought. Second, we want to know whether, when these forms do make an appearance, the substance of what is expressed helps to portray an underlying viewpoint or system of thought. The answer to the former question is definitely affirmative, and to the second, equally firmly negative. So the results are conclusive only in a rather general way. In Leviticus Rabbah (as in other documents of its type), the prevailing mode of thought is to interpret one thing in terms of another, specifically, biblical statements\u2014heroes, values, symbols\u2014in terms of a second, distinct but intersecting, corpus of heroes, values, symbols. But if we wish to find out precisely how to describe the contents of that other something, the intersecting system, we shall look in vain for guidance, as to matters of substance, from form. To repeat: formal traits signal the modes of thought but not the results of reflection. They define the way questions are framed and answered but not the answers themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The System of Leviticus Rabbah: Topical Classification<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The message of Leviticus Rabbah comes to us from the ultimate framers. It is delivered through their selection of materials already available as well as through their composition of new ones. What we now require is a clear statement of the major propositions expressed in Leviticus Rabbah. That will emerge through classification of the statements, with the notion that the principal themes, and the messages on those themes, should coalesce into a few clear statements.
\nThe first, and single paramount, category takes shape within the themes associated with the national life of Israel. The principal lines of structure flow along the fringes: Israel\u2019s relationships with others. These are (so to speak) horizontal, with the nations, and vertical, with God. But, from the viewpoint of the framers of the document, the relationships form a single, seamless web, for Israel\u2019s vertical relationships dictate the horizontals as well; when God wishes to punish Israel, the nations come to do the work. The relationships that define Israel, moreover, prove dynamic, not static, in that they respond to the movement of the Torah through Israel\u2019s history. When the Torah governs, then the vertical relationship is stable and felicitous, the horizontal one secure, and, when not, God obeys the rules and the nations obey God.
\nWe now catalogue and classify all of the propositions emerging from the paragraphs of thought. My effort is to state, as simply and accurately as I can, what the framer of a given paragraph wished to express, either directly or through rich illustrative materials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The National Life of Israel: Israel, God, and the Nations<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:XI. Torah is life to Israel, poison to nations.
\nI:XII. Gentiles have no prophets.
\nI:XIII. Gentile prophets are inferior.
\nII:I. Israel is precious to God.
\nII:IV\u2013V. God gave Israel many laws so as to express his love and ongoing concern. This was because they enthroned God at the Red Sea.
\nII:VI. Scripture is so worded as to treat Israel with respect.
\nV:II. God punishes Israel\u2019s sins by placing gentile rulers over them, e.g., Sennacherib.
\nV:VII. Virtues of Israel are vices for nations [see I:XI, XIII].
\nVI:I. Israel are God\u2019s witnesses.
\nVI:V. Israel violated its oath at Sinai, but God forgave Israel. [Also: VII:I.]
\nVII:IV. God is concerned not to waste Israel\u2019s resources.
\nX:I\u2013III. God favors prophets and priests who justify Israel.
\nXII:II. God meets Israel in the tent of meeting.
\nXIII:II. Israel alone was worthy to receive the Torah. By observing food taboos, Israel shows its special position. [Also: XIII:III.]
\nXIII:IV\u2013V. Food taboos symbolize Israel\u2019s fate among the nations. The four kingdoms as exemplary of food laws.
\nXV:IX. Skin ailments symbolize Israel\u2019s fate among the nations. The four kingdoms.
\n[XVI:I. Leprosy as punishment for social sins, e.g., gossip.]
\nXVII:I. Israel is singled out to be punished for specific sins. Others suffer at last judgment.
\nXVII:V. If Israel sins in the Land, it will be punished as Canaan was.
\nXVII:VI. Canaanites hid their treasures, and by afflicting the houses, God revealed the hiding place.
\nXVII:VII. The Temple\u2019s affliction is symbolized by the leprosy disease affecting houses.
\nXVIII:II. Individuals and nations cause their own punishment. [Also: XVIII:III.]
\nXVIII:IV. Israel was unafflicted at Sinai. After they sinned, various afflictions appeared.
\nXVIII:V. God governs Israel the same way kings govern kingdoms. But God heals with that with which he punishes.
\nXIX:IV. Israel\u2019s sins provoke punishment.
\nXX:VIII\u2013IX. Sins in the cult caused death of Nadab and Abihu.
\nXX:X. Social sins and the death of Nadab and Abihu. Snootiness, pride.
\nXXI:XI. Israel is sustained by merits of the patriarchs.
\nXXII:VIII. God permitted sacrifice as an antidote to sin.
\nXXIII:I\u2013III. Israel is the rose, the nations, the thorns. Various circumstances in Israel\u2019s history at which that fact was shown.
\nXXIII:V. Israel among the nations is steadfast in loyalty to God and will be redeemed.
\nXXIII:VI. Israel was created only to do religious duties and good deeds.
\nXXIII:VII. Israel must be different from gentiles, particularly in sexual practices. [Also XXIII:IX, XXIII:XIII.]
\nXXIV:I\u2013II. When God exalts a people, it is done justly and so his act endures.
\nXXV:I. The Torah is what protects Israel.
\nXXV:IV. God kept his promises to the patriarchs to favor their descendants.
\nXXVII:V. God favors the victim.
\nXXVII:VI. God shows Israel special favor, which disappoints the nations. He does not demand much from Israel. [Also: XXVII:VIII.]
\nXXVII:IX. The animals used in the cult stand for the meritorious ancestors.
\nXXVII:XI. God will ultimately save Israel even from its cruelest enemies.
\nXXVIII:III. God asks very little of Israel.
\nXXVIII:IV. Merely with prayer Israel is saved, not with weapons.
\nXXVIII:VI. The merit of the religious duty of the sheaf of first fruits causes Israel to inherit the land, peace is made, Israel is saved.
\nXXIX:II. Israel\u2019s suffering among the nations is due to Jacob\u2019s lack of faith.
\nXXIX:V. Israel is redeemed because of keeping commandments. [Also: XXIX:VIIIB.]
\nXXIX:VII. Israel is saved through the merit of the patriarchs. [Also: XXIX:VIII, XXIX:X.]
\nXXX:I. Israel serves Esau [Rome] because of insufficient devotion to Torah study.
\nXXX:II. Israel\u2019s victory is signified by palm branches.
\nXXX:IX\u2013XII. The symbols of Sukkot stand for God, the patriarchs, Israel\u2019s leaders, Israel. [Also: XXX:XIV.]
\nXXXI:III. God wants from Israel something he surely does not need, e.g., lamp, and that is the mark of God\u2019s love. [Also: XXXI:IV, XXXII:VIII.]
\nXXXII:I. Israel is reviled among the nations but exalted by God.
\nXXXII:VIII. God goes into exile with Israel.
\nXXXIII:VI. Israel, sold to the nations, joins their Creator with them.
\nXXXIV:VI. God forgives Israel\u2019s sin and repeatedly redeems them.
\nXXXIV:XIII. If Israel is not liberal to the poor, their wealth will go to Esau [Rome].
\nXXXV:I. If Israel attains merit, curses are turned into blessings.
\nXXXVI:II. Israel compared to a vine.
\nXXXVI:III. Patriarchs left their merit to Israel.
\nXXXVI:IV. World was created through the merit of Jacob.
\nXXXVI:V. Israel saved through the merits of the patriarchs.
\nXXXVI:VI. That merit yet endures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The recurrent messages may be stated in a single paragraph. God loves Israel, so he gave them the Torah, which defines their life and governs their welfare. Israel is alone in its category (sui generis), so what is a virtue to Israel is a vice to the nation, life-giving to Israel, poison to the gentiles. True, Israel sins, but God forgives that sin, having punished the nation on account of it. Such a process has yet to come to an end, but it will culminate in Israel\u2019s complete regeneration. Meanwhile, Israel\u2019s assurance of God\u2019s love lies in the many expressions of special concern, for even the humblest and most ordinary aspects of the national life: the food the nation eats, the sexual practices by which it procreates. These life-sustaining, life-transmitting activities draw God\u2019s special interest, as a mark of his general love for Israel. Israel then is supposed to achieve its life in conformity with the marks of God\u2019s love. These indications moreover signify also the character of Israel\u2019s difficulty, namely, subordination to the nations in general, but to the fourth kingdom, Rome, in particular. Both food laws and skin diseases stand for the nations. There is yet another category of sin, also collective and generative of collective punishment, and that is social. The moral character of Israel\u2019s life, the treatment of people by one another, the practice of gossip and small-scale thuggery\u2014these too draw down divine penalty. The nation\u2019s fate therefore corresponds to its moral condition. The moral condition, however, emerges not only from the current generation. Israel\u2019s richest hope lies in the merit of the ancestors, thus in the Scriptural record of the merits attained by the founders of the nation, those who originally brought it into being and gave it life.
\nThe world to come is so portrayed as to restate these same propositions. Merit overcomes sin, and doing religious duties or supererogatory acts of kindness will win merit for the nation that does them. Israel will be saved at the end of time, and the age, or world, to follow will be exactly the opposite of this one. Much that we find in the account of Israel\u2019s national life, worked out through the definition of the liminal relationships, recurs in slightly altered form in the picture of the world to come.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel and the World to Come: Salvific Doctrines and Symbols<\/p>\n\n\n\n
II:II. In this world and in the world to come, Israel, Levites, priesthood, heave offerings, firstlings, Land, Jerusalem, etc., will endure.
\nIII:I. Israel will be redeemed on the Sabbath.
\nVII:III. Israel will be redeemed through the merit of Torah study.
\nIX:I. The thanksgiving offering will continue in the world to come. [Also: IX:VIII.]
\nX:IX. Jerusalem in the world to come.
\nXI:II. Rebuilding of Jerusalem in the world to come.
\nXVII:VII. Temple will be rebuilt.
\nXXI:I\u2013IV. Israel is saved because of the merit of the people at various turnings in their history, e.g., at the Red Sea. Also through merit of atonement.
\nXXI:V\u2013VI. Religious duties counteract sin.
\nXXIII:V. Israel will be saved through its steadfast faith.
\nXXIII:VI. Israel will be redeemed when Esau no longer rules.
\nXXX:XVI. Through merit of lulab, Temple will be rebuilt.
\nXXXI:XI. Merit of eternal light brings messiah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The world to come will right all presently unbalanced relationships. What is good will go forward, what is bad will come to an end. The simple message is that the things people revere, the cult and its majestic course through the year, will go on; Jerusalem will come back, so too the Temple, in all their glory. Israel will be saved through the merit of the ancestors, atonement, study of Torah, practice of religious duties. The prevalence of the eschatological dimension at the formal structures, with its messianic and other expressions, here finds its counterpart in the repetition of the same few symbols in the expression of doctrine. (That is why I did not once again catalogue eschatological conclusions.)
\nWhat of the individual? So far we have reviewed the message framed for the community at large. If a nation lives as the Torah dictates, then what virtues will each person attain? The answer is that, like Israel at large, the individual, standing for the nation, will be humble, remain within natural limits and laws, obey the Torah, and above all avoid arrogance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Individual: The Condition of Humanity<\/p>\n\n\n\n
XIV:I. People should be humble, because of the circumstances of their creation.
\nXIV:II\u2013IX. Various propositions on the creation of the fetus. All emphasize the role of God in the creation of each individual.
\nXV:II. People exhibit natural traits and do well to remain within their normal limits.
\nXX:I. Both good and evil die in the same way.
\nXX:II. People should not make merry in this world. [Also: XX:III.]
\nXX:XII. Death effects atonement.
\nXXII:I\u2013IV. Even things that appear superfluous serve a purpose.
\nXXVI:V. God prescribes rules for mortals because they have a propensity to do evil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet a second catalogue pertains to the same subject, namely, the inner life of the nation, the moral life of Israel. The theme of the moral life of Israel produces propositions concerning not only the individual but, more important, the social virtues that the community as a whole must exhibit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:X. Israel became punishable for violating divine law only after the Torah was taught to them a second time in the tent of meeting.
\nII:VII. Offerings should not derive from stolen property. [Also: III:IV.]
\nIII:I. Not expiating sin through an inexpensive offering is better than doing so through an expensive one. Better not sin at all. [Also: IX:I, IX:V, IX:VIII.]
\nIII:II\u2013III. God will not despise a meager offering of a poor person. [Also: III:V, VIII:IV.]
\nIV:I. God punishes with good reason and not blindly.
\nIV:II. The soul wants to do ever more religious duties.
\nIV:III. Unwitting sin is caused by haste.
\nIV:IV\u2013V. Soul and body are jointly at fault for sin.
\nIV:VI. Israelites are responsible for one another.
\nIV:VIII. Soul compared to God.
\nV:IV. Philanthropy makes a place for the donor.
\nV:VIII. Israel knows how to please God.
\nVI:III. False oath brings terrible punishment.
\nVII:II. If one repents sin, it is as if he made an offering in the rebuilt Temple.
\nVII:II. God favors the contrite and penitent. [Also: VII:VI, VIII:I, IX:I, IV, VI, God favors the thanksgiving offering.]
\nIX:III. God favors those who bring peace even more than those who study Torah.
\nIX:IX. Peace is the highest value.
\nX:V. Repentance and prayer effect atonement for sin.
\nX:VI. Priests\u2019 acts effect atonement.
\nXI:V. God responds to human virtue by acting in the same way.
\nXII:I, IV. Wine leads to poverty, estrangement.
\nXIV:V. Even the most pious person has a sinful side to his nature.
\nXV:IV. Gossip causes a specific ailment. God punishes Israel because he cares about Israel\u2019s moral condition.
\nXV:V. Sin of mother effects embryo.
\nXV:VI. Correspondence of sin and punishment. People get what they deserve.
\nXVI:I. Leprosy punishes gossip, other sins. [Also: XVI:II, XVII:III, XVIII:IV.]
\nXVI:V. Sinning through speech\u2014general principle and particular examples.
\nXVI:VI. Skin disease and gossip. [Also: XVI:VII.]
\nXVI:VIII. People cause their own ailments through sin.
\nXVII:II. Diseases afflicting a house and the sin of the owner.
\nXVII:IV. God penalizes first property, then the person.
\nXXII:VI. Thievery is tantamount to murder.
\nXXII:X. For each prohibition there is a release.
\nXXIII:X\u2013XI. God rewards those who avoid sin.
\nXXIII:XII. Adultery may be in one\u2019s mind.
\nXXIV:VI. Sanctification is through avoiding sexual misdeed.
\nXXIV:VII. Israel must remain holy if God is to be in its midst. [Also: XXIV:VIII.]
\nXXV:III. People are like God when they plant trees.
\nXXVI:II. God\u2019s pure speech versus humanity\u2019s gossip.
\nXXVII:I. God seeks justice, but it may be fully worked out only in the world to come. [Also: XXVII:II.]
\nXXX:V. One cannot serve God with stolen property. [Also: XXX:VI.]
\nXXXII:V. Israel keeps itself sexually pure.
\nXXXIII:I. What people say has the power of life and death.
\nXXXIV:II. God repays generosity.
\nXXXIV:V. People should not envy one another.
\nXXXIV:VIII. God rewards generosity. [Also: XXXIV:IX, XXXIV:X, XXXIV:XI.]
\nXXXV:VII. If Israel keeps the commandments, it is as if they made them.
\nXXXVII:I. It is unwise to vow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First of all, the message to the individual constitutes a revision, for this context, of the address to the nation: humility as against arrogance, obedience as against sin, constant concern not to follow one\u2019s natural inclination to do evil or to overcome the natural limitations of the human condition. Israel must accept its fate, obey and rely on the merits accrued through the ages and God\u2019s special love. The individual must conform, in ordinary affairs, to this same paradigm of patience and submission.
\nGreat men and women, that is, individual heroes within the established paradigm, conform to that same pattern, exemplifying the national virtues. Among these, of course, Moses stands out; he has no equal. The special position of the humble Moses is complemented by the patriarchs and by David, all of whom knew how to please God and left as an inheritance to Israel the merit they had thereby attained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel\u2019s Leaders: Priests, Rabbis, Prophets<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:I. Prophets are messengers to mortals, and Moses was the greatest of them.
\nI:III. Moses had several names.
\nI:IV. Abraham, Jacob, David, Moses were recognized by God.
\nI:V. Moses was humble.
\nI:VI. Moses\u2019 teaching was precious in God\u2019s view.
\nI:VII. God recognized how much honor was paid to him by Moses.
\nI:VIII. God showed special favor to Moses.
\nI:IX. As above.
\nI:XII. After tent of meeting was built, prophecy ceased among gentiles.
\nI:XIV. Moses was superior to all other Israelite prophets.
\n[III:VI. Priests have every right to the residue of the meal offering.]
\nV:VII. The elders sustain Israel through their merits, which they pass on.
\nV:VIII. David knows how to please God.
\nX:I. God favored Abraham because he sought mercy.
\nX:II. The great prophets all loved to justify Israel.
\nXI:VIII. Israel can do nothing without its leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While we find numerous stories about rabbis in the modern (fourth-century) mold, Yohanan, Simeon b. Laqish, Yudan, not to mention Hillel, they usually exemplify established social policies or virtues. They scarcely exhibit distinctive traits of personality. They do not stand comparison with the scriptural figures and only rarely appear in the same supernatural framework. Such stories do not belong in the present classification at all. When we do find them, we observe that they exemplify such common virtues as are catalogues in the earlier lists.
\nBy this point, the reader will anticipate a long catalogue of paragraphs of thought in praise of study of the Torah. While, as we have already observed, the symbol of Torah plays an integral part in the larger account of Israel\u2019s national and moral life, paragraphs of discourse devoted not to the use of the symbol but to its exposition\u2014statements about what one does in studying Torah, for example\u2014prove fewer than we should have anticipated. Torah study serves as a prevailing symbol, to be sure, but alongside other paradigmatically definitive symbols. If we regard Torah study as particular to the larger rabbinic system and definitive of its main concerns, we cannot demonstrate that fact from the brief list that follows. When we come to list those paragraphs of thought in which the symbol of the Torah predominates, we produce a paltry catalogue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Torah, Study of Torah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:XI. Torah is source of life to Israel, poison to nations.
\nIII:I. Better study what one can than overreach.
\nXI:III. Value of Torah study.
\nXII:III. Praise of words of Torah.
\nXIII:I. One who loses his temper forgets his Torah.
\nXIX:I\u2013III. Various teachings on study of Torah.
\nXX:VII. Disciple should not teach in the presence of master.
\nXXV:I\u2013II. Rewards for study of Torah.
\nXXVI:I. God\u2019s sayings are pure.
\nXXX:I. Israel serves Esau because of not studying Torah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The list of course understates the symbolic centrality of the Torah, which occurs in the more important lists already given. But what that means is not to be missed. When we frame our scheme of classification, we find that the principal categories of social definition\u2014the boundaries of the group, its relationships to outsiders\u2014invoke the symbol of Torah but for purposes to which that symbol turns out to be subordinated. Torah serves to define Israel. Torah keeps Israel alive, tells it what to do. Studying the Torah and doing what it says generates that merit that ultimately will accrue to rescue Israel. So Torah and Torah study rarely define that \u201cother\u201d that forms the unseen reality to which things refer. When we produce that metamorphosis that changes what things say into what they mean, the Torah only uncommonly is what they really mean. From what has been said, we already may form a hypothesis about what that \u201cother\u201d will usually be. It is the nation, Israel\u2014that alone.
\nTorah indeed falls into the same category as merit. Neither forms a central category. The two work in pretty much the same way. They make the system work, fueling its action, providing its motives, establishing its dynamic. Approved activities produce the currency of merit, a kind of symbol of moral wealth that, like money, is impersonal and so interchangeable. The schedule of approved activities makes its appearance, of course, in the Torah. Accordingly, to appeal to wildly inappropriate metaphors, the Torah constitutes the description of the economy, while merit measures the gross national product.
\nBut when we construct a system of classification meant to encompass the principal statements of Leviticus Rabbah, neither Torah nor merit dictates lines of structure and differentiation, though both Torah and merit occur frequently. Because the present list is brief, therefore, we should not conclude it refers to an unimportant category. The contrary is the case. Listing those paragraphs of thought in which the theme of the Torah predominates obscures the centrality of the Torah and of merit in lists of paragraphs of thought devoted to other, more important propositional taxa. Little said about Torah here, however, would have surprised the writers of the wisdom literature, once they were informed that Torah means here what wisdom meant to them. The Torah in its mythic and supernatural dimensions scarcely makes an appearance here. But it is critical to both Talmuds. In all, Leviticus Rabbah focuses, as I said, upon a category other than Torah, specifically, the nation and its salvation, the individual and his or her part in the salvific process, the community, its social and personal sins, social and personal suffering, atonement, redemption. Torah plays strikingly little part in the category formation of our document. Torah as Scripture makes its entry in another way.
\nThe foregoing lists obscure yet another fact. A quite sizable proportion of Leviticus Rabbah\u2014an enormous list indeed\u2014consists of paragraphs of thought that rework themes but make no clearly stated point. In the passages that follow, I find no clearly and explicitly sustained proposition at all. These present, rather, exegesis for \u201cits own sake,\u201d meaning episodic remarks about the meanings of phrases or sentences. Other passages make up no more than collections of thematically associated statements with no single, unifying proposition. A few, finally, provide what look to be liturgies, or present nothing more than narratives, lacking all purpose in the larger argument.
\nWhile all of these sorts of materials do express ideas, I find in none of them an explicit effort to lay down a given proposition. Rather, while they work through available values and restate congeries of conventional ideas, they lack all polemic. At any rate I perceive no propositional point. That is why I am unable to classify the paragraphs listed below in accord with any taxonomic scheme at all. The reader, however, may see inner relationships among the items listed here, hence the possibility of propositional or doctrinal positions, that I have missed. The upshot, in any case, is that the vast majority of paragraphs of thought\u2014surely in excess of two thirds of the whole\u2014do propose to set forth statements that we can discern.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Paragraphs of Discourse That Yield No Clearly Sustained Proposition
\n I:II
\n II:I
\n III:VI
\n IV:IV
\n IV:VII
\n V:I
\n V:V\u2013VI (Shebna)
\n VI:II
\n VI:IV
\n VI:VI
\n VII:IV
\n VII:V
\n VIII:II
\n VIII:III
\n IX:I (Achan)
\n IX:II
\n IX:VI
\n X:IV
\n X:VII
\n X:VIII
\n X:IX
\n XI:I
\n XI:IV
\n XI:VI
\n XI:VII
\n XI:IX
\n XII:V
\n XV:I
\n XV:III
\n XV:VIII
\n XVI:III
\n XVI:IV
\n XVI:IX
\n XVIII:I
\n XIX:V
\n XIX:VI
\n XX:IV
\n XX:V
\n XX:XI
\n XXI:VII
\n XXI:VIII
\n XXI:IX
\n XXI:X
\n XXI:XII
\n XXII:V
\n XXII:VII
\n XXII:IX
\n XXIII:IV
\n XXIII:VIII
\n XXIV:III
\n XXIV:IV
\n XXIV:V
\n XXIV:IX
\n XXV:V
\n XXV:VI
\n XXV:VII
\n XXV:VIII
\n XXVI:III
\n XXVI:IV
\n XXVI:VI
\n XXVI:VII
\n XXVI:VIII
\n XXVII:III
\n XXVII:IV
\n XXVII:VII
\n XXVII:X
\n XXVII:XII
\n XXVIII:I
\n XXVIII:II
\n XXVIII:V
\n XXIX:I
\n XXIX:III
\n XXIX:IV
\n XXIX:VI
\n XXIX:IX
\n XXIX:XI
\n XXIX:XII
\n XXX:III
\n XXX:V
\n XXX:VII
\n XXX:VIII
\n XXX:XIII
\n XXX:XV
\n XXXI:I
\n XXXI:II
\n XXXI:V
\n XXXI:VI
\n XXXI:VII
\n XXXI:IX
\n XXXI:X
\n XXXII:II
\n XXXII:III
\n XXXII:IV
\n XXXII:VI
\n XXXII:VII
\n XXXIII:II
\n XXXIII:III
\n XXXIII:IV
\n XXXIII:V
\n XXXIV:I
\n XXXIV:III
\n XXXIV:IV
\n XXXIV:VII
\n XXXIV:XII
\n XXXIV:XIV
\n XXXIV:XV\u2013XVI
\n XXXV:II
\n XXXV:III
\n XXXV:IV
\n XXXV:V
\n XXXV:VI
\n XXXV:VIII
\n XXXV:IX
\n XXXV:X
\n XXXV:XI
\n XXXV:XII
\n XXXVI:I
\n XXXVII:II
\n XXXVII:III
\n XXXVII:IV<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If we now ask about further recurring themes or topics, there is one so commonplace that we should have to list the majority of paragraphs of discourse in order to provide a complete list. It is the list of events in Israel\u2019s history, meaning, in this context, Israel\u2019s history solely in scriptural times, down through the return to Zion. The one-time events of the generation of the flood, Sodom and Gomorrah, the patriarchs and the sojourn in Egypt, the exodus, the revelation of the Torah at Sinai, the golden calf, the Davidic monarchy and the building of the Temple, Sennacherib, Hezekiah, and the destruction of northern Israel, Nebuchadnezzar and the destruction of the Temple in 586, the life of Israel in Babylonian captivity, Daniel and his associates, Mordecai and Haman\u2014these events occur over and over again. They turn out to serve as paradigms of sin and atonement, steadfastness and divine intervention, and equivalent lessons. We find, in fact, a fairly standard repertoire of scriptural heroes or villains, on the one side, and conventional lists of Israel\u2019s enemies and their actions and downfall, on the other. The boastful, for instance, include (VII:VI) the generation of the flood, Sodom and Gomorrah, Pharaoh, Sisera, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, the wicked empire (Rome)\u2014contrasted to Israel, \u201cdespised and humble in this world.\u201d The four kingdoms recur again and again, always ending, of course, with Rome, with the repeated message that after Rome will come Israel. But Israel has to make this happen through its faith and submission to God\u2019s will. Lists of enemies ring the changes on Cain, the Sodomites, Pharaoh, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, Haman.
\nAccordingly, the mode of thought brought to bear upon the theme of history remains exactly the same as before: list making, with data exhibiting similar taxonomic traits drawn together into lists based on common monothetic traits or definitions. These lists then through the power of repetition make a single enormous point. They prove a social law of history. The catalogues of exemplary heroes and historical events serve a further purpose. They provide a model of how contemporary events are to be absorbed into the biblical paradigm. Since biblical events exemplify recurrent happenings, sin and redemption, forgiveness and atonement, they lose their one-time character. At the same time and in the same way, current events find a place within the ancient, but eternally present, paradigmatic scheme. So no new historical events, other than exemplary episodes in lives of heroes, demand narration because, through what is said about the past, what was happening in the times of the framers of Leviticus Rabbah would also come under consideration. This mode of dealing with biblical history and contemporary events produces two reciprocal effects. The first is the mythicization of biblical stories, their removal from the framework of ongoing, unique patterns of history and sequences of events and their transformation into accounts of things that happen all the time. The second is that contemporary events too lose all of their specificity and enter the paradigmatic framework of established mythic existence. So (1) the Scripture\u2019s myth happens every day, and (2) every day produces reenactment of the Scripture\u2019s myth.
\nIn seeking the substance of the mythic being invoked by the exegetes at hand, who read the text as if it spoke about something else and the world as if it lived out the text, we uncover a simple fact. At the center of the pretense, that is, the as-if mentality of Leviticus Rabbah and its framers, we find a simple proposition. Israel is God\u2019s special love. That love is shown in a simple way. Israel\u2019s present condition of subordination derives from its own deeds. It follows that God cares, so Israel may look forward to redemption on God\u2019s part in response to Israel\u2019s own regeneration through repentance. When the exegetes proceeded to open the scroll of Leviticus, they found numerous occasions to state that proposition in concrete terms and specific contexts. The sinner brings on his own sickness. But God heals through that very ailment. The nations of the world govern in heavy succession, but Israel\u2019s lack of faith guaranteed their rule and its moment of renewal will end it. Israel\u2019s leaders\u2014priests, prophets, kings\u2014fall into an entirely different category from those of the nations, as much as does Israel. In these and other concrete allegations, the same classical message comes forth.
\nAccordingly, at the foundations of the pretense lies the long-standing biblical-Jewish insistence that Israel\u2019s sorry condition in no way testifies to Israel\u2019s true worth\u2014the grandest pretense of all. All of the little evasions of the primary sense in favor of some other testify to this, the great denial that what is, is what counts. Leviticus Rabbah makes that statement with art and imagination. But it is never subtle about saying so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Salvation and Sanctification<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The message of Leviticus Rabbah attaches itself to the book of Leviticus, as if that book had come from prophecy and addressed the issue of salvation. But it came from the priesthood and spoke of sanctification. The paradoxical syllogism\u2014the as-if reading, the opposite of how things seem\u2014of the composers of Leviticus Rabbah therefore reaches simple formulation. In the very setting of sanctification we find the promise of salvation. In the topics of the cult and the priesthood we uncover the national and social issues of the moral life and redemptive hope of Israel. The repeated comparison and contrast of priesthood and prophecy, sanctification and salvation, turn out to produce a complement, which comes to most perfect union in the text at hand.
\nSince Leviticus Rabbah\u2019s authors devote a given parashah to a single paramount theme, let us now review the thirty-seven main themes and classify them among the established categories just now worked out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel and the Nations: Israel and God<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I. Moses as unique.
\nII. Israel as precious to God [see XXXVI below].
\nVI. Israel bore false witness through the golden calf.
\nVII. The calf brought enmity between God and Israel.
\nXI. The Israelite cult corresponds to creation.
\nXIII. Israel\u2019s food taboos are a mark of divine favor.
\nXVII. God\u2019s favor for Israel is shown by his punishing Israel in this world for its sins, a sign that it will be redeemed later on [see XVIII, XIX below].
\nXXIII. Israel is the rose, the nations, thorns.
\nXXV. The Torah protects Israel.
\nXXVI. The Torah\u2019s teachings are necessary to keep mortals pure.
\nXXX. Israel is subordinate to Esau because of insufficient mastery of the Torah.
\nXXXI. God does not need anything from Israel but makes demands to demonstrate his caring.
\nXXXII. God favors those who are humbled and reviled, namely, Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel\u2019s moral condition: The individual, the community<\/p>\n\n\n\n
III. Modest offering of a moral person is preferred.
\nV. All are equal before God, in both the penalty of sin and also atonement.
\nVIII. God favors the humble [see XXXII].
\nIX. God favors the thanksgiving offering, which is not necessitated by sin.
\nX. God favors those who are righteous and hate wickedness.
\nXI. The evils of drunkenness.
\nXIV. People should be humble.
\nXVI. God despises the arrogant and those who sin by things that they say [see XV below].
\nXVIII. Punishment heals.
\nXIX. God punishes but heals.
\nXX. The good and the evil die in the same way, merrymaking is inappropriate, and people should preserve a comely prudence and restraint.
\nXXII. Everything ultimately conforms to God\u2019s will.
\nXXIV. Israel\u2019s holiness depends on sexual purity.
\nXXXIII. What people say can kill or heal.
\nXXXIV. God favors those who help the poor.
\nXXXV. Israel\u2019s moral rules correspond to nature\u2019s laws.
\nXXXVI. Things are equivalent in importance, even if one usually takes priority over the other. But Jacob takes precedence.
\nXXXVII. Vowing is to be avoided.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel\u2019s Redemption: God\u2019s Punishment, Israel\u2019s Repentance and Restoration<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IV. God\u2019s rule is just; even when mortals suffer it is just punishment for sin.
\nXV. People\u2019s ailments are caused by their sins, particularly sins against society [see XVII above].
\nXXI. God saves Israel because of merit.
\nXXVII. God punishes the wicked.
\nXXVIII. The practice of religious duties wins merit and leads to redemption.
\nXXIX. Israel is judged with mercy, redeemed through merit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In these catalogues, I have proposed a single, brief unifying proposition to encompass the bulk, though obviously not all, of the paragraphs of thought of a given parashah. If we look once more at these statements, we notice the focus of nearly all of them comes to rest upon the society of Israel, its national fate and moral condition. Indeed, nearly all of the parashiyyot turn out to deal with the national, social condition of Israel, and this in three contexts: (1) Israel\u2019s setting in the history of the nations, (2) the character of the inner life of Israel itself, (3) the future history of Israel. So the biblical book that deals with the holy Temple now is shown to address the holy people. Leviticus really discusses not the consecration of the cult but the sanctification of the nation\u2014its conformity to God\u2019s will laid forth in the Torah, and God\u2019s rules.
\nSo when we review the document as a whole and ask what is that something else that the base text is supposed to address, it turns out that the sanctification of the cult stands for the salvation of the nation. So the nation now is like the cult then, the ordinary Israelite now like the priest then. The holy way of life lived now, through acts to which merit accrues, corresponds to the holy rites then. The process of metamorphosis is full, rich, complete. When everything stands for something else, the something else repeatedly turns out to be the nation. This is what our document spells out in exquisite detail, yet never missing the main point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
4<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Syllogism in Context: Address to the Age<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Literary Context<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In seeking to situate our document and its message in a larger context, we turn first of all to the near at hand. Leviticus Rabbah stands in close relationship to four prior documents, bits and pieces of which it utilizes for its own purposes. Two of these, the Mishnah and Tosefta, are simply cited verbatim. The other two, the Talmud of the Land of Israel (otherwise known as the Yerushalmi, the Palestinian Talmud) and Genesis Rabbah, share materials (paragraphs of thought or components thereof) with Leviticus Rabbah. As we noted earlier, some of these can be shown to be distinctive to the Genesis Rabbah, others to the Yerushalmi. Where the Yerushalmi and Leviticus Rabbah go over the same subject in the same words, we cannot definitively show that the passage was made up to serve the one and then was borrowed for the needs of the other. In any event, among these four available documents, the most important is the Yerushalmi. Its importance, to begin with, derives from the simple literary connection. But, as we seek to describe the larger system to which Leviticus Rabbah points, we shall see that the Yerushalmi provides a far more ample and complete picture of the whole world view at hand (though that picture too is partial) than does our document.
\nIf I had to specify the single most striking difference between the large picture presented by Leviticus Rabbah and the counterpart emerging from the Yerushalmi, it arises in the figure of the rabbi. To state matters simply, the Yerushalmi is about the rabbi and his role in Israel\u2019s sanctification now and salvation later. That is why the Torah defines a category in Yerushalmi. Leviticus Rabbah absorbs and takes for granted that same protean figure and his centrality in Israel\u2019s reality. But Leviticus Rabbah is not about the rabbi and what he says and does, in the way in which the Yerushalmi is. It is about Israel\u2019s moral condition and salvation. That is why the Torah does not contribute to the category formation of our document, as I pointed out earlier.
\nLet me then briefly survey the figure of the rabbi as he emerges in the Talmud of the Land of Israel. The reader will observe in the text of Leviticus Rabbah how much is taken for granted but how little is repeated out of this portrait. The Talmud of the Land of Israel portrays the rabbi as an effective authority over Israel. The rabbi was part of the administration of the patriarch, the Jews\u2019 ethnic ruler, who stood at the margins of the rabbinical estate, one foot in, the other out. The sage was limited in his power by popular will and consensus, by established custom, and by other sorts of Jewish Big Men. Furthermore, the rabbi as clerk and bureaucrat dealt with matters of surpassing triviality, a fair portion of them of no interest to anyone but a rabbi. He might decide which dog a flea might bite. But would the flea listen to him? Accordingly, the Talmud\u2019s voluminous evidence of the rabbis\u2019 quest for authority over the Jewish nation turns out to present ambiguities. On the one side, the rabbi could make some practical decisions. On the other, he competed for authority over Israel with the patriarch and with local village heads. And, in general, no Jew decided much.
\nLeviticus Rabbah, for its part, knows all the facts about the rabbi taken for granted in the Talmud of the Land of Israel. But its points of emphasis are different. While the Torah obviously forms the center of the salvific scheme at hand, the Torah\u2019s and the rabbi\u2019s miraculous powers, his right to decide things in accord with the Torah, his political role, his moral authority based on Torah learning\u2014these standard conventions of the Talmud of the Land of Israel make only infrequent appearances. The points of emphasis lie elsewhere, but, to be sure, these rest upon the given of rabbinical authority and charisma. The difference is one of emphasis, not of principle.
\nNow to the social setting of the literature at hand. The two documents (and their fellows) derive from a world in which Israel\u2019s situation grew ever darker. As we shall see in the next section, long-established rights, of many centuries standing, fell away. The institutions of Jewish self-rule, focused upon the patriarch, lost their power at the very moment at which the Yerushalmi had come to closure and Leviticus Rabbah was reaching its final condition as well. About these matters the authors of both documents say nothing.
\nYet silence is also a response. It is not possible to suppose that the rabbinic writers, by the end of the fourth century, in the aftermath of nearly a century of Christian rule and pagan disaster, of Jewish messianic fervor followed by a heartbreaking debacle\u2014it is not possible to suppose that the people who made the Talmud and Leviticus Rabbah did not recognize things had changed for the worse. Nor can we maintain for one moment the outlandish possibility that rabbis had nothing to say about the events of the day, merely pretending nothing was new. They knew. They cared. They judged. But if so, then we can suppose only one of two alternatives. Either the rabbis of the Talmud framed their document in total disregard of the issues of the day. Or they composed their principal literary monuments in the encounter with those issues but with serene certainty of their mastery of events. By harping on how they decided things and in the Yerushalmi inserting into the processes of legal theory precedents established in their courts, and by representing the life of Israel in such a way that the government of the nation was shown to be entirely within the hands of the nation\u2019s learned, legitimate authorities, the Talmud\u2019s sages stated quite clearly what they thought was going on. With its salvific message, Leviticus Rabbah declared that Israel remained Israel, wholly subject to its own law, entirely in control of its own destiny, fully possessed of its own land. Testimony to and vindication of the eternity of Israel lay in the continuing authority of Israel\u2019s sages, fully in control of God\u2019s Torah for Israel.
\nLet us now move onward from the place of the rabbi in the two documents to a larger contrast. When I described the larger system of the Yerushalmi (in Judaism in Society: The Evidence of the Yerushalmi), I found it possible to take up a rather broad and encompassing set of topics. The taxa of the preceding chapter by contrast turn out to treat only a few topics, albeit important ones. But the equivalent taxa for the Yerushalmi cover the matters of time and circumstance, traits of the evidence as a whole, the principal social form exhibited by the document, the sanction and teleology of the document\u2019s system as a whole. It is only this fourth taxon that proves useful in the equivalent analysis of Leviticus Rabbah. In that regard, we may see our document as an enormous amplification of one point of interest in its predecessor.
\nThe true contrast, in fact, is to be drawn between the Yerushalmi and its associated documents, including both Genesis Rabbah and Leviticus Rabbah, and the Mishnah and its complements in Abot, on the one side, and the Tosefta, on the other. How does the system adumbrated in the former set compare to the system fully exposed in the latter? In circa A.D. 200, the Mishnah, on which the Yerushalmi and its associated writings rest, looks to classical times. It describes an orderly world in which Israelite society is neatly divided among its castes, arranged in priority around the center that is the Temple, systematically engaged in a life of sanctification remote from the disorderly events of the day. The Talmud of the Land of Israel and Leviticus Rabbah, in circa A.D. 400, portray the chaos of Jews living among gentiles, governed by a diversity of authorities, lacking all order and arrangement, awaiting a time of salvation for which, through sanctification, they make themselves ready. The Mishnah\u2019s imaginary Israel is governed by an Israelite king, high priest, and Sanhedrin. The Talmud\u2019s and Leviticus Rabbah\u2019s flesh-and-blood Jews lived under rabbis near at hand, who settled everyday disputes of streets and households, and distant archons of a nameless state\u2014the fourth and final monarchy\u2014to be manipulated and placated, endured but survived. The Mishnah\u2019s Judaism breathes the pure air of public piazza and stoa; Judaism in the later documents, the ripe stench of private alleyway and courtyard. The image of the Mishnah\u2019s Judaism is evoked by the majestic Parthenon, perfect in all its proportions, conceived in a single moment of pure rationality. The other kind of Judaism is a scarcely choate cathedral in process, the labor of many generations, each of its parts the conception of a diverse moment of devotion, all of them the culmination of an ongoing and evolving revelation in the here and now, a snare for Heaven\u2019s light.
\nLeviticus Rabbah, in particular, represents a theory of how to compose a document totally the opposite of that of the Mishnah\u2019s authors. The Mishnah came into being in accord with a single literary and formal pattern. It began at the end point and worked backward, so that everything expresses a single aesthetic. Leviticus Rabbah, to the contrary, was made up at the end of a long process in which materials selected for use were completed. The work of the redactors of the Mishnah extended to every detail. That of the authors of Leviticus Rabbah came only at the end and ignored all details other than the choosing and ordering of topics. So in the unfolding of the rabbinic canon, Leviticus Rabbah marked a striking rejection of earlier theories of editing and authorship and developed a totally new concept of how to set out the work.
\nIn all, the second century yielded a single document of Judaism, the Mishnah. The dawn of the fifth century witnessed the beginnings and formation of many and the completion of one. By that time, the Talmud of the Land of Israel, a vast amplification of the Mishnah, neared closure. The Tosefta, a supplement to the Mishnah\u2019s materials in the Mishnah\u2019s own idiom and structure, was taking shape. The Sifra, a compilation of exegeses pertinent to Leviticus, with special interest in the relationship of the Mishnah\u2019s laws to those of Leviticus, would soon follow. In the hundred years beyond the closure of the Yerushalmi, a quite different mode of collection and organizations of sayings, represented by the compilations of exegetical remarks on Genesis and Leviticus, Genesis Rabbah and Leviticus Rabbah, would come to full expression. Nor may we silently pass by the other, greater and more influential Talmud, the one created in Babylonia, generally thought to have come to its final condition in the two centuries after the Yerushalmi\u2019s closure. Accordingly, the Mishnah, a single document, stands at the head of many paths. Numerous roads lead forward, out of the Mishnah.
\nUntil the composition of Genesis Rabbah and Leviticus Rabbah, however, none led backward, from the Mishnah to Scripture. In taking that long road back, Leviticus Rabbah in particular reverted to issues subordinated in the Mishnah but paramount in the Yerushalmi and other documents of the late fourth and early fifth centuries: the meaning of history, the advent of salvation, the task of Israel in the shaping of its own destiny by humbly accepting God\u2019s rules. We now turn to the political and historical context in which the issue of how Israel would be saved became so urgent as to refocus the organizing principles of literary discourse from the Mishnah to Scripture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Political Setting of Leviticus Rabbah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Every composition in the rabbinic canon that reached closure from the fourth century onward delivers essentially the same message. But it was commonplace long before as well. Leviticus Rabbah joins a sizable company when it tells the Jewish nation that its moral condition dictates its political and national context. Subjugation comes on account of sin, redemption will follow atonement and regeneration. It would be difficult to compose a more familiar theological sentence, indeed, in the setting of the entire context of priestly and prophetic writing, from biblical times onward. All that separates the message of Leviticus Rabbah from salvific doctrines of all prior Judaisms emerges from a single symbol. It is the framers\u2019 commonplace resort to the symbol of the Torah and the rabbi, and to a range of secondary embodiments of that symbol. But, as we saw, Leviticus Rabbah does not resort to Torah as a principal category of its system or devote substantial discourse to the Torah or to study of the Torah. These self-evidently constitute the foundation and the given, but not the focus and the point of generative tension. And, so far as we survey the shelves of books of the rabbinic canon bearing the dates of the fourth and fifth centuries, only with enormous difficulty can we differentiate this composition from the others.
\nOf greater interest is the setting to which the document at hand, along with the Talmud of the Land of Israel, Genesis Rabbah, and certain other writings, testifies. Yet before describing matters, I have to specify why the setting matters at all. When we find special interest in the matter of how Israel may participate in the process leading to its salvation, of course, we surely must conclude that salvific issues reflect political crisis. But we cannot claim that that point of stress testifies to a circumstance particular to a given age. From the return to Zion onward, Israelite writers speculated on what had to be done to secure permanent salvation. That is why they composed the Hebrew Scriptures as we know them. From A.D. 70 onward, moreover, people offered explanations of what had to be done, and not done, to secure salvation in the aftermath of the end of blood rites. Accordingly, the special interest and message of Leviticus Rabbah take up a place at the end of a long procession of writings on the same subject. The message, moreover, in its general principles would not have surprised earlier thinkers, though some of the details would have proved unfamiliar. So we cannot claim more than we know. The fact at hand is simple. The redactors who spoke through Leviticus Rabbah in its final composition did address their own day. To understand the urgency, if not the detailed contents, of their message, therefore, we do have to pay attention to the condition of Israel at that time, that is, at the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth centuries in the Land of Israel. What they wished to say clearly seemed to them sufficiently pressing that they worked very hard to compose an enormous composition for stating their message to their time. So, in a word, the message may be familiar, but the age that provoked it is not.
\nAs to the time at hand, the beginning, the period of the formation of Leviticus Rabbah (and its companions), is marked off by the completion of the Mishnah, at circa A.D. 200, and, at the end, by the closure of the Talmud of the Land of Israel, at circa A.D. 400, and Leviticus Rabbah in the next decades. The reason these boundaries appear firm is simple. No authorities of Leviticus Rabbah appear also in the Mishnah. So by definition, all the named masters come after circa A.D. 200, perhaps even a century later. The shared materials of Leviticus Rabbah and the Yerushalmi testify that the two documents came to composition and closure at approximately the same time, hence at circa A.D. 400\u2013450. These dates of course constitute mere guesses, but they serve to tell us with what centuries we deal. The tumultuous centuries at hand witnessed the transition from late antiquity to early medieval times. The Roman Empire became two, dividing East from West; turned from pagan to Christian, from the mode of being we know as classical to the one we identify as medieval. The birth of the system of Judaism to which Leviticus Rabbah gives partial testimony thus forms a chapter in the history of the movement of the West from its Greek, Roman, and Israelite beginnings, to its full expression in Christianity, for the generality of Europe; (later on) in Islam, for Africa and Asia; and in Judaism, for the margins of both worlds.
\nA very brief account of the principal historical traits of the third and fourth centuries allows us to form a picture of Leviticus Rabbah in its world. To state matters simply, the third century produced collapse, the fourth century reconstruction. In the third century the old order crumbled. In the fourth, the rubble of the classical age was reshaped into the foundations of the medieval world. The world of circa A.D. 200 stood continuous with a long and stable past. The age of circa A.D. 400 looked forward to a long and continuous future, with institutions stretching onward to Europe and the Middle Ages. The Eastern empire was so strongly founded that it endured for another thousand years. But in-between, behind, and near at hand, in the interim, one could see only the abyss\u2014a lost past, an uncertain future, a difficult present. What had happened, in brief summary, was that, at the beginning of the third century, the centuries-old principate, under which the Roman empire had flourished, had come to an end. For two-and-a-half centuries, the Augustan political structure had sustained a vast empire with peace and consequent prosperity. From 235 to 285, by contrast, the government fell apart in civil wars. From the murder of Alexander Severus in 235 to the victory of Diocletian in 284, there was anarchy. The twenty years of peace provided by Diocletian from 285 to 305 were followed by further civil war. It was Constantine who in the earlier fourth century reunited the empire and reestablished government. The causes of the century of collapse and ruin need not detain us. What is important to know is that, for the world at large, the fourth century proved a time of reordering and reconstruction of stability.
\nLet us proceed to somewhat more detail. The frontiers of the Roman Empire cracked open in the middle of the third century, admitting armies of marauders East, North, and West. The task of the later third- and fourth-century emperors, East and West, then was to stem the tide, reconstruct a defensible border, and reestablish effective government over vast territories. This they did in ample measure in the East. Accordingly, the history of the Land of Israel as part of the Roman Empire of the third and fourth centuries is the story of crisis and remission, calamitous collapse and painful reconstruction. When the Empire suffered assault on all fronts, a long sequence of hapless emperors proved unable to protect the homeland and defend the frontiers. All of this manifest history happened at the surface of the world. Underneath, the old and established order continued its slow and majestic progress. The latent or subterranean history, to a corner of which our document testifies, was considerably less dramatic but no less important. Great landowners, the educated upper classes of the towns and countryside, retained their estates and long-term power. In these classes there was a systematic exercise of nostalgia, as various groups sought to regain roots in the past, patronized scholars, restudied the classics. As Peter Brown puts it (World, p. 21): \u201cAs the Mediterranean receded, so a more ancient world came to light. Craftsmen in Britain returned to the art forms of the La T\u00e8ne age. The serf of late Roman Gaul reemerged with his Celtic name, the vassus. The arbiters of piety of the Roman world, the Coptic hermits of Egypt, revived the language of the Pharaohs; and the hymn writers of Syria heaped on Christ appellations of Divine Kingship that reach back to Sumerian times.\u201d In this context, the reversion of the composers of Leviticus Rabbah to the ancient Scriptures in their search for authority forms part of a larger movement back to roots and tradition rediscovered and invented at one and the same time.
\nIn 312 Constantine achieved power in the West, and in 323 he took the government of the entire Roman empire into his own hands. Establishing his capital in the East, at Byzantium, Constantine rebuilt a sizable administration, capable of raising money to pay for an army and bureaucracy. In the year 313 he promulgated the edict of Milan, in which Christianity attained the status of toleration. Christians and all others were given the free power to follow the religion of their choice. Constantine himself became a Christian sometime thereafter. In the next decade Christianity became the most favored religion. Converts from Judaism were protected and could not be persecuted by Jews. Christians were freed of the obligation to perform pagan sacrifices. Priests were exempted from certain taxes. Sunday became an obligatory day of rest. Celibacy was permitted. From 324 onward Constantine ceased to maintain a formal impartiality, now intervening in the affairs of the Church, settling quarrels among believers, and calling the Church Council at Nicaea (325) to settle issues of the faith. He was baptized only on the eve of his death in 337. From the viewpoint of the affairs of the East, his most important act was the founding of Constantinople, the second Rome, destined to become the guardian of classical civilization for a thousand years. Reaching his decision in 324, Constantine had the notion of turning ancient Byzantium into a city that was wholly Christian. The city was inaugurated in 330 and became the effective capital of the East.
\nOver the next century the pagan cults were destroyed, their priests deprived of support, their intellectuals bereft of standing. The issues of the day were to be debated within the agenda of Christianity; the goal of the day was to attain orthodoxy. In the time of Constantine, the result of the engagement of the state, through the emperor, in affairs of the Church, first became clear in the protracted Athanasian-Arian controversy. In the end, the Church changed in character, becoming all-powerful even within the lifetimes of men who had faced persecution and death in its cause. Unprepared for a role in civil and political life, Christianity had promised a kingdom of Heaven. But the church of Christ in heaven gained its realm in the here and now. Using the state to fight its enemies, it became subservient to the state as well. So Constantine first legitimated, then adopted Christianity. He began by bringing to an end the intense persecution undertaken in 303 by Diocletian, rescinding his decree in the West in 306, and arranging the toleration of all religions in 312. He ended by seizing the property of pagan temples and endowing Christian churches, lavishing upon the clergy valuable rights as well.
\nWe see, then, that the fourth century was \u201cthe age of the restoration.\u201d Even coins called it by that name: Reparatio Saeculi (Brown, World, p. 34). It was a time Brown describes (World, p. 34) as \u201cthe background of a rich and surprisingly resilient society, that had reached a balance and attained a structure significantly different from the classical Roman period.\u201d The age was marked by a widening gulf between rich and poor, and by confiscatory taxes (a third of a farmer\u2019s gross produce) inflexibly applied and ill distributed. A further trait was intense provinciality. Leaders came out of their own society and stayed there. Officials governed provinces in which they owned large tracts of land (Brown, World, p. 36). Ruling groups therefore knew their territories well and could govern effectively, as in the case of the Jewish patriarchs of the Holy Land. The great man\u2014the patron or boss\u2014interceded for his clients but also told them what to do. At the end the rabbi emerged out of the same mold.
\nFor nearly everyone in the Roman world, the most important event of the period in which Genesis Rabbah, the Talmud of the Land of Israel, and Leviticus Rabbah were coming into being was the legalization of Christianity in the aftermath of ferocious persecutions, followed very rapidly by the adoption of Christianity as the state\u2019s most favored religion. The astonishing advent of legitimacy and even power provoked the rewriting of Christian and world history and the working out of theology as reflection on this new polity and its meaning in the unfolding of human history. A new commonwealth came into being, taking over the old and reshaping it for the new age. The Church at just this time emerged as an organization competing with the state and attracted some of the aristocracy and some remarkably creative intellectuals. By the end of the fourth century, with Theodosius\u2019 law of A.D. 392, the practice of paganism had been outlawed. The great city, Rome, fell to barbarians in 410. There never was a more momentous century in the history of the West. On all of these immense events, the rabbinic canon, including both Leviticus Rabbah and the Talmud of the Land of Israel, a document of the very same years, maintains perfect silence.
\nA continuous survey, year by year, of the history of the Jews in the Land of Israel is neither necessary nor possible, because our principal documents, including Genesis Rabbah, Leviticus Rabbah, and the Talmud of the Land of Israel, are essentially ahistorical. Such tales and fables as they do tell us are disconnected, notoriously difficult to interpret as accounts of things that really happened on some one day. In any event they always are reshaped for the didactic or theological purposes of the storyteller. On the basis of independent evidence, not a single one of them can be verified or falsified as to the main point they choose to relate or the dramatic narrative they claim to provide. Using the Talmud and Leviticus Rabbah in order to discover manifest history\u2014what was really happening to the Jews of the Land from one period to the next\u2014is not possible. The rabbis\u2019 information is of another order entirely.
\nThe indifference of the framers of the rabbinic writings to events that strike us as important is easy to prove. As I said just now, to take a single stunning example, the conversion of Constantine to Christianity must be regarded, as Lot says (p. 39), as \u201cthe most important fact in the history of the Mediterranean world between the establishment of the hegemony of Rome and the setting up of Islam.\u201d The rabbinic canon nowhere refers to that event, scarcely gives testimony to its consequences for the Jews, and continues to harp upon prohibited relationships with \u201cpagans\u201d in general, as though nothing had changed from the third century to the fourth.
\nOne other event requires attention, one I regard as definitive for the Judaism at hand. It is the reversion to paganism of the emperor Julian, circa 360. That move involved a measure of favor to Jews and Judaism. He permitted the rebuilding of the Temple at Jerusalem, but died before much progress could be made. For a moment Jews were moved to celebrate the near-term advent of the Messiah, the rebuilding of Jerusalem, the restoration of the Temple and its blood rites. But the hopes, so unexpectedly aroused, rapidly dissipated. Julian died on his Iranian campaign, Christian emperors resumed rule, and the policy of the state undertook to insure that never again would the hegemony of Christianity over paganism come under siege. In the context of the power of the messianic hope, the pathos of disappointment, in which in the second century we find the composition of the Mishnah, in the fourth century the writing of the Talmud and the first exegetical collections came about. From the time of Julian, for nearly three quarters of a century, there was, in Michael Avi-Yonah\u2019s words, \u201cthe great assault on the Jews and Judaism.\u201d But he observes that in the first part of this period, 363\u2013383, no important changes affected the status of the Jews. From the accession of Theodosius II in 383 to the death of his son, Arcadius, in 408, there was an \u201cenergetic attack on Judaism by the leaders of the church, mainly through pressure on the imperial government. The government ceded here and there but did not cause serious injury to the Jewish community as a whole or to Jews as individuals\u201d (Avi-Yonah, p. 208). Only in the final period, from the accession of Theodosius II to the publication of his third Novella, 408\u2013438, were Jews\u2019 rights both as individuals and in communities \u201cseriously curtailed. The patriarchate was abolished\u201d (ibid.).
\nTheodosius I, from 392\u2013395, issued a number of laws protecting Jews. From 398\u2013404, there were laws contradicting one another in policy, some confirming, some abrogating the same right. But from 404 onward, anti-Jewish laws tended to limit Jewish rights. The basic policy was to isolate Jews, prevent them from growing in numbers, lower their status, and suppress their instruments of self-government (Avi-Yonah, p. 213). Laws against intermarriage posed no problem to the Jews. The ones limiting proselytism and those protecting converts from Judaism did not affect many people. But the edicts that reduced Jews to second-class citizenship did matter. They were not to hold public office but had to sit on city councils responsible for the payment of taxes. Later, they were removed from the councils, though still obligated, of course, for taxes. Between 404 and 438 Jews were forbidden to hold offices in the civil service, represent cities, serve in the army or at the bar, and they ultimately were evicted from every public office. These were hardly of much practical importance (Avi-Yonah, p. 216).
\nIn the earliest decade of the fifth century, however, Jewish self-governing communities retained their autonomy. Avi-Yonah (pp. 217\u2013218) provides a convenient summary:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The legal change as regards the communal autonomy occurred in 415. Till then the Roman government followed the traditional line of supporting the Jewish self-governing communities. In 392, while promulgating laws against the Jews in the matters of mixed marriages and proselytism, the emperors were still defending the Jewish courts instituted by the patriarch. They discouraged for instance appeals to the civic courts against excommunications pronounced by these courts. In 396 all intervention by strangers in Jewish markets which aimed at interference with the free movement of prices was forbidden. In 397 the community officials, who were under the authority of the patriarch, were freed from the curiae. If the patriarch dismissed them, they would lose the privilege; in this way the power and authority of the patriarch were much enhanced by the Roman government. In 398 a law was made which seemed prima facie to subject the Jews to the authority of the Roman court and their laws. In fact it left a loophole, in that it authorized the Jews to have recourse to courts of arbitration in civil matters. The rabbinical courts continued to act in the guise of arbitrators and the civil courts were instructed to carry out their decisions. In 412 the right of Jews not to appear before the civil courts on Sabbaths and Jewish holidays was confirmed. It seems that many Christians had great confidence in the uprightness of the rabbinical courts. They asked such courts to judge their cases, especially if the defendant was a Jew. In 415 this practice was forbidden. All cases between Christians and Jews were henceforward to be tried by the ordinary civil court. This was the first real infringement of Jewish judicial autonomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 404 the privileges of the patriarchate were confirmed. A decade later, accused of building new synagogues, causing Christian slaves to be circumcised, and judging litigations of Christians, the patriarch was reprimanded by Theodosius and deprived of his status. Christian slaves were freed. New synagogues were destroyed (Avi-Yonah, pp. 227\u2013228). When Gamaliel VI died, the patriarchate came to an end.
\nThe facts briefly summarized in the foregoing paragraphs leave little doubt about the context in which our document lays stress on the messianic doctrine. The chronic issue of salvation became acute in the time of Julian, circa 360. The disappointment following his premature death and failure to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem demanded a response. I cannot think of a more pointed reply than we have found in our document. It is quite simple. The ineluctable questions of the day found answers, point by point, in the document at hand. The basic mode of thought\u2014denial of what is at hand in favor of a deeper reality\u2014proves remarkably apt. The substance of thought confronts the crisis too.
\n\u201cAre we lost for good to the fourth empire? No, we may yet be saved.
\n\u201cHas God rejected us forever? No, aided by the merit of the patriarchs and matriarchs and of the Torah and religious duties, we gain God\u2019s love.
\n\u201cWhat must we do to be saved? We must do nothing, we must be something: sanctified.
\n\u201cThat status we gain through keeping the rules that make Israel holy. So salvation is through sanctification, all embodied in Leviticus read as rules for the holy people.\u201d
\nThe Messiah will come not because of what a pagan emperor does, nor, indeed, because of Jewish action either, but because of Israel\u2019s own moral condition. When Israel enters the right relationship with God, then God will respond to Israel\u2019s condition by restoring things to their proper balance. Israel cannot, but need not, so act as to force the coming of the Messiah. Israel can so attain the condition of sanctification, by forming a moral and holy community, that God\u2019s response will follow the established prophecy of Moses and the prophets. So the basic doctrine of Leviticus Rabbah is the metamorphosis of Leviticus. Instead of holy caste, we deal with holy people. Instead of holy place, we deal with holy community, in its holy Land. The deepest exchange between reality and inner vision, therefore, comes at the very surface: the rereading of Leviticus in terms of a different set of realities from those to which the book, on the surface, relates. No other biblical book would have served so well; it had to be Leviticus. Only through what the framers did on that particular book could they deliver their astonishing message and vision.
\nThe complementary points of stress in Leviticus Rabbah\u2014the age to come will come, but Israel must reform itself beforehand\u2014address that context defined by Julian, on the one side, and by the new anti-Judaic Christian policy, on the other. The repeated reference to Esau and Edom and how they mark the last monarchy before God\u2019s through Israel underlines the same point. These truly form the worst of the four kingdoms. But they also come at the end. If only we shape up, so will history. As I said, that same message will hardly have surprised earlier generations, and it would be repeated afresh later on. But it is the message of our document, and it does address this context in particular. We therefore grasp an astonishing correspondence between how people are thinking, what they wish to say, and the literary context\u2014rereading a particular book of Scripture in terms of a set of values different from those expressed in that book\u2014in which they deliver their message. Given the mode of thought, the crisis that demanded reflection, the message found congruent to the crisis, we must find entirely logical the choice of Leviticus and the treatment accorded to it. So the logic and the doctrine\u2014the logos and topos of our opening discussion\u2014prove remarkably to accord with the society and politics that produced and received Leviticus Rabbah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Message and Matrix: The Larger System<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Leviticus Rabbah takes for granted a substantial and well-formed system of Judaism. But nothing in the document suggests that the framers imagine they are the first to set forth that system, whole or in part. On the contrary, like the Yerushalmi, the text at hand points toward a larger matrix, a world view and way of life constituted by that community of Israel to whom the composition at hand speaks. I cannot point to a single passage in which an author proposes to demonstrate against opposition that any truly fundamental point is valid. By that I mean, the framers simply take for granted at all points that the symbols and values they espouse require application and forceful advocacy, but not proof. Torah is a given; the coming of the Messiah in response not to Israel\u2019s action but to its condition is a well-known fact. The promise that the much yearned for \u201cage to come\u201d will come soon, if only Israel reforms itself, reinforces the basic theme and thesis of the book. But it does not appear that the framers of Leviticus Rabbah saw themselves as the first to say so. Thus, it is clear, Leviticus Rabbah testifies to the existence of a coherent world view and way of life embodied in a distinct and distinctive society, the rabbis\u2014masters and disciples\u2014or estate of Jews of the third and fourth century in the Land of Israel. But, as I must emphasize, before us in Leviticus Rabbah is no complete system of Judaism contained in a single document. The Judaism to which Leviticus Rabbah testifies defines the matrix in which, among other documents, Leviticus Rabbah came into being. But this composition and each of its fellows do not constitute the sole, or even the most important, piece of evidence about that kind of Judaism. Nor is there a single document that expresses that whole. Accordingly, the Judaism in Genesis Rabbah, Leviticus Rabbah, and the Talmud of the Land of Israel is not the Judaism only of those books.
\nBefore proceeding, let me briefly allude to the contemporary and companion of Leviticus Rabbah, the Talmud of the Land of Israel. That document, like the one at hand, also testifies to the rabbinic system of which it too forms a principal part. As I explained earlier, its points of insistence prove congruent to, but essentially distinct from, those of Leviticus Rabbah. The Talmud of the Land of Israel, to begin with, is organized as a phrase-by-phrase exegesis of the Mishnah, not of Scripture. It speaks about many things with a single voice. Its modes of discourse are not much differentiated, in particular, when a passage of the Mishnah comes under analysis. Then we find a limited range of repetitious rhetoric of patterns through which any passage of Mishnah exegesis will unfold. A remarkably limited repertoire of exegetical initiatives was available to the framers of the Yerushalmi\u2019s discussions of passages of the Mishnah. They are likely to choose and carry out one of only a handful of procedures. Indeed, these may be reduced to two: explain the simple meaning of a passage, or expand and theorize about one passage in the light of other passages (or of a problem common to several passages). Exegesis may therefore take the form of (1) explanation of the meaning of a given pericope of the Mishnah, or (2) expansion upon the meaning. It follows that if we understand what the Talmud does with a single item, we also may confidently claim to describe and make sense of what the Talmud is apt to do with a great many such items.
\nGiven the calamities of the later fourth and early fifth century, in which the document at hand came into being, and the uncertainty about what was to follow, we shall hardly be surprised to discover in the Yerushalmi, as much as in Leviticus Rabbah, a document aimed on every page at the reaffirmation and validation of the faith of Judaism as the rabbis had framed it. In an age of deep self-doubt, the Yerushalmi\u2019s framers spoke confidently about the basis, in revelation accurately transmitted and logically understood, of Israel\u2019s true salvation through the Torah as the rabbi represented it. That is the meaning of the Yerushalmi\u2019s Judaism, deriving from its context, the traits of its text, and its larger matrix. Accordingly, while the Talmud of the Land of Israel aims principally at the exegesis and amplification of the laws of the Mishnah, it also points toward a matrix beyond its text. On the one hand, the Talmudic interest in the Mishnah\u2019s statements is purposeful. Transcending the Mishnah\u2019s facts, it expresses the speculative concerns of philosophical lawyers wholly within the framework of the Mishnah\u2019s modes of thought. But these same exegetes\u2014both the ones who are named and the still more influential ones who speak through the Talmud\u2019s single voice\u2014speak implicitly within the framework of a larger world view not exhausted by the Mishnah. They bring to the Mishnah a program defined outside of the Mishnah and expressing concerns of a segment of society beyond their own immediate circle. The comparison, in the present context, to Leviticus Rabbah, need scarcely detain us. That document too points toward the matrix of a system beyond its pages. That document too takes up the exegesis of a prior text but reads that text in a remarkably independent way. The work speaks implicitly of a world view not exhausted by Scripture or the Mishnah. So the redactors bring to both a program defined outside of either one and expressive of urgent concerns of a segment of society beyond their immediate circle. In a large scale, both the Yerushalmi and Leviticus Rabbah belong within the same taxonomic framework.
\nTo present a complete account of the system of Judaism presented by the Yerushalmi and Leviticus Rabbah, we should have to move far beyond the limits of both books. An adequate description of the larger system of their Judaism requires attention to a fair number of documents beyond the one at hand. As we know, these include at least ten other compilations of biblical exegeses besides Leviticus Rabbah, the Tosefta, the entirety of the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, and various other minor tractates, compositions of prayers, and other writings of rabbis in late antiquity. It therefore would not serve to limit the pertinent data for the description and interpretation of the kind of Judaism to which our book points merely to the book itself. For we should find ourselves attempting to interpret as a whole what in fact is merely a half-completed description of the entire system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Salvation in the Larger System<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But we can spell out the main point of the larger system as a whole: how Israel is to be saved. The rabbinic system\u2019s ultimate concern was to provide Israel with an account of how to overcome the unsatisfactory circumstances of an unredeemed present, so as to accomplish the movement from here to the much-desired future. When the authorities of Leviticus Rabbah present statements on the promise of the law for those who keep it, therefore, they provide glimpses of the goal of the system as a whole. For both the nation and the individual, the answer was the same\u2014to attain salvation. For the individual, that meant the life of the world to come; and for the nation, the return to, and restoration of, Jerusalem and its holy Temple. The system\u2019s teleology is not stated with great frequency in discourse even on exegetical and theological issues. Yet, once emerging with force and authority, the purpose of the system as a whole is amply clear. The profundity of the message, its decisive place at the center and heart of matters, its power to impart to the Judaism to which Leviticus Rabbah attests life-force and meaning\u2014these become self-evident, once a statement of the ultimate and critical points of insistence comes forth.
\nLooking backward from the end of the fourth century to the end of the first, the framers of our document surely perceived what two hundred years earlier, with the closure of the Mishnah, need not have appeared obvious and unavoidable, namely, the definitive end, for here and now at any rate, of the old order of cultic sanctification. That again is why Leviticus in particular demanded a rereading. It could not speak about what it seemed to address. It had to refer to something else. Each verse required interdigitation with a verse of another sort entirely. After a hundred years there may have been some doubt. After two centuries more with the fiasco of Julian near at hand, there can have been little hope left. The Mishnah had designed a world in which the Temple stood at the center, a society in which the priests presided at the top, and a way of life in which the dominant issue was the sanctification of Israelite life. Whether the full realization of that world, society, and way of life was thought to come sooner or later, the system had been meant only initially as a utopia, but in the end as a plan and constitution for a material society here in the Land of Israel. Two hundred years now had passed from the closure of the Mishnah to the completion of Genesis Rabbah, Leviticus Rabbah, and the Talmud of the Land of Israel. Much had changed. Roman power had receded from part of the world. Pagan rule had given way to the sovereignty of Christian emperors. The old order was cracking; the new order was not yet established.
\nBut, from the perspective of Israel, the waiting went on. The interim from Temple to Temple was not differentiated. Whether conditions were less favorable or more favorable hardly made a difference. History stretched backward, to a point of disaster, and forward, to an unseen and incalculable time beyond the near horizon. Short of supernatural events, salvation was not in sight. Israel for its part lived under its own government, framed within the rules of sanctification, and constituted a holy society. But when would salvation come, and how could people even now hasten its day? These issues, in the nature of things, proved more pressing as the decades rolled by, becoming first one century, then another, while none knew how many more, and how much more, must still be endured.
\nSo the unredeemed state of Israel and the world, the uncertain fate of the individual\u2014these framed and defined the context in which all forms of Judaism necessarily took shape. The question of salvation presented each with a single ineluctable agendum. But it is not merely an axiom generated by our hindsight that makes it necessary to interpret all of a system\u2019s answers in the light of the single question of salvation. In the case of the Judaism to which Leviticus Rabbah attests, the matter is explicitly stated.
\nIn the Mishnah\u2019s entire corpus of ideas, there is scarcely a hint of the paramount idea of the earlier second century, the hope for the imminent advent of the Messiah. The Mishnah\u2019s system, whole and complete, remains reticent on the entire theme. By contrast, our document finds ample place for a rich collection of statements on the messianic theme. What this means is that, between the conclusion of the Mishnah and the closure of the Talmud and Leviticus Rabbah, room had been found for the messianic hope.
\nThe \u201crabbinization\u201d of the messianic hope required its neutralization, so that, as in A.D. 360, peoples\u2019 hopes would not be raised prematurely, with consequent, incalculable damage to the defeated nation. We have seen how this is done in Leviticus Rabbah. First of all, rabbis insisted the Messiah would come in a process extending over a long period of time, thus not imposing a caesura upon the existence of the nation and disrupting its ordinary life. Accordingly, Leviticus Rabbah treats the messianic hope as something gradual, to be worked toward, not a sudden cataclysmic event. That conception was fully in accord with the notion that the everyday deeds of people formed a pattern continuous with the salvific history of Israel. The improvement in standards of observing the Torah, therefore, to be effected by the nation\u2019s obedience to the clerks, will serve as a guidepost on the road to redemption. The moral condition of the nation ultimately guarantees salvation. God will respond to Israel\u2019s regeneration, planning all the while to save the saved, that is, those who save themselves.
\nThe hope for the Messiah\u2019s coming is further joined to the moral condition of each individual Israelite. Hence the messianic fulfillment was made to depend on the repentance of Israel. The entire drama, envisioned by others in earlier types of Judaism as a world-historical event, was reworked in context into a moment in the life of the individual and the people of Israel collectively. The coming of the Messiah depended not on historical action but on moral regeneration. So from a force that moved Israelites to take up weapons on the battlefield, the messianic hope and yearning were transformed into motives for spiritual regeneration and ethical behavior. The energies released in the messianic fervor were then linked to rabbinical government, through which Israel would form the godly society.
\nThe advent of the Messiah will not be heralded by the actions of a pagan king. Whoever relies upon the salvation of a gentile is going to be disappointed. Israel\u2019s salvation depends wholly upon Israel itself. Two things follow. First, the Jews were made to take up the burden of guilt for their own sorry situation. But, second, they also gained not only responsibility for, but also power over, their fate. They could do something about salvation, just as their sins had brought about their tragedy. This old, familiar message, in no way particular to the clerks of Leviticus Rabbah, took on specificity and concreteness in the context of our document, which invoked a rather detailed program for reform and regeneration.
\nEspecially striking in the rabbinical doctrine of salvation is the blurring of boundaries between the nation and the individual. Suffering affected both. Catastrophe of a historical and one-time event, such as the destruction of the Temple, was brought into juxtaposition with personal suffering and death. Accordingly, while the things the nation and its people must be saved from were many, the mode of salvation was one. The consequence for the theory of salvation was this. Torah might protect a person from suffering or death, and Torah might in due course save Israel from its subjugation to the nations of the world. In regard to both the individual and society, Torah would save Israel for a life of Torah in Heaven as much as on earth.
\nSince Heaven was conceived in the model of earth, so that the analysis of traditions on earth corresponded to the discovery of the principles of creation, the full realization of the teachings of Torah on earth, in the life of Israel, would transform Israel into a replica of heaven on earth. We deal, therefore, with a doctrine of salvation in which the operative symbol, namely, Torah, and the determinative deed, namely, Torah learning, defined not only how to reach salvation but also the very nature of the salvation to be attained. The system was whole and cogent. Entering it at any point, we find ourselves at once before the structure as a whole. It is important, then, to recognize, as we do, that the profound issues confronting Israelite existence, national and individual alike, were framed in terms of Torah and resolved through the medium of Torah. Stated simply: salvation was to come from Torah; the nature of salvation was defined in Torah.
\nNo wonder, then, that the framers of Leviticus Rabbah created the composition as we have it. What was profoundly specific to the authors of Leviticus Rabbah, in the larger scheme of salvation through Torah, was the choice of the book of Leviticus as that part of the Torah that would present the rules of salvation. The message then stood out from the traits of the whole, not only the specific statements of the parts. If you want to be saved, become holy. Since you will be saved through the Torah, study that part of the Torah that tells how to be saved, which is the book of Leviticus. It is no surprise that, for centuries following, Jewish children began their study of Torah with the book of Leviticus. Nothing would have served so well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Logic of the Composition in Context<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The authors of Leviticus Rabbah express their ideas, first, by selecting materials already written for other purposes and using them for their own; second, by composing materials; and third, by arranging both in parashiyyot into an order through which propositions may reach expression. As we sifted and resifted traits of organization and topics of discourse, we reached two complementary conclusions leading to a single proposition.
\nThe formal conclusion was that the principal mode of thought required one thing to be read in terms of another, one verse in light of a different verse (or topic, theme, symbol, idea), one situation in light of another.
\nThe substantive conclusion was that the principal subject of our composition is the moral condition of Israel, on the one side, and the salvation of Israel, on the other.
\nThe single unifying proposition\u2014the syllogism at the document\u2019s deepest structure\u2014was that Israel\u2019s salvation depends upon its moral condition.
\nIn these three statements we are able to account for the literary character and the topical contents of the document and, further, to express its single paramount proposition. The context in which the work of selection, arrangement, and composition went on, of course, is one (if not uniquely) in which Israel\u2019s salvation framed the issue of the times.
\nAt the outset I alleged that we have at hand a syllogistic statement, by which I mean a statement of logical, not merely rhetorical, coherence. I promised to specify the logic that defines the underlying principle to account for the unity and cogency of the whole. The logic in substance has now been identified. My reason for maintaining that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes not merely diverse thoughts but a single, sustained composition, is fully exposed. But the question remains, in the context of logical discourse, what sort of syllogism do we have in hand? It is to this matter that we now turn. The question demands attention, because when we answer it we shall know how the framers communicate. We shall claim to understand how, through selecting existing materials and including compositions of new ones, they develop their points and establish a discourse sufficiently cogent and logical to make an important point.
\nSince I claim that the authors do state propositions, I have at the end to make that claim stick by showing how they do so. It is, in a word, through a rich tapestry of unstated propositions that only are illustrated, delineated at the outset, by the statement of some propositions that also are illustrated. It is, in a word, a syllogism by example\u2014that is, by repeated appeal to facts\u2014rather than by argument alone. For in context an example constitutes a fact. The source of many examples or facts is Scripture, the foundation of all reality. Accordingly, in the context of Israelite life and culture, in which Scripture recorded facts, we have a severely logical, because entirely factual, statement of how, rightly organized and classified, facts sustain a proposition. In context that proposition is presented as rigorously and critically as the social rules of discourse allowed.
\nPrecisely what sort of syllogism does our document set forth? In my view, it is a perfectly simple one (which biblical historians and prophets used all the time, as at Leviticus 26\u201327): if X, then Y; if not X, then not Y. If Israel carries out its moral obligations, then God will redeem Israel. If Israel does not, then God will punish Israel. This simple statement is given innumerable illustrations, for example, Israel in times past repented, therefore God saved them. Israel in times past sinned, therefore God punished them. Other sorts of statements follow suit. God loves the humble and despises the haughty. Therefore God saves the humble and punishes the haughty. In the same terms, if a person is humble, then God will save him, and if one is haughty, then God will punish him. Accordingly, if one condition is met, then another will come about. And the opposite also is the fact. True, the document does not express these syllogisms in the form of arguments at all. Rather they come before us as statements of fact, and the facts upon which numerous statements rest derive from Scripture. So, on the surface, there is not a single statement in the document that a Greco-Roman logician would have understood, since the formal patterns of Greco-Roman logic do not make an appearance. Yet once we translate the statements the authors do make into the language of abstract discourse, we find exact correspondences between the large-scale propositions of the document and the large-scale syllogisms of familiar logic.
\nAlong these same lines, we may find numerous individual examples in which, in exquisite detail, the syllogistic mode at hand\u2014if X, then Y; if not X, then not Y\u2014defines the pattern of discourse. The logic at hand, at its deepest layers, accords with the formal logic of the Stoic logic of propositions (described by Berchman in Appendix One). We find both brief and simple propositions that make sense of large-scale compositions, for example, on humility and arrogance, and also an overall scheme of proposition and argument, a micro- and a macrosyllogistic discourse, with the small and the large corresponding to one another.
\nThe place of Scripture in such a logical system now requires explanation. To understand how Scripture functions, we have clearly to grasp the larger logical matrix.
\nIn light of the account of the syllogistic possibilities at hand, we may identify the theorems of argumentation operative in our document (and not alone here, of course). What is important is that the logic at hand proves subject to verification on grounds other than those supplied by the proof texts alone because the appeal is to an autonomous realm, namely, reason confirmed by experience. The repeated claim is not that things are so merely because Scripture says what it says, but that things happened as they happened in accord with laws we may verify or test (as Scripture, among other sources of facts, tells us). The emphasis is on the sequence of events, the interrelationship exhibited by them. How does Scripture in particular participate? It is not in particular at all. Scripture serves as a source of information, much as any history of the world or of a nation would provide sources of information: facts. Who makes use of these facts? In our own time it is the social scientist, seeking the rules that social entities are supposed to exhibit. In the period at hand it was the rabbinical philosopher, seeking the rules governing Israel\u2019s life. So far as people seek rules and regularities, the search is one for logic, for philosophy. It follows that our document rests upon logical argumentation. Its framers, rabbis, served as philosophers in the ancient meaning of the term. And, in consequence, Scripture for its part is transformed into the source of those facts that supply both the problem, chaos, and the solution, order, rule. So Scripture in the hands of the rabbis of our document corresponds to nature in the hands of the great Greek philosophers.
\nTo make these claims stick in detail, we turn to a quite specific aspect of the larger issue. Berchman, in Appendix One, describes propositions as atomic or molecular. The latter always joins together two or more occurrences of a proposition, the former deals with a simple statement, subject and predicate. Clearly, we cannot point to many atomic propositions; the entire discourse at hand is made up of sets of statements, facts joined together and, in their joining, made to say more than they do individually. As a set they demonstrate a law, just as does the logical theorem of Mishnaic discourse. That is to say, the Mishnah makes its principal points by collecting three or five examples of a given rule. The basic rule is not stated, but it is exemplified through the several statements of its application. As in the Mishnah\u2019s mode of discourse, the reader then may infer the generalization from its specific exemplifications. Sometimes, but not often, the generalization will be made explicit. The whole then constitutes an exercise in rhetoric and logic carried out through list making. And the same is true in Leviticus Rabbah. But it makes lists of different things from those of the Mishnah: events, not everyday situations. The framers of Leviticus Rabbah revert to sequences of events, all of them exhibiting the same definitive traits and the same ultimate results, for example, arrogance, downfall, not one time but many; humility, salvation, over and over again, and so throughout. Indeed, if I had to select a single paramount trait of argument in Leviticus Rabbah, it would be this: presentation of a theorem stated by the making of a list of similar examples. The search for the rules lies through numerous instances that, all together, yield the rule.
\nIn context, therefore, we have the counterpart to the list making that defined the labor of the philosophers of the Mishnah. Through composing lists of items joined by a monothetic definitive trait, the framers produce underlying or overriding rules always applicable. Here too, through lists of facts of history, the foundations of social life rise to the surface. All of this, we see, constitutes a species of a molecular argument, framed in very definite terms, for example, Nebuchadnezzar, Senacherib, David, Josiah did so-and-so with such-and-such a result. Thus, as already stated, the mode of argument at hand is the assembly of instances of a common law. The argument derives from the proper construction of a statement of that law in something close to a syllogism. The syllogistic statement often, though not invariably, occurs at the outset, all instances of so-and-so produce such-and-such a result, followed by the required catalogue.
\nA final point is in order. The conditional syllogisms of our composition over and over again run through the course of history. The effort is to demonstrate that the rule at hand applies at all times, under all circumstances. This is because the conditional syllogism must serve under all temporal circumstances. The recurrent listing of events subject to a single rule runs as often as possible through the course of all of human history, from creation to the fourth monarchy (Rome), which, everyone knows, is the end of time prior to the age that is coming. Accordingly, the veracity of rabbinic conditional arguments depends over and over again on showing that the condition holds at all times.
\nTo summarize the proposition: the proposition of the syllogistic argument at hand derives from clear statements of Scripture, the conditional part: if X, then Y; if not X, then not Y. Leviticus 26 (which occupies strikingly slight attention in our composition) states explicitly that if the Israelites keep God\u2019s rules, they will prosper, and if not, they will suffer. The viewpoint is commonplace, but its appearance at Leviticus in particular validates the claim that it is topically available to our authors. The two further stages in the encompassing logic of the document do represent a step beyond the simple and commonplace theorem. The first is the construction of the molecular argument, encompassing a broad range of subjects. The second, and the more important of the two, is the insistence of the temporal character of the list. That is why the recurrent reference to sequences of figures, events, or actions, all listed in accord with a monothetic definitive trait, forms so central a component in the argument of the document as a whole.
\nWhat Leviticus Rabbah does not contribute is what is to be proved, the basic proposition at hand. Why not? Because, as I said, it is one that would not have surprised most of the framers of the important components of Scripture itself. What the authors of the document do originate (along with authors in the Talmud of the Land of Israel) is the mode of proof through review of examples deriving from a wide range of times and places. That logical contribution explains why our document differs from all but one of its contemporaries and all of its predecessors, except, of course, for one. As I explained, the Mishnah too composes its arguments through the laying down of basic principles\u2014syllogisms\u2014sustained by lists of specific instances in the validation and clarification of those principles. So too the authors of Leviticus Rabbah collect and arrange, since they do not propose to invent facts but to interpret them by discovering the rules the facts obey. The facts with which they work are indifferently Scriptural or contemporary (though mostly the former). The propositions they propose to demonstrate through these facts, however, are eternal.
\nSo, in a word, Leviticus Rabbah takes up the modes of thought and argumentation characteristic of the Mishnah and accomplishes the logically necessary task of applying them to society. Speaking of society, the authors turn to, among other records, the history book, Scripture, which provides examples of the special laws governing Israel, the physics of Israel\u2019s fate. In Scripture, but not only there, the authors find rules and apply them to their own day.
\nThe statements just now given require one final exercise of list making on my part. Since I maintain that the document overall does the bulk of its argumentation through the construction of lists, I have now to catalogue lists of Leviticus Rabbah and the point that each of those lists proposes to make.
\nBefore turning to the two catalogues, the reader should revert to the outline of the document as a whole because the fundamental principle of argumentation is revealed in the structure of the whole. Each parashah consists of a proposition about a given topic and a sequence of facts pertinent to, and proving, that proposition. The facts are catalogues, of course. Each fact consists of a tale, saying, filigree of intersecting verses, or other exercise in assembling available facts. So the first catalogue of lists has already been given at the head of Chapter 3, and it consists of thirty-seven entries\u2014by definition.
\nWe come then to the two lists at hand. The first presents the entries in which a given proposition is followed by a list of historical facts, spread over the history of the world and Israel, in which said proposition is shown to be true. The second list catalogues entries in which a given proposition is illustrated by cases drawn from timeless, everyday life; parables; tales of exemplary heroes of biblical or rabbinic origin and the like. The fact that the former exceeds the latter in volume is not important to my argument. The two (differentiated) catalogues together reveal only the surface of the list making activity. I suspect that further criteria for analyzing the kinds and functions of lists, the properties of one type of list as distinct from those of another, lie near at hand. But for the purpose of my analysis, the present preliminary probe suffices to show that list making is not an activity limited to the purposeful composition of the thirty-seven whole parashiyyot. It is a very specific and constructive exercise, directed at the formation of many of the most striking compositions of the document\u2019s main divisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lists in Which the Atemporality of a Proposition Is Demonstrated<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:IV. God speaks to Israelite prophets in word and vision, because they are superior to gentile prophets. Examples: Abraham, Jacob, David, Moses.
\nI:V. God favors the humble: Hillel, Moses at the bush, at the sea, at Sinai, at the Tent of Meeting.
\nI:IX. God favored Moses above all: Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses.
\nI:XIII. Israelite prophets are superior: examples in life of Balaam, Job, Abraham, Moses.
\nII:II. Where \u201cto me\u201d is used, the referent will never be moved, in this world or the next. Priests, Levites, Israel, firstlings, Sanhedrin, Land, Jerusalem, sanctuary, offerings, anointing oil.
\nIV:I. Catalogue of examples of divine justice: Sanhedrin, golden calf, generation of the wilderness, Sodomites, Shittim.
\nV:I\u2013III. God may give peace to the wicked but ultimately punishes them: Sodom, ten tribes, etc.
\n[V:IV. Rewards accruing to philanthropy: various contemporary examples.]
\nV:VIII. One has to know how to placate God: historical, contemporary instances.
\nVI:I. Israel bore false witness but God forgives them: Sinai.
\nVII:I. Israel sinned, but God forgave them: down to time of Ezekiel; Aaron and golden calf.
\nVII:II. God responds to the contrite heart: contemporary, historical examples.
\nVII:IV. God prefers Israel\u2019s offerings. Noah vs. Israel; Moses, Solomon.
\nVII:VI. God punishes the boastful: flood, Sodomites, Pharaoh, Sisera, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, etc. Fourth monarchy. God favors humble Israel.
\nIX:IX. Peace is great: Israel at Sinai. Abraham and Sarah, Manoah, Joseph and his brothers, etc.
\nX:I\u2013III. God loves righteous and hates wicked people: Abraham, Sodom, Isaiah, Aaron.
\nX:IX. Miracles done in the Temple, in creation, show that what is less may contain more.
\nXI:I\u2013IV. Wisdom speaks of creation, eschatological rebuilding of Temple, Torah, tent of meeting. All point toward divine foreknowledge of Israel\u2019s salvific history.
\nXI:V. God responds to human virtue, vice: Abraham, Moses.
\nXI:VII. Any passage using \u201cand it came to pass\u201d refers to a time of woe: Abraham, Ahaz, Jehoiakim, Ahasueros, etc.
\nXI:VIII. God respects Israel\u2019s elders: Egypt, Sinai, wilderness, tent of meeting, age to come.
\nXII:I. Wine causes dissension: Noah, Lot, ten tribes, Judah-Benjamin, Ahasueros-Vashti, etc.
\nXIII:II. God sifted all possibilities in choosing Israel, Jerusalem, Land, etc.
\nXIII:V. All the prophets foresaw what the pagans would do to Israel: Adam, Abraham, Daniel, Moses.
\nXV:I. When wind is not controlled, it destroys the world: time of Job, Elijah, Jonah.
\nXV:IX. Israel is punished by the nations in the way individuals are punished by sin: Babylonia, Media, Greece, Rome.
\nXVI:I. Leprosy is caused by sin: daughters of Zion, Miriam, Joab, Uzziah, Gehazi, Israel.
\nXVII:III. Leprosy comes because of ten sins. Cases: Israel, daughters of Zion, Joab, Gehazi, Goliath, Shebna, Uzziah, Miriam, etc.
\nXVII:VII. The house of Lev. 14:34\u2019s leprosy is the Temple. Proofs from diverse references to the history of the Temple.
\nXVIII:II. People are punished and healed in themselves (e.g., as with flux): Eve, Esau, Obadiah, Sennacherib, Hiram, Nebuchadnezzar, Evil Merodach.
\n[XIX:II. Whoever tries to uproot a single teaching of the Torah is punished: Solomon, various examples of a textual character.]
\nXIX:IV. Through restraint, there is blessing, and through indolence, punishment: Israel at Sinai, time of Jeremiah. Moral examples also.
\nXX:I. One fate comes to righteous and wicked: Noah vs. Neccho; Moses, Aaron, spies, Josiah, Ahab, David, Nebuchadnezzar, etc.
\nXX:II. Do not make merry: Adam, Abraham, Elisheba.
\nXXI:I\u2013IV. God saves Israel. Examples: at the Red Sea, Philistines, Amalekites, on New Year and Day of Atonement.
\nXXIII:I\u2013VII. Israel is like a rose to the nations\u2019 thorns: Rebecca, Egypt, Sinai, current generations\u2019 suffering. Very lengthy, mainly historical catalogue.
\nXXIII:IX\u2013XI. God punishes the wicked: generation of flood, Sodomites. God rewards the virtuous: Joseph, Jael, Palti. Those who resist lust: Joseph, David, Boaz.
\n[XXIV:IV. All blessings come from Zion. The proof texts do not catalogue specific events.]
\nXXVI:VIII. Two acts of speech will bear two distinct messages: time of Ezekiel, Esther.
\nXXVII:IV. What God will do in redeeming Israel has already been demonstrated: resurrection\u2014Elijah, Elisha, Ezekiel; Joshua; Hananiah, Mishael, Azariah.
\nXXVII:V. God favors the persecuted: Abel, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, David, Israel.
\nXXVII:VI. Nations rejoice when God punishes Israel, but are disappointed when God forgives Israel: three examples.
\nXXVII:XI. The wicked compete in persecuting Israel: Cain, Esau, Pharaoh, Haman, Gog.
\nXXVIII:IV. Prayer suffices, without arms, to vanquish the enemy: Abraham, Moses, Joshua, Deborah and Barak, Hezekiah, Mordecai.
\nXXVIII:VI. The merit of the sheaf defended Gideon, Hezekiah, Ezekial, Mordecai.
\nXXIX:I. Jacob\u2019s ladder signified the nations, and his lack of faith made it possible for them to succeed. Babylonia, Media, Greece, Rome.
\nXXX:III. God answers prayers of the destitute: Mordecai, Hezekiah, contemporary times.
\nXXXII:V. Israel avoids sexual licentiousness and so is saved: Sarah, Joseph, Israel in Egypt.
\nXXXII:VI. To be remembered may be a blessing or it may be a curse + numerous historical cases of each.
\nXXXIV:VIII. Showing kindness is rewarded, not doing so is punished: Abraham, Ammon and Moab, Jethro and Moses, Boaz and Ruth, Reuben, Aaron, etc.
\nXXXVI:II. Israel is lowly in this world, but will be exalted in the world to come: Joseph, Joshua, David, etc.
\nXXXVI:IV. All things are owing to the merit of Jacob.
\nXXXVI:VI. Merit of patriarchy endures through all time, even to today. Earlier endings were not decisive: Jehoahaz, Elijah, Hosea, etc.
\nXXXVII:I. Vowing leads to cardinal sins: Jacob, Abraham.
\nXXXVII:IV. When people ask properly, God responds in kind: Eliezer, Caleb, Saul, Jephthah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lists in Which Atemporality Plays No Evident Part<\/p>\n\n\n\n
II:I. Ten things are precious.
\nII:I\u2013V. Catalogue of praise of Israel.
\nIII:I. One should not overreach, e.g., in learning, farming, work, redemption and world to come.
\nIII:V\u2013VI. Catalogue of examples of proposition that a poor persons\u2019 offering is welcome on the altar.
\nIV:III. Unwitting sin follows hasty action: various examples.
\nIV:VI. The unity of Israel and their fate.
\nIV:VII. Comparison of soul to God.
\nV:VII. Israel\u2019s virtues are the nations\u2019 vices.
\nVIII:IV. God does not waste Israel\u2019s resources.
\nIX:I, IV, VII. The thanksgiving offering is superior: various examples.
\nX:VI. Priests\u2019s garments effect atonement. Various examples drawn from symbolic repertoire.
\nXII:I. Bad traits of wine. Long catalogue of illustrative facts.
\nXII:III. Words of Torah generate merit.
\nXIII:I. When you lose your temper, you forget your Torah.
\nXIV:I\u2013III. God performs miracles with fetus.
\nXV:V\u2013VII. If people do not carry out God\u2019s will, they are punished in an appropriate way.
\nXVI:I. Leprosy is caused by sin: various specific sins.
\nXVI:V. The mouth can sin: pledging but not paying charity gift, boasting about Torah learning, gossip, etc.
\nXVI:VIII. People are responsible to avoid ailments. This they do by not sinning.
\nXVIII:V. God governs Israel as a king governs his realm. Various everyday examples.
\nXX:VIII\u2013X. Sons of Aaron died on account of specified sins: long list.
\nXXI:VI. Israel is forgiven through the merit of this: Torah, religious duties, circumcision, Sabbath, Jerusalem, ten tribes, etc.
\nXXI:XI. As above + patriarchs.
\nXXII:III\u2013IV. Everything carries out God\u2019s will. Various examples, Titus\u2019 gnat, frogs, snakes.
\nXXII:VI. Thievery is tantamount to murder. Proof texts.
\nXXII:X. God prohibits some things but permits others.
\nXXIV:IV. See the counterpart list.
\nXXIV:VI. Sanctification demands avoiding sexual sins.
\nXXV:II. Those who support disciples while they study gain merit. Examples + tales.
\nXXV:VIII. Passages of the Torah are to be interpreted in the light of the adjoining statements.
\nXXVI:I. Scripture avoids unseemly language.
\nXXVI:II. People sin with their tongues.
\nXXVII:IX. Sacrificial animals stand for the patriarchs and their merits.
\nXXIX:III\u2013VI. The shofar brings redemption: various stories to illustrate or prove the proposition.
\nXXIX:XI. Under all circumstances the seventh is preferred.
\nXXX:II. Seven groups of righteous will see God\u2019s face.
\nXXX:VI. One should not use stolen property to carry out religious duties: numerous cases.
\nXXX:IX\u2013XII. Symbols of the festival of Tabernacles stand for God, patriarchs, Sanhedrin, Israel.
\nXXXI:I\u2013VIII. God does not need what he asks of Israel, but asks so as to favor Israel.
\n[XXXII:VI. Some are named and it is a blessing; others are named and it is a curse. See the corresponding list.]
\nXXXIII:I. Speech may kill.
\nXXXIV:I\u2013V. It is blessed to help the poor.
\nXXXVI:I. Some things are of equal importance, even though one usually is listed before the other.
\nXXXVI:II. Israel comparable to grape vine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In general, a list of historical events will not allude, also, to social or moral sins, and vice versa. That is a marked tendency but not a fixed rule. The main point is simple. We have assembled a long catalogue in which the point is to demonstrate the atemporality, the universal applicability, of a given fixed law. Clearly, people made lists of other, social facts to establish other laws. So list making did not limit itself to lists of facts of moral rules as these are shown to have been demonstrated through the ages. But it certainly turns out to be a striking and commonplace mode of proving a point and arguing a case. And the philosophers of the age would have understood the logic of discourse even if they did not understand a word of the proposed theorems.
\nIf we now stand back and ask ourselves to classify the mode of discourse of the parashiyyot, each viewed in its entirety, we find no difficulty in doing so. A parashah takes up a single theme. The theme attracts not an anthology of diverse materials but a composition of entirely pointed ones. So the framers of the document wish to make a significant statement about a given theme. (Heinemann\u2019s thesis that the very arrangement of the blocks of material within a given parashah also proves purposeful is reviewed in Appendix Two.) We may, therefore, characterize the framing of a parashah very simply: a thesis about a given theme, executed through the selection and arrangement of existing materials alongside the composition and introduction of new ones. Ordinarily, it would appear that the ones that seem to us new\u2014those involving the intersecting verse\/base-verse construction\u2014occur at the outset, the others later on.
\nWhat in fact do we have? It is a two-stage discourse: first, the announcement of a proposition in the opening and fresh paragraphs of thoughts, second, the assembly of a set of materials to illustrate, amplify, or demonstrate the validity of the same proposition. Thus to state matters in the simplest way: in the parashiyyot we have compositions that consist of classified lists: (1) topic, then (2) catalogue of pertinent facts. The argumentation of a list inheres in its facts\u2014the strongest argument possible. So the syllogism at hand is familiar. A proposition supported by catalogues of pertinent facts proving said proposition dominates throughout. Each proposition, of course, is readily translated into the most commonplace syllogistic logic: if X, then Y; if not X, then not Y. That we find everywhere present, though only occasionally made explicit. So far as each parashah is devoted to a given topic, moreover, and each topic generates a concrete proposition, for example, wine causes bad things to happen, each parashah by itself constitutes an extended list of facts to demonstrate that if X, then Y; if not X, then not Y.
\nSo, to conclude, where else have we determined that the fundamental logic of discourse emerges in list making? It is, of course, in the Mishnah itself. The upshot is simple. Leviticus Rabbah makes use of facts of Scripture, along with facts deriving from parables, tales of rabbis, and the like, to construct lists that make points and establish truth, just as the Mishnah constructs lists of examples aimed at laying down a single, ineluctable principle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Judaism and Scripture<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Now that we have put the issue of Scripture\u2019s role in Judaism into the proper, that is the logical, context, we see that the same logic that unifies the diverse discussions of the Mishnah and establishes the single mode of argument and proof of that document operates in Leviticus Rabbah as well.
\nThe Mishnah draws on the facts of everyday life (including the laws in Scripture), but rarely finds need to demonstrate the atemporality of the consequence rules. Why not? Because to begin with the Mishnah\u2019s allegations at hand do not speak of Israel, viewed as a distinct, indeed a unique, social entity, but of the rules of Israel\u2019s everyday life. The philosophers of the Mishnah made lists of facts that yield laws for the ordinary world of the village and family, hence by definition undifferentiated as to time, place, or circumstance. They speak of that natural world so as to point toward the supernatural, addressing the ordinary and aiming at the holy.
\nThe philosophers of Leviticus Rabbah for their part find it necessary to demonstrate the atemporality of the rules at hand, because their laws to begin with deal with a single society, Israel. Like social scientists looking for rules applicable everywhere, they established as their criterion for validity the condition that the rules pertain at all times and to all contexts of Israel\u2019s history. If the logical status and standing of their rules prove identical to the status and standing of the statements of the philosophers of the Mishnah, namely, philosophically well-founded theorems, on the surface, matters appear otherwise.
\nFor the comparison of the rhetorical traits of the Mishnah to those of Leviticus Rabbah yields not a single important fact (except where a paragraph of the Mishnah is cited verbatim in Leviticus Rabbah). But rhetoric does not matter. While the rhetoric is distinctive to the given document, the logic is the same in both. On that account, we may reasonably conclude that Scripture enters the system (the Judaism) of the Mishnah exactly as it enters the system (the Judaism) that defines the matrix of Leviticus Rabbah. In both cases the point of entry is designated by the requirements of the system at hand. The road beyond, into the center of the system, follows the rules and paths signified by the larger logic that in the end constitutes the system\u2019s map. The same logic map serves the Mishnah and Leviticus Rabbah: lists of facts to demonstrate the theorem.
\nWe need have little doubt that the place and use of Scripture in Leviticus Rabbah abide by rules of logic governing discourse in Leviticus Rabbah. Scripture proves paramount on the surface but subordinated in the deep structure of the logic of the document because Scripture enjoys no autonomous standing, for example, as the sole source of facts. It also does not dictate the order of discussion. It furthermore does not (by itself) determine the topics to be taken up, since its verses, cited one by one in sequence, do not tell us how matters will proceed. Scripture, moreover, does not allow us to predict what proposition a given set of verses will yield. On the contrary, because of the insistence that one verse be read in light of another, one theme in light of another, augmentative one, Leviticus Rabbah prohibits us from predicting at the outset, merely by reading a given verse of Scripture, the way in which a given theme will be worked out or the way in which a given proposition will impart a message through said theme.
\nSo, in all, the order of Scripture does not govern the sequence of discourse. The themes of Scripture do not tell us what themes will be taken up, the propositions of Scripture about its stated themes, what Scripture says, in its context, about a given topic. They do not define the propositions of Leviticus Rabbah about that topic. The upshot is simple. Scripture contributes everything and nothing. It provides the decoration, the facts, much language. But whence the heart and soul and spirit? Where the matrix, where the source? The editors, doing the work of selection, making their points through juxtaposition of things not otherwise brought into contact with one another\u2014they are the ones who speak throughout. True, the hand is the hand of Scripture. But the voice is the voice of the collectivity of the sages, who are authors speaking through Scripture.
\nIf, moreover, Scripture contributes facts, so too do the ones who state those ineluctable truths that are expressed in parables, and so too do the ones who tell stories, also exemplifying truths, about great heroes and villains. No less, of course, but, in standing, also no more than these, Scripture makes its contribution along with other sources of social truth.
\nGreek science focused upon physics. Then the laws of Israel\u2019s salvation serve as the physics of the sages. But Greek science derived facts and built theorems on the basis of other sources besides physics; the philosophers also, after all, studied ethnography, ethics, politics, and history. For the sages at hand, along these same lines, parables, exemplary tales, and completed paragraphs of thought deriving from other sources (not to exclude the Mishnah, Tosefta, Sifra, Genesis Rabbah, and such literary compositions that had been made ready for the Talmud of the Land of Israel)\u2014these too make their contribution of data subject to analysis. All of these sources of truth, all together, were directed toward the discovery of philosophical laws for the understanding of Israel\u2019s life, now and in the age to come.
\nTo state the main conclusion, standing paramount and dominant, Scripture contributed everything but the main point. That point comes to us from the framers of Leviticus Rabbah\u2014from them alone. To offer a homely homily, the word rabbah, RBH, derives from the same root as the word RBWY, which, in the parlance of exegetical convention, means amplification, extension, inclusion. A verse or a word read as a RBWY extends to more cases than the original sense of the verse or word would appear to require. Along these same lines, what we have in Leviticus Rabbah on a grand scale proves to be a labor of the amplification, extension, and augmentation of Leviticus: a RBWY of passages of Leviticus. So far as Leviticus Rabbah transcends the book of Leviticus\u2014and that means, in the whole of its being\u2014the document speaks for the framers, conveys their message, pursues their discourse, makes the points they wished to make. For they are the ones who made of Leviticus, the book, Leviticus Rabbah, that greater Leviticus, the document that spoke of sanctification but, in its augmented version at hand, meant salvation. As closely related to the book of Leviticus as the New Testament is to the Old, Leviticus Rabbah delivers the message of the philosophers of Israel\u2019s history.
\nI have emphasized that Leviticus Rabbah carries a message of its own, which finds a place within, and refers to, a larger system. The method of thought and mode of argument act out a denial of one reality in favor of the affirmation of another. That dual process of pretense at the exegetical level evokes the deeper pretense of the mode of thought of the larger system, and, at the deepest layer, the pretense that fed Israel\u2019s soul and sustained it. Just as one thing evokes some other, so does the rabbinic system overall turn into aspects of myth and actions of deep symbolic consequence what to the untutored eye were commonplace deeds and neutral transactions. So too the wretched nation really enjoyed God\u2019s special love. As I stated at the outset, what is important in the place and function accorded to Scripture derives significance from the host and recipient of Scripture, that is to say, the rabbinic system itself.
\nBut so far as Leviticus Rabbah stands for and points toward that larger system, what are the commonplace traits of Scripture in this other, new context altogether?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
APPENDIX ONE<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Stoic Logic of Propositions<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Robert Berchman<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This brief overview covers only those elements of the Stoic logic of propositions that relate to elements of the rabbinic syllogistic of Leviticus Rabbah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I. The early Stoics developed a logic of propositions which became in late antiquity one of the bases of philosophical argumentation along with the class logic of the Peripatetics. It consisted of five theorems. The most interesting aspect of this \u201clogic of propositions\u201d is its arrangement into a deductive theory. The elements of this logic are arguments, where an argument is regarded as a system of propositions containing premises and a conclusion. Arguments of five types are taken as basic, and all others are declared provable in terms of these, that is, they can be reduced to these. The basic types are represented by the following five schemas:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A. If the first, then the second.\nThe first.\nTherefore, the second.\n\nB. If the first, then the second.\nNot the second.\nTherefore, not the first.\n\nC. Not both the first and second\nThe first.\nTherefore, not the second.\n\nD. The first or the second.\nThe first.\nTherefore, not the second.\n\nE. The first or the second.\nNot the first.\nTherefore, the second.<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nFor an example of a proof in the system, consider the following schema:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. If both the first and the second, then the third.\n2. Not the third.\n3. The first.\nTherefore, not the second.<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nThis supposes (according to Sextus Empiricus) the use of the following rule: \u201cIf we have premises which yield a conclusion, then we have in effect also the conclusion among the premises, even if it is not explicitly stated.\u201d Hence from (1) and (2), by a basic argument of type B, we get:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
4. Not both the first and the second,<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nwhich according to the rule can now be considered as one of the premises. From (3) and (4), we then obtain the conclusion by a type C argument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
II. There were four rules by which such proofs were to be carried out. We possess only two (possibly three) of these rules. The first was:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If from two propositions a third is deduced, then either the two together with the denial of the conclusion yields the denial of the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The third was:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If from two propositions a third is deduced and there are propositions from which one of the premises may be deduced, then the other premises together with these propositions will yield the conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The presupposition of this logic is that every valid argument in this calculus could be reduced to a chain of arguments of the five basic types (A\u2013E). For example, one schema goes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If the first, then the second.\nIf the first, then not the second.\nTherefore, not the first.<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nAn example, following this schema, is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If you know that you are dead, then you are dead.\nIf you know that you are dead, then you are not dead.\nTherefore, you do not know that you are dead.<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nIt is proposed that the structure of this syllogistic could be quite broadsweeping, and it was understood as such in some circles. That is, a type A argument need not be confined to a three line proposition. A whole unit, or even a chapter could be composed in the form of this type of argument. Hence one could have what could be called the macro- as well as micrologic of argumentation operable in a text, based upon formal rules of argumentation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
III. Further elements of logic include these: Propositions, according to the Stoics, are divided into atomic and molecular. An atomic proposition is composed of subject and predicate without the help of a logical connective. A molecular proposition always contains at least one connective and consists either of two occurrences of a proposition (as in, if it is day, then it is day) or different propositions (e.g., if it is day, then it is light). Atomic propositions are either definite (e.g., this man is walking), indefinite (e.g., somebody is walking), or indeterminate (e.g., Socrates is walking).
\nTypes of molecular proposition include the negation, conjunction, disjunction. The negation of a proposition is said to be formed by prefixing \u201cnot\u201d with the emphasis placed upon \u201cprefix.\u201d Thus, they said, the correct negation of:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is day and it is night, is:\nNot both: it is day and it is night.\n\nThis is quite different from:\n\nIt is day and it is not night.<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nA conditional proposition is one that is formed from two occurrences of a single proposition or from different propositions by means of the connective \u201cif\u201d (e.g., if it is day, then it is light). The part immediately following the \u201cif\u201d is the antecedent, and the other part is the consequent, even when the conditional is stated backwards (e.g., it is light if it is day). A conjunction is a molecular proposition compounded by means of the connective \u201cand\u201d (e.g., it is day and it is light). Similarly, the part of a disjunction are joined by \u201cor\u201d (e.g., it is day or it is light).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IV. There was a great controversy about the meanings of conditionals. Sextus Empiricus states and illustrates the four main proposals. He arranges the arguments from weakest (material implication) to the strongest, at each step providing an example which is true in all of the preceding senses but false in the sense at hand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For Philo (of Megara) says that a true conditional is one which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent; e.g., when it is day and I am conversing, \u201cIf it is day, then I am conversing\u201d; but Diodorus defines it as one which neither is not ever capable of having a true antecedent and a false consequent. According to him, the conditional just mentioned seems to be false, since when it is day and I have become silent, it will have a true antecedent and a false consequent; but the following conditional seems true: If atomic elements of things do not exist, the atomic elements of things do exist, since it will always have the false antecedent, atomic elements of things do not exist, and the true consequent, atomic elements of things do exist. And those who introduce connection or coherence say that a conditional holds whenever the denial of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent; so that, according to them, the above-mentioned conditionals do not hold, but the following is true: If it is day, then it is day. And those who judge by suggestion declare that a conditional is true if its consequent is in effect included in its antecedent. According to these, if it is day, then it is day and every repeated conditional will probably be false, for it is impossible for a thing to be included in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Philo\u2019s definition, what we call today \u201cmaterial implication,\u201d was the most favored among the Stoics. Here is their definition:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Since, then, there are four possible combinations of the parts of a conditional\u2014true antecedent and true consequent, false antecedent and false consequent, false and true, or conversely true and false\u2014they say in the first three cases the conditional is true (i.e., if the antecedent is true and the consequent is true, it is true; if false and false, it again is true; likewise for false and true); but in one case only is it false, namely, whenever the antecedent is true and the consequent false.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the Philonian sense a conditional will hold if and only if it holds at all times. It is this notion we must focus upon. It appears that, at least for Philo, the conditionals were held to be true based upon time variables. This means that temporal factors play an important role in the adjudicating of the truth-falseness of conditionals. Within the context of rabbinic syllogistic it is this element which is crucial given the agricultural-temporal concerns of the Rabbinic documents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
V. Now, these definitions, concerning the nature of propositions and the meanings of conditional propositions, were part of the Stoic theory of \u201cpropositional logic.\u201d How the propositions were formed I have already outlined. I have also sketched the rules theorems that go along with them. The proposal is that there are formal parallels between Rabbinic syllogistic, at least in Leviticus Rabbah, and Stoic syllogistic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Appendix Two<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Bibliographical Essay<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Joseph Heinemann on Leviticus Rabbah<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Prior studies on Leviticus Rabbah take up five topics: the text tradition, redaction, exegetical and linguistic problems, and the relationship between the organization of the materials of the document and its message and use. The final item most closely pertains to the thesis of this book and also has attracted the most sophisticated and valuable research. All of it comes from Joseph Heinemann, with two principal articles, \u201cThe Art of Composition in Leviticus Rabbah,\u201d Hassifrut 8 (1969\u201371), 809\u2013834 (in Hebrew), and \u201cProfile of a Midrash. The Art of Composition in Leviticus Rabba,\u201d Journal of the American Academy of Religion 39 (1971): 141\u2013150, an abbreviation of the main theses of the former article.
\nHeinemann recognizes that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes a new literary genre because of its interest in composing expositions of themes rather than phrase-by-phrase exegeses. He calls it a \u201chomiletical midrash\u201d because of the prevailing notion of his day that the documents at hand served as sermons in synagogues. But his analysis of the art of composition in no way rests upon this commonplace but unproved, and probably false, presupposition. In the English version of his article, Heinemann states his main thesis on the composition of our document as follows (p. 143):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although an expositional midrash neither possesses nor requires any specific structure other than a rough-and-ready division of the material into chapters, in this new type of midrash it was both possible and imperative to arrange each homily according to a definite pattern, to give it order and coherence, and to strive towards the integration of the many dozens of individual comments, stories, and expositions of which it is made up into a larger entity. Even though in Genesis Rabba\u2014but not in the tannaitic midrashim\u2014an attempt is made to mark the beginning of most chapters by one or more short proems, the bulk of the material following them is just a hodgepodge of disjointed aggadot, devoid of any shape or form. In striking contrast, the homilies of Leviticus Rabba are not only, on the whole, homogeneous as far as their contents are concerned, they also possess a clear, formal structure: Each of them opens with a number of proems\u2014mostly of considerable length and intricate pattern\u2014followed by the \u201cbody of the sermon,\u201d which enlarges upon the themes touched on in the former, concluding with a brief peroration, devoted mostly to the messianic hope. Although it seems certain that these various component parts are not original creations of the author but rather parts of sermons actually delivered in the Synagogue, which came down to him through oral tradition, undoubtedly the welding-together of these separate and often heterogeneous parts into one organic entity must be ascribed to him. In fact, we may look upon him as the creator of a new form, which was adopted subsequently by authors of other homiletical midrashim, which might be called the \u201cliterary homily.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
My analysis of the formal traits of Leviticus Rabbah produces results in close alignment with Heinemann\u2019s, as we have seen. What he calls a proem I have classified in terms of internal traits, those, in particular, of the arrangement and juxtaposition of verses of Scripture. What he calls \u201cthe body of the sermon\u201d of course requires further literary differentiation, as I have accomplished it in Chapter 2. What he sees as a \u201cbrief peroration\u201d I see as a common, but not ubiquitous, conclusion on a single theme (not literary form), that of eschatology. But I do not think one can make the case that the parashiyyot conclude with something we might uniformly classify as a \u201cperoration.\u201d Heinemann is troubled by the enormous complexity of the base-verse\/intersecting verse construction: \u201cIt stands to reason that in an actual, live sermon, delivered to an audience, the preacher would use no more than one such proem. What purpose would be served by opening a sermon with a series of introductions, each complete in itself and unconnected with the others and each leading \u2026 up to the same point which had already been reached with the first one?\u201d In my view, if we do not assume we have sermons, we also do not have to regard these questions as problems at all. Heinemann\u2019s conclusion, that the author \u201cdrew his material from a variety of sermons known to him,\u201d therefore seems to me simply beside the point.
\nHeinemann\u2019s principal contribution is his claim that the several parashiyyot are arranged in accord with an \u201cinner structure.\u201d He claims that \u201cdifferent parts of one and the same homily express, through their juxtaposition, contrasting and even contradictory aspects of the same theme.\u201d I am not so certain as Heinemann that we can account for the arrangement, within each parashah, of successive paragraphs of thought on the common theme. I wish he were right. Only with considerable difficulty have I proposed that we may effect differentiation among types of material, with four main types at hand, as I have explained. But the outline of the document as a whole does not produce for me the impression that not only types of literary material but also the sequence of particular paragraphs of thought exhibit a clear cut discursive or argumentative purpose. If the unfolding of a theme, beyond the base-verse\/intersecting verse construction, so works itself out that the arrangement of units of thought makes a further point, or set of points, independent of the materials at hand, I am unable to see how that takes place systematically and ubiquitously.
\nHeinemann in his English version gives a substantial example of the thematic system he discerns. Let me allow him to speak in his own words (pp. 146\u2013147):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Even though all homilies have a certain formal pattern in common, as described before, the author does not by any means mechanically construct all his sermons exactly along the same lines. The organization of the material is not contrived by technical devices only, but, as we have seen, it is dictated by the inner logic of the theme and the need to attain coherence and integration. Let us illustrate this by outlining the structure of one more homily. The whole of chapter XIII, relating to Lev. 11:1f., dealing with beasts clean and unclean, i.e., fit or unfit for eating, is undoubtedly an organic unity (except for the first proem, which relates to verse 1 and does not appear to link up with what follows). The second proem opens with \u201cHe rose and measured the earth, and He released nations\u201d (Hab. 3:6), which is taken to mean that the heathen were released from obligations such as the dietary laws because they were unable to endure even the seven Noahide precepts given to them. Moreover, a parable is told of a physician who had two patients, one who would live and one who would certainly die; to the one who would live he said: \u201cThis you may eat, that you may not eat,\u201d but regarding the one about to die he said: \u201cGive him whatever he asks!\u201d Thus the dietary restrictions were given only to the people of Israel, who are destined for the life of the World-to-Come. Furthermore, these (and all other) precepts were given for the purpose of purifying them. From here we pass to detailed descriptions of the marvels of the Time-To-Come: Behemoth and Leviathan will engage in a wild-beast contest for the entertainment of those who have not been spectators at the wild-beast contests of the heathen nations of this world; they will eventually slaughter each other to provide a banquet for the righteous, who refrained from eating ritually forbidden meat in this world. When God said: \u201cThese are the living things which you may eat,\u201d he implied, \u201cif you will prove yourselves worthy, you will eat, but if not, you will be eaten (consumed) by the heathen empires.\u201d All the prophets foresaw the empires engaged in their activities; a point demonstrated by a series of proof-texts, concluding with \u201cMoses foresaw the empires engaged in their activities,\u201d for which a daring allegorical interpretation of our chapter, dealing with the unclean animals, is offered as proof: The camel alludes to Babylon, \u2026 the rockbadger alludes to Media, \u2026 the hare alludes to Greece, \u2026 the swine alludes to Edom (i.e., Rome).\u2026 Why is Edom compared to a swine? To tell you that just as the swine, when reclining, puts forward its cloven hooves, as if to say \u201cSee that I am clean,\u201d so, too, does the empire of Edom boast, as it commits violence and robbery, that it is but executing justice. It is not content with not exalting the righteous, it also slays them. But while each preceding empire brought in its train another one [empire], no other empire will follow Rome; hence, it is called hazir, because it will restore (hahazir) the crown to its rightful owner, as it is written, \u201cAnd saviours shall come on Mount Zion to judge the mount of Esau; and the kingdom shall be the Lord\u2019s\u201d (Obad. 21). All sections of this homily refer, in one way or another, to animals and the eating of their meat; yet, instead of dealing with details of the precepts, they put the entire chapter into an utterly new perspective. Far from being a burden, the dietary laws are a token of distinction for Israel, a means by which they are set apart from other nations and will, eventually, inherit life in the World-to-Come. If they refrain from participating in the wild-beast contests and from eating forbidden meat in this world, incomparably greater pleasures are in store for them in the future. And this very chapter, apparently but enumerating the list of forbidden animals, is in truth foretelling the messianic redemption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What Heinemann does is report on the sequence of themes in the parashah. He furthermore demonstrates that the parashah presents a single main idea, which hardly requires proof if one simply reads the entire parashah.
\nBut he has claimed much more than that, and I do not think he has succeeded in substantiating his claim. He says that the organization of the material \u201cis dictated by the inner logic of the theme and the need to attain coherence and integration.\u201d But all he has done in the cited paragraph is outline how things are, with the further implication that that is how things should be. Why one theme logically must come first, and another at the end, why everything must be exactly where it is\u2014this he does not demonstrate in requisite detail. The Hebrew version of the same position provides (pp. 828\u2013834) a survey of the entire document, along the same lines of my outline at the beginning of Chapter 3. But I am unable to discern much analysis or argument resting on Heinemann\u2019s outline. In my work on the sequence of themes in the several Mishnah tractates, I was able to demonstrate that in many, though not in all, tractates, the thesis or problematic of the framers of the tractate\u2014the point they wished to prove about the topic of the tractate\u2014dictated the order in which the components of the tractate would be organized. So I believe that the possibility of a logical ordering of paragraphs of thought exists. But Heinemann has not demonstrated it, and I am unable to do so. I wish he were right, but I doubt that he is.
\nClearly, success in showing that the individual paragraphs of thought, and even the smaller components of those paragraphs, stand where they do because of a large-scale thesis, to which each makes its contribution only in its present location, would vastly ease my task. For my thesis that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes a composition and not merely a compilation would rest on far firmer foundations if such a demonstration was successfully accomplished. Unhappily, merely stating a proposition and describing the relevant data do not really accomplish the task of demonstrating so refined a thesis. Heinemann moves from the sequence of topics to the contents of the document, and, by way of proof he time and again further points toward what is as against how things must be. On the basis of this mode of argumentation, we make very little progress.
\nThe following is another example of what I take to be argument from episode and proof from example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The most outstanding feature in the composition of this midrash is the tendency of the author to present his themes in all their complexity and with all their manifold implications. He does not see any virtue in simplification, still less in oversimplification; he looks upon his subjects not just from one angle, but from all possible angles; he likes to bring out contrasts and to emphasize opposites. What we might term his \u201cdialectical approach\u201d is manifest throughout the work in a variety of ways. For one thing when he is obliged to use heterogeneous material for building up one of his homilies, he often achieves integration by stressing the contrast between different interpretations and thus creates a relationship between them of thesis and antithesis. In ch. 25 the verse \u201cAnd when you shall come into the land and shall plant all manner of trees \u2026 \u201c(Lev. 19:23) is taken first allegorically: the Torah is called a tree, as it is written \u201cShe is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her\u201d (Prov. 3:18), and the importance of the study of the Torah is elaborated; then there is an abrupt transition, and we are told that the people of Israel are commanded to engage in the planting of trees just as God himself planted trees (in the Garden of Eden) at the time of creation. The two interpretations of the \u201ctree,\u201d offered side by side, are not only different but also, in a sense, contradictory; one implies that the supreme duty of Israel is the study of Torah, while the second exhorts them to engage derekh erez (the way of the land). But \u201cif a man will plough at the time of ploughing, and sow at the time of sowing \u2026 and reap at the time of reaping \u2026 what shall become of the (study of the) Torah?\u201d (b. Berakhot 35 b). The bold juxtaposition of the two opposing concepts suggests its own solution: In spite of the apparent contradiction between the two demands, they are not essentially incompatible, but \u201cAn excellent thing is the study of the Torah combined with derekh erez \u2026 \u201c(Avot II.2).
\n Often the emphasis on contrasts and opposites is first and foremost a stylistic device for knitting together more closely the different aggadot making up the constituent parts of the homily. Towards the beginning of chap. 9, elaborating mainly on the theme of peace, the story is told of R. Yannai who had invited a man to his house, believing him to be scholar, and then, on discovering him to be an ignoramus, insulted him: \u201cA dog has eaten of Yannai\u2019s food!\u201d; but at the end of the same homily we have another tale, of R. Meir, who, to the consternation of his disciples, allowed himself to be insulted in order \u201cto make peace between a man and his wife.\u201d Surely these two anecdotes were interwoven into the same chapter and because each of them gains in depth by being viewed against its counterpart. Elsewhere the author of the midrash presents one and the same subject from a variety of points of view, even though they conflict with one another. In chap. 10:3, Aaron is cleared of all guilt in making a golden calf and immediately afterwards we are told that for this very reason the death of his sons was decreed. But in chap. 27 the sin of the golden calf is ascribed to the mixed multitude; Israel had no part in it\u2014Aaron still less. Chap. 23 sings a hymn of praise for the people of Israel in Egypt, who were worthy of redemption because they were not contaminated by the immorality prevailing there, even though \u201cboth these and those were uncircumcised \u2026 these wore garments made of a mixture of wool and linen and those wore garments made of a mixture of wool and linen\u201d; and the same motif recurs again in chap. 32:5. \u201cIsrael were redeemed from Egypt \u2026 because none of them was found to be immoral.\u201d But in chap. 21:4 the \u201cprinces of the nations\u201d accuse Israel of being no different from the gentiles: \u201cThese are idol-worshipers and those are idol-worshippers; these commit sexual immorality and those commit sexual immorality; these are shedders of blood and those are shedders of blood\u201d\u2014in exactly the same style used in chap. 23 to proclaim Israel\u2019s superiority over heathen nations!
\n There are many more passages where we find this tendency of emphasizing contrasts and opposites, of presenting contradictory or conflicting viewpoints. Some of these may, of course, have been inherent in the traditional material of which the author of Leviticus Rabba made use. But even so, had he wished to do so, he could easily have avoided a good many of the \u201ccontradictions\u201d contained in his work, harmonized opposing ideas or omitted them. Far from doing so, he appears to delight in demonstrating to his readers the complexity of the Torah, which may be expounded \u201cby adducing forty-nine reasons for declaring a thing unclean and forty-nine for declaring it clean\u201d (XXVI.2), and in making manifest the many facets of the one divine truth. For, in spite of all seeming contradictions, \u201cBoth these and those are the words of the living God\u201d (b. Eruvin 13b).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A rigorous proof for the foregoing propositions would require a different sort of demonstration. We should have to show that the (or merely one) primary redactional principle was the juxtaposition of opposites. Now perhaps that is the case. One may argue, for instance, that the aesthetic at the foundations of the base-verse\/intersecting verse construction rests the aesthetics of contrast and comparison. I do maintain, for another instance, that the prevailing mode of thought requires us to interpret one thing in terms of something else. But the \u201csomething else\u201d is not necessarily the opposite; it is just something different. Often it is congruent.
\nIf Heinemann wishes to prove as his \u201coutstanding feature\u201d the \u201cpresentation of themes in all their complexity,\u201d why would anyone differ? That thesis yields the point that the framers of the document include more than a single proposition on a given theme, and sometimes propositions, juxtaposed, appear to say different, even opposed, things about the stated theme. What that demonstrates in my view is that the framers of Leviticus Rabbah collected and arranged diverse materials. Heinemann claims more than this. He alleges that the principle of arrangement is to juxtapose opposites. That is simply not demonstrated systematically over the greater part of the surface of the whole. Once more, I wish that Heinemann had succeeded in proving just that. I am unable to do so, and I doubt that he has succeeded either.
\nNonetheless, Heinemann is the only scholar known to me to propose that the document at hand (or any other important rabbinic composition) coheres, speaks cogently and distinctively, and adheres to the principles of composition. He further maintains that these principles of composition relate to the larger message and purpose of the authors. If in the specified details I indicate why I do not think he has proved his particular propositions, it is not because I disagree with his purpose or basic thesis. In a barren desert of mindless philology, resting on little more than erudition and good guesses, in a scholarly world in which method adds up to no more than putting together things one happens to remember, Heinemann was an oasis. He exhibited, in context, the unique virtues of aesthetic and intellectual interest. He undertook a quest for meaning in context of a difficult and complex document. I do not know of any other writing on the hermeneutics of Leviticus Rabbah that compares to his. If the reader will examine the introductions to translations of other compositions of biblical exegeses as these have appeared in English, the truth will become rapidly apparent. In most of the translators\u2019 introductions there is scarcely any program of research, either into literature and history, or into hermeneutics, pertaining to the midrash collections at hand. What we have in essays standing at the head of presentations of midrash composition (whether in English or in Hebrew) is the academic equivalent to children\u2019s show-and-tell, on the one side, and to cavemen\u2019s hunting-and-gathering, on the other. In that setting Heinemann was a beacon of enlightenment. All the more pity that his actual achievements proved so intellectually flimsy.
\nHeinemann\u2019s other important articles include \u201cThe Triennial Lectionary Cycle,\u201d Journal of Jewish Studies 9 (1968): 41\u201348; \u201cChapters of Doubtful Authenticity in Leviticus Rabbah,\u201d Tarbis 37 (1967\u201368): 339\u2013354, reprinted in Likkutei Tarbis. The Aggadic Literature. A Reader, selected by Avigdor Shinan (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1983), 3\u201318, and \u201cThe Proem in the Aggadic Midrashim. A Form-Critical Study,\u201d Scripta Hiersolymitana 22 (1971) 100\u2013122. The last-named article begins with a sizable bibliography on the proem (p. 100), and the entire problem and the state of the question emerge in this paper in full and complete discussion.
\nNone of Heinemann\u2019s discussion of the proem is particularly compelling, since it predictably rests on the assumption that the compositions at hand were sermons. That supposition dictates the shape of discussion, for example, Were these \u201cproems\u201d complete sermons or just beginnings of sermons? Were they (as Heinemann proposes, p. 109) originally sermons delivered before the scriptural lesson itself? So Heinemann argues, \u201cIf the preacher was striving, by means of his sermon, to provide an introduction to the actual reading of the pericope, which would follow immediately afterwards, we can well understand why he insisted on concluding with the first verse or verses of the portion about to be read.\u201d That is certainly true. But it is not the only possible explanation of the phenomenon at hand. Without the prior knowledge that we deal with sermons, it is not even a possible explanation at all. I do not mean to suggest that Heinemann\u2019s discussion of the proem contains nothing of interest. On the contrary, his \u201cTannaitic proems and their formal characteristics,\u201d the final part of the article, surveys important data. Still, Heinemann\u2019s conclusion rests on so many improbable, and, at any rate, undemonstrated, assumptions, that it must be viewed as little more than a curiosity:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To sum up: All the data concerning proems in the tannaitic period point to the same conclusions. The relatively rare occurrence of genuine proems, taken together with the comparative frequence of pseudo-proems, both testify that the proem had not yet become the most favoured form of the sermon. In amoraic times, when the proem attains the favourite position, \u201cpseudo-proems\u201d are no longer found. The various formal deviations noted above either disappear altogether in later times or occur in special cases only, when they are unavoidable; and even when the full development of the theme would demand \u201cspoiling the form,\u201d most preachers prefer an incomplete proem to one marred by a formal deviation. In the amoraic era the proem-pattern reaches its full development and acquires strict conventional rules of structure, formal perfection and polish. But in tannaitic times, when it was but one of many rhetorical forms used in the public sermon, the proem was still flexible and less stereotype.
\n Since we have identified the proem as a pattern created to serve in comparatively brief sermons, preceding the scriptural reading, we may venture to suggest that towards the end of the second century the longer sermons, following upon the reading of the haftara, which had originally formed part of the morning service on Sabbaths and festivals, were felt to be too much of a burden, perhaps because the service itself had become more extensive and cumbersome. Hence the sermon became divorced from the service and was delivered on Sabbath afternoons or, at times, on Friday night (in winter?). In order not to leave the morning service with its scriptural lesson devoid of any form of instruction, the short proem-form, preceding the reading, was developed and, eventually, from the third century onwards, became extremely popular.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While Heinemann stands out as the sole important scholar of Leviticus Rabbah, an account of available research requires attention to a few other names. Happily, a brief but complete survey comes to us through G\u00fcnter Stemberger\u2019s revision of H. L. Strack\u2019s classic bibliography, Hermann L. Strack and G\u00fcnter Stemberger, Einleitung in Talmud und Midrasch: Siebente, v\u00f6llig neu bearbeitete Auflage (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1982), 267\u2013269. I have already referred to the debate between Margulies and Hanokh Albeck on whether materials shared between Leviticus Rabbah and the Talmud of the Land of Israel originated in the latter document and were then borrowed for use by the former, or originated in some prior locus and were used autonomously by the framers of each document respectively. Albeck\u2019s article, titled \u201cMidrash Vayyiqra Rabba,\u201d is in the Ginzberg Festschrift (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1945), 25\u201343 (in Hebrew). On other parallels between our composition and later ones, Stemberger\u2019s survey of studies, pp. 268\u2013269, provides an ample bibliography. Abraham Goldberg\u2019s \u201cOn the Authenticity of the Chapters \u2026,\u201d in Tarbiz 38 (1968): 184 ff., should also be noted. None of these articles takes up the issues that have occupied us in the present volume, so far as I am able to tell. Finally, I call attention to Richard S. Sarason, \u201cThe Petihtot in Leviticus Rabba: \u2018Oral Homilies\u2019 or Redactional Constructions?\u201d in G. Vermes and J. Neusner, eds., Essays in Honour of Yigael Yadin. Journal of Jewish Studies 33 (1982): 557\u2013568. I agree with Sarason\u2019s basic thesis on the proem, but not with his judgment that Leviticus Rabbah constitutes \u201can exegetical anthology, ultimately not so different in this regard from Genesis Rabba\u201d (p. 563). I think that judgment is wrong and that Leviticus Rabbah is vastly different from Genesis Rabbah. But that point is not critical to Sarason\u2019s case. In all, only two important names figure in the study of Leviticus Rabbah\u2014Mordecai Margulies and Joseph Heinemann. The greatness of Margulies illumines every page in this book after this one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Part Two<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Translation of the Text of Leviticus Rabbah, Edited by Mordecai Margulies<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Midrash Wayyikra Rabbah: A Critical Edition Based on Manuscripts and Genizah Fragments with Variants and Notes<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Introduction to the Translation<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Justification for this second translation into English of Leviticus Rabbah requires little effort. Margulies\u2019s text, which I have translated, vastly improves upon the standard printed text. We now have a text based on careful study of all manuscript evidents and parallel passages. The necessity of providing a translation of that text seems to me self-evident. Not only do I translate the superb text of Mordecai Margulies, Midrash Wayyikra Rabbah: A Critical Edition Based on Manuscripts and Genizah Fragments with Variants and Notes, vol. 1\u20135 (Jerusalem, 1953\u20131960), but for the sense of each passage, I have framed matters in line with Margulies\u2019s interpretation, imposing my own view only rarely. So the value of this translation, apart from the studies in Part One, is to render available in English Margulies\u2019s superior text and his main points about its meaning. The former now replaces the \u201cstandard printed text\u201d translated by J. Israelstam and Judah J. Slotki, Midrash Rabbah Leviticus. Translated into English with Notes, Glossary, and Indices, under the editorship of H. Freedman and Maurice Simon (London, Sorcino: 1939). But the excellent translation of Israelstam and Slotki remains the model for all to follow, and I found much assistance in their work.
\nMargulies\u2019s text diverges from the standard printed one on nearly every page. Since he has assembled the pertinent manuscript evidence and evaluated it all, the text he has framed must now take the place of the conventional one. He also has provided a complete commentary. He has identified, for each passage, the parallel appearances. He has explained the meaning of words and phrases in an up-to-date way and in constant dialogue, in particular, with the lexicographical erudition of the age represented by Saul Lieberman. In all, he has provided those textual and philological foundations required for a responsible translation of the original. Those things I find much less within my capacities than the analytical-critical study, in particular, of problems of redaction and (to the minor extent that they are relevant here) form. My own contribution to the study of the document, beyond the translation of the new and excellent text of Margulies, consists in the systematic analysis of the redactional structure of each item, the differentiation between and among materials presently presented as all one and the same, and the explanation of what I believe to be the layers or levels of the composite in hand. I do not mean to exaggerate the value of these areas of inquiry, but I do believe that all further historical and religious study of the document must begin in the literary and analytical issues I systematically introduce. That is why I have found it worth my while to retranslate the text and to undertake my particular sorts of studies of its literary character.
\nI have had to develop a way of differentiating the several units beyond the received one. The established mode differentiates between one parashah, or chapter, and the next, and, within the parashah, or chapter, between one sizable unit and the next. As soon as I began my translation, I realized that the subdivision itself consisted of several distinct units of discourse, each with its marks of particularity. In order to show what I believe to be the components of which each subunit of a parashah is made up\u2014for these, I show, were framed before inclusion in the subunit\u2014I have preserved what we have and then added further marks of differentiation. The established markings are converted into Roman numerals. Thus I:I stands for the first parashah, or chapter, then the first subunit as signified in the standard printed texts. Then the Arabic letter signifies my further differentiation within the subdivision, thus I:I.1.A signifies the first sentence (A) of the first complete unit of thought (1) of the first subdivision (I) of the first parashah (I) and so on. I cannot claim that all of the instances in which I differentiate a \u201ccomplete unit of thought\u201d are equally self-evident. In many instances I may have missed further marks of differentiation, and a more critical eye than mine will have to discern them. But I am fairly sure that I have not divided, so differentiated, a complete unit of thought into subdivisions but have consistently preserved the clear recognition of where the full exposition of a theme, topic, or idea begins, attains full exposition, and reaches a conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah One<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:I<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. \u201cThe Lord called Moses [and spoke to him from the tent of meeting, saying, \u2018Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, \u201cWhen any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle from the herd or from the flock\u201d \u2019].\u201d\nB. R. Tanhum bar Hanilai opened [discourse by citing the following verse:] \u201c \u2018Bless the Lord, you his messengers, you mighty in strength, carrying out his word, obeying his word\u2019 [Ps. 103:20].\nC. \u201cConcerning whom does Scripture speak?\nD. \u201cIf [you maintain that] Scripture speaks about the upper world\u2019s creatures, [that position is unlikely, for] has not [Scripture in the very same passage already referred to them, in stating], \u2018Bless the Lord, all his hosts [his ministers, who do his word]\u2019 [Ps. 103:21]?\nE. \u201cIf [you maintain that] Scripture speaks about the lower world\u2019s creatures, [that position too is unlikely,] for has not [Scripture in the very same passage already referred to them, in stating], \u2018Bless the Lord, [you] his messengers\u2019 [Ps. 103:20]? [Accordingly, concerning whom does Scripture speak?]\nF. \u201c[We shall now see that the passage indeed speaks of the lower ones.] But, since the upper world\u2019s creatures are perfectly able to fulfill the commands assigned to them by the Holy One, blessed be he, therefore it is said, \u2018Bless the Lord, all of his hosts.\u2019 But as to the earthly creatures of the lower world [here on earth], because they cannot endure the commands of the Holy One, blessed be he, [the word all is omitted, therefore the verse of Scripture states,] \u2018Bless the Lord, [you] his messengers\u2019\u2014but not all of his messengers.\u201d\n2. A. Another matter: Prophets are called messengers [creatures of the lower world], in line with the following passage, \u201cAnd he sent a messenger and he took us forth from Egypt\u201d (Num. 20:16).\nB. Now was this a [heavenly] messenger, [an angel]? Was it not [merely] Moses [a creature of the lower world]?\nC. Why then does Scripture, [referring to what Moses did,] call him a \u201cmessenger?\u201d\nD. But: It is on the basis of that usage that [we may conclude] prophets are called \u201cmessengers\u201d [in the sense of creatures of the lower world].\nE. \u201cAlong these same lines, \u2018And the messenger of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim\u2019 [Judges 2:1]. Now was this a [heavenly] messenger, [an angel]? Was it not [merely] Phineas?\nF. \u201cWhy then does Scripture, [referring to Phineas], call him a \u2018messenger?\u2019 \u201d\nG. Said R. Simon, \u201cWhen the holy spirit rested upon Phineas, his face burned like a torch.\u201d\nH. But rabbis say, \u201cWhat did Manoah\u2019s wife say to him [concerning Phineas]? \u2018Lo, a man of God came to me, and his face was like the face of a messenger of God\u201d \u2019 (Judges 13:6).\nI. [Rabbis continue,] \u201cShe was thinking that he is a prophet, but he is in fact a [heavenly] messenger [so the two looked alike to her].\u201d\n3. A. Said R. Yohanan, \u201cFrom their very essence, we derive evidence that the prophets are called \u2018messengers,\u2019 in line with the following passage: \u2018Then said Haggai, the messenger of the Lord, in the Lord\u2019s agency, to the people, \u201cI am with you, says the Lord\u201d \u2019 [Hag. 1:13].\nB. \u201cAccordingly, you must reach the conclusion that [from] their very character, we prove that the prophets are called \u2018messengers.\u2019 \u201d\n4. A. [Reverting to the passage cited at the very outset,] \u201cYou mighty in strength, carrying out his word [obeying his word]\u201d (Ps. 103:20).\nB. Concerning what [sort of mighty man or hero] does Scripture speak?\nC. Said R. Isaac, \u201cConcerning those who observe the restrictions of the Seventh Year [not planting and sowing their crops in the Sabbatical Year] does Scripture speak.\nD. \u201cUnder ordinary conditions a person does a religious duty for a day, a week, a month. But does one really do so for all the rest of the days of an entire year?\nE. \u201cNow [in Aramaic:] this man sees his field lying fallow, his vineyard lying fallow, yet he pays his anona tax [a share of the crop] and does not complain.\nF. \u201c[In Hebrew:] Do you know of a greater hero than that!\u201d\nG. Now if you maintain that Scripture does not speak about those who observe the Seventh Year, [I shall bring evidence that it does].\nH. \u201cHere it is stated, \u2018Carrying out his word\u2019 [Ps. 103:20] and with reference to the Seventh Year, it is stated, \u2018This is the word concerning the year of release\u2019 [Deut. 15:2].\nI. \u201cJust as the reference to \u2018word\u2019 stated at that passage applies to those who observe the Seventh Year, so reference to \u2018word\u2019 in the present passage applies to those who observe the Seventh Year.\u201d\n5. A. [Continuing discussion of the passage cited at the outset:] \u201cCarrying out his word, harkening to his word\u201d (Ps. 103:20):\nB. R. Huna in the name of R. Aha: \u201cIt is concerning the Israelites who stood before Mount Sinai that Scripture speaks, for they first referred to doing [what God would tell them to do], and only afterward referred to hearing [what it might be], accordingly stating \u2018Whatever the Lord has said we shall carry out and we shall harken\u2019 \u201d (Ex. 24:7).\n6. A. [Continuing the same exercise:] \u201cHarkening to his word\u201d (Ps. 103:20):\nB. Said R. Tanhum bar Hanilai, \u201cUnder ordinary circumstances a burden which is too heavy for one person is light for two, or too heavy for two is light for four.\nC. \u201cBut is it possible to suppose that a burden that is too weighty for six hundred thousand can be light for a single individual?\nD. \u201cNow the entire people of Israel were standing before Mount Sinai and saying, \u2018If we hear the voice of the Lord our God any more, then we shall die\u2019 [Deut. 5:22]. But, [for his part], Moses heard the sound of the [Divine] word himself and lived.\nE. \u201cYou may find evidence that that is the case, for, among all [the Israelites], the [act of] speech [of the Lord] called only to Moses, on which account it is stated, \u2018The Lord called Moses\u2019 \u201d (Lev. 1:1).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nLev. 1:1 intersects with Ps. 103:20 to make the point that Moses was God\u2019s messenger par excellence, the one who blesses the Lord, is mighty in strength, carries out God\u2019s word, obeys God\u2019s word. This point is made first implicitly at No. 1 by proving that the verse speaks of earthly, not heavenly, creatures. Then it is made explicit at No. 6. Nos. 1\u20132 present two sets of proofs. The second may stand by itself. It is only the larger context that suggests otherwise. No. 3 is continuous with 2. No. 4 and No. 5 refer back to the cited verse, Ps. 103:20 but not to the context of Lev. 1:1. So we have these units:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1.A\u2013F Ps. 103:20 refers to some earthly creatures.\n 1.G\u2013M, 2, 3 Prophets are called messengers.\n 4 Ps. 103:20 refers to a mighty man who observes the Sabbatical Year.\n 5 Ps. 103:20 refers to the Israelites before Mount Sinai\n 6 Ps. 103:20 refers to Moses.<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nIf then we ask what is primary to the redaction resting on Lev. 1:1, it can be only 1.A\u2013F and 6. But since 1.A\u2013F does not refer to Moses at all, but only sets up the point made at No. 6, No. 6 does not require No. 1. It makes its point without No. 1\u2019s contribution. Furthermore, No. 1, for its part, is comprehensible by itself as a comment on Ps. 103:20 and hardly requires linkage to Lev. 1:1. If, therefore, I may offer a thesis on the history of the passage, it would begin with Lev. 1:1 + No. 6. Reference to Ps. 103:20 then carried in its wake Nos. 1.A\u2013F, G\u2013M, 2, 3, 4, and 5\u2014all of them to begin with autonomous sayings formed into a kind of handbook on Ps. 103:20. So first came the intersection of Lev. 1:1 and Ps. 103:20 presented by No. 6, and everything else followed in the process of accretion and aggregation, mostly of passages in Ps. 103:20.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:II<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. R. Abbahu opened [discourse by citing the following verse]: \u201c \u2018They shall return and dwell beneath his shadow, they shall grow grain, they shall blossom as a vine, their fragrance shall be like the wine of Lebanon\u2019 [Hos. 14:7].\nB. \u201c \u2018They shall return and dwell beneath his shadow\u2019\u2014these are proselytes who come and take refuge in the shadow of the Holy One, blessed be he.\nC. \u201c \u2018They shall grow grain\u2019\u2014they are turned into [part of] the root, just as [any other] Israelite.\nD. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse: \u2018Grain will make the young men flourish, and wine the women\u2019 [Zech. 9:17].\nE. \u201c \u2018They shall blossom as a vine\u2019\u2014like [any other] Israelite.\nF. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse: \u2018A vine did you pluck up out of Egypt, you did drive out the nations and plant it\u2019 \u201d (Ps. 80:9).\n2. A. Another interpretation [= Genesis Rabbah 66:3]: \u201cThey shall grow grain\u201d\u2014in Talmud.\nB. \u201cThey shall blossom as a vine\u201d\u2014in lore.\n3. A. \u201cTheir fragrance shall be like the wine of Lebanon [and Lebanon signifies the altar]\u201d\u2014\nB. Said the Holy One, blessed be he, \u201cThe names of proselytes are as dear to me as the wine offering that is poured out on the altar before me.\u201d\n4. A. And why [is it that mountain or that altar] called \u201cLebanon?\u201d\nB. In line with [the following verse]: \u201cThat goodly mountain and the Lebanon\u201d (Deut. 3:25).\nC. R. Simeon b. Yohai taught [= Sifre Deut. 6; 28], \u201cWhy is it called Lebanon (LBNN)? Because it whitens (MLBYN) the sins of Israel like snow.\nD. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse: \u2018If your sins are red as scarlet, they shall be made white (LBN) as snow\u2019 \u201d (Is. 1:18).\nE. R. Tabyomi said, \u201cIt is [called Lebanon (LBNN)] because all hearts (LBB) rejoice in it.\nF. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018Fair in situation, the joy of the whole world, even Mount Zion, at the far north\u2019 \u201d (Ps. 48:3).\nG. And rabbis say, \u201cIt is [called Lebanon] because of the following verse: \u2018And my eyes and heart (LB) shall be there all the days\u2019 \u201d (1 Kings 9:3).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nSo far as we have a sustained discourse, we find it at Nos. 1 and 3. No. 2 is inserted whole because of its interest in the key verse, Hos. 14:7. Reference at that verse to \u201cLebanon\u201d explains the set-piece treatment of the word at No. 4. These units may travel together, but the present location seems an unlikely destination. But someone clearly drew together this anthology of materials on, first, Hos. 14:7, and, by the way, second, the word \u201cLebanon.\u201d Why the two sets were assembled is much clearer than how they seemed to the compositor of the collection as a whole to belong to the exposition of Lev. 1:1. Margulies\u2019s thesis that the theme of the righteous proselyte intersects with the personal biography of Moses through Pharaoh\u2019s daughter (a proselyte!) on the surface seems farfetched. So, in all, the construction of the passage surely is prior to any consideration of its relevance to Lev. 1:1, and the point of the construction certainly is the exegesis of Hos. 14:7\u2014that alone. Whether the materials shared with other collections fit more comfortably in those compositions than they do here is not a pressing issue, since, as is self-evident, there is no link to Lev. 1:1 anyhow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:III<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. R. Simon in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi, and R. Hama, father of R. Hoshaiah, in the name of Rab: \u201cThe Book of Chronicles was revealed only for the purposes of exegetical exposition.\u201d\n2. A. \u201cAnd his wife Hajehudijah bore Jered, the father of Gedor, and Heber, the father of Soco, and Jekuthiel the father of Zanoah\u2014and these are the sons of Bithiah, the daughter of Pharaoh, whom Mered took\u201d (1 Chron. 4:17).\nB. \u201cAnd his wife, Hajehudijah [= the Judah-ite]\u201d\u2014that is Jochebed.\nC. Now was she from the tribe of Judah, and not from the tribe of Levi? Why then was she called Hajehudijah [the Judah-ite]?\nD. Because she kept Jews (Jehudim) alive in the world [as one of the midwives who kept the Jews alive when Pharaoh said to drown them].\n3. A. \u201cShe bore Jered\u201d\u2014that is Moses.\nB. R. Hanana bar Papa and R. Simon:\nC. R. Hanana said, \u201cHe was called Jered (YRD) because he brought the Torah down (HWRYD) from on high to earth.\u201d\nD. \u201cAnother possibility: \u2018Jered\u2019\u2014for he brought down the Presence of God from above to earth.\u201d\nE. Said R. Simon, \u201cThe name Jered connotes only royalty, in line with the following verse: \u2018May he have dominion (YRD) from sea to sea, and from the river to the end of the earth\u2019 [Ps. 72:8].\nF. \u201cAnd it is written, \u2018For he rules (RWDH) over the entire region on this side of the River (1 Kings 5:4).\n4. A. \u201cFather of Gedor\u201d\u2014\nB. R. Huna in the name of R. Aha said, \u201cMany fence-makers (GWDRYM) stood up for Israel, but this one [Moses] was the father of all of them.\u201d\n5. A. \u201cAnd Heber\u201d\u2014\nB. For he joined (HBR) the children to their father in heaven.\nC. Another possibility: \u201cHeber\u201d\u2014for he turned away (H\u02bfBYR) punishment from coming to the world.\n6. A. \u201cThe father of Soco\u201d\u2014\nB. This one was the father of all the prophets, who perceive (SWKYN) by means of the holy spirit.\nC. R. Levi said, \u201cIt is an Arabic word. In Arabia they call a prophet \u2018sakya.\u2019 \u201d\n7. A. \u201cJekuthiel\u201d (YQWTY\u05d0L)\u2014\nB. R. Levi and R. Simon:\nC. R. Levi said, \u201cFor he made the children hope [MQWYN] in their Father in heaven.\u201d\nD. Said R. Simon, \u201cWhen the children sinned against God in the incident of the Golden Calf \u2026\u201d\nE. \u201c \u2018The father of Zanoah\u2019\u2014\nF. \u201cMoses came along and forced them to give up (HZNYHN) that transgression.\nG. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018[And he took the calf which they had made and burned it with fire and ground it to powder] and strewed it upon the water\u2019 \u201d (Ex. 32:20).\n8. A. \u201cAnd these are the sons of Bithiah (BT YH), the daughter of Pharaoh\u201d\u2014\nB. R. Joshua of Sikhnin in the name of R. Levi: \u201cThe Holy One, blessed be he, said to Bithiah, the daughter of Pharaoh, \u2018Moses was not your child, but you called him your child. So you are not my daughter, but I shall call you my daughter\u2019 [thus BT YH, daughter of the Lord].\u201d\n9. A. \u201cThese are the sons of Bithiah \u2026 whom Mered took\u201d\u2014\nB. [Mered] is Caleb.\nC. R. Abba bar Kahana and R. Judah bar Simon:\nD. R. Abba bar Kahana said, \u201cThis one [Caleb] rebelled [MRD] against the counsel of the spies, and that one [Bathiah] rebelled [MRDH] against the counsel of her father [Pharaoh]. Let a rebel come and take as wife another rebellious spirit.\u201d\nE. [Explaining the link of Caleb to Pharaoh\u2019s daughter in a different way], R. Judah b. R. Simon said, \u201cThis one [Caleb] saved the flock, while that one [Pharaoh\u2019s daughter] saved the shepherd [Moses]. Let the one who saved the flock come and take as wife the one who saved the shepherd.\u201d\n10. A. Moses [thus] had ten names (at 1 Chron. 4:17): Jered, Father of Gedor, Heber, Father of Soco, Jekuthiel, and Father of Zanoah [with the other four enumerated in what follows].\nB. R. Judah bar Ilai said, \u201cHe also was called [7] Tobiah, in line with the following verse: \u2018And she saw him, that he was good (TWB)\u2019 [Ex. 2:2]. He is Tobiah.\u201d\nC. R. Ishmael bar Ami said, \u201cHe also was called [8] Shemaiah.\u201d\n11. A. R. Joshua bar Nehemiah came and explained the following verse: \u201c \u2018And Shemaiah, the son of Nethanel the scribe, who was of the Levites, wrote them in the presence of the king and the princes and Zadok the priest and Ahimelech the son of Abiathar\u2019 [1 Chron. 24:6].\nB. \u201c[Moses was called] Shemaiah because God heard (SM\u02bf YH) his prayer.\nC. \u201c[Moses was called] the son of Nethanel because he was the son to whom the Torah was given from Hand to hand (NTN \u05d0L).\nD. \u201c \u2018The scribe,\u2019 because he was the scribe of Israel.\nE. \u201c \u2018Who was of the Levites,\u2019 because he was of the tribe of Levi.\nF. \u201c \u2018Before the king and the princes\u2019\u2014this refers to the King of kings of kings, the Holy One, blessed be he, and his court.\nG. \u201c \u2018And Sadoq the priest\u2019\u2014this refers to Aaron the priest.\nH. \u201c \u2018Ahimeleh\u2019\u2014because [Aaron] was brother (\u05d0H) of the king.\nI. \u201c \u2018The son of Abiathar\u2019 (\u05d0BYTR)\u2014the son through whom the Holy One, blessed be he, forgave (WYTR) the deed of the Golden Calf.\u201d\n12. A. R. Tanhuma in the name of R. Joshua b. Qorhah, and R. Menehemiah in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: \u201cHe also was called [9] Levi after his eponymous ancestor: \u2018And is not Aaron, your brother, the Levite\u2019 \u201d (Ex. 4:14).\nB. And [he of course was called] [10] Moses\u2014hence [you have] ten names.\nC. Said the Holy One, blessed be he, to Moses, \u201cBy your life! Among all the names by which you are called, the only one by which I shall ever refer to you is the one which Bithiah, the daughter of Pharaoh, called you: \u2018And she called his name Moses\u2019 \u201d (Ex. 2:10), so God called Moses.\nD. So: \u201cHe called Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nNow we see the basis for Margulies\u2019s view of the relevance of I:II, that the daughter of Pharaoh named Moses, and she was a proselyte. But the passage at hand (I:III) stands fully by itself, leading to the climax at the very end, at which the opening words of the opening verse of the book of Leviticus are cited. The point of the entire, vast construction is the inquiry into the various names of Moses. From that standpoint we have a strikingly tight composition. But still, the unit is a composite, since it draws together autonomous and diverse materials. The first passage, No. 1, is surely independent, yet it makes for a fine superscription to the whole. Then the pertinent verse, at No. 2.A. 1 Chron. 4:17, is cited and systematically spelled out in Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Not only so, but at No. 10, we review the matter and amplify it with an additional, but completely appropriate, set of further names of Moses, Nos. 10 + 12, to be viewed, in line with No. 12, as a unified construction. No. 11 is inserted and breaks the thought. Then 12.C tells us the point of it all, and that brings us back to Lev. 1:1, on the one side, and to No. 8. But, as we have seen, we cannot refer to No. 8 without drawing along the whole set, Nos. 2\u20139. So the entire passage forms a single, sustained discussion, in which diverse materials are determinedly drawn together into a cogent statement. We notice that No. 7 presents a text problem, since Levi\u2019s statement is not matched by Simon\u2019s. Levi speaks of Jekuthiel and Simon of \u201cthe father of Zanoah.\u201d But the only problem is at 7.B. If we omit that misleading superscription\u2014which served perfectly well at 3.B + C\u2013F\u2014and have 7.D and E change places, we get a perfectly fine autonomous statement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:IV<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. R. Abin in the name of R. Berekhiah the Elder opened [discourse by citing the following verse]: \u201c \u2018Of old you spoke in a vision to your faithful ones, saying, \u201cI have set the crown upon one who is mighty, I have exalted one chosen from the people\u2019 \u201d [Ps. 89:20].\nB. \u201c[The Psalmist] speaks of Abraham, with whom [God] spoke both in word and in vision.\nC. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018After these words the word of God came to Abram in a vision, saying \u2026\u2019 [Gen. 15:1].\nD. \u201c \u2018\u2026 to your faithful one\u2019\u2014\u2018You will show truth to Jacob, faithfulness to Abraham\u2019 [Mic. 7:20].\nE. \u201c \u2018\u2026 saying, \u201cI have set the crown upon one who is mighty\u201d\u2014for [Abraham] slew four kings in a single night.\u2019\nF. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018And he divided himself against them by night \u2026 and smote them\u2019 \u201d (Gen. 14:15).\n2. A. Said R. Phineas, \u201cAnd is there a case of someone who pursues people already slain?\nB. \u201cFor it is written, \u2018He smote them and he [then] pursued them\u2019 [Gen. 14:15]!\nC. \u201cBut [the usage at hand] teaches that the Holy One, blessed be he, did the pursuing, and Abraham did the slaying.\n3. A. [Abin continues,] \u201c \u2018I have exalted one chosen from the people\u2019 [Ps. 89:20].\nB. \u201c \u2018It is you, Lord, God, who chose Abram and took him out of Ur in Chaldea\u2019 \u201d (Neh. 9:7).\n4. A. [\u201cI have exalted one chosen from the people\u201d (Ps. 89:20)] speaks of David, with whom God spoke both in speech and in vision.\nB. That is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u201cIn accord with all these words and in accord with this entire vision, so did Nathan speak to David\u201d (2 Sam. 7:17).\nC. \u201cTo your faithful one\u201d (Ps. 89:20) [refers] to David, [in line with the following verse:] \u201cKeep my soul, for I am faithful\u201d (Ps. 86:2).\nD. \u201c\u2026 saying, \u2018I have set the crown upon one who is mighty,\u201d (Ps. 89:20)\u2014\nE. R. Abba bar Kahana and rabbis:\nF. R. Abba bar Kahana said, \u201cDavid made thirteen wars.\u201d\nG. And rabbis say, \u201cEighteen.\u201d\nH. But they do not really differ. The party who said thirteen wars [refers only to those that were fought] in behalf of the need of Israel [overall], while the one who held that [he fought] eighteen includes five [more, that David fought] for his own need, along with the thirteen [that he fought] for the need of Israel [at large].\nI. \u201cI have exalted one chosen from the people\u201d (Ps. 89:20)\u2014\u201cAnd he chose David, his servant, and he took him \u2026\u201d (Ps. 78:70).\n5. A. [\u201cOf old you spoke in a vision to your faithful one \u2026\u201d] speaks of Moses, with whom [God] spoke in both speech and vision, in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u201cWith him do I speak mouth to mouth [in a vision and not in dark speeches]\u201d (Num. 12:8).\nB. \u201cTo your faithful one\u201d\u2014for [Moses] came from the tribe of Levi, the one concerning which it is written, \u201cLet your Thummim and Urim be with your faithful one\u201d (Deut. 33:8).\nC. \u201c\u2026 saying, \u2018I have set the crown upon one who is mighty\u2014\nD. The cited passage is to be read in accord with that which R. Tanhum b. Hanilai said, \u201cUnder ordinary circumstances a burden which is too heavy for one person is light for two, or too heavy for two is light for four. But is it possible to suppose that a burden that is too weighty for six hundred thousand can be light for a single individual? Now the entire people of Israel were standing before Mount Sinai and saying, \u2018If we hear the voice of the Lord our God any more, then we shall die\u2019 [Deut. 5:22]. But, for his part, Moses heard the voice of God himself and lived\u201d [= I:I.6.B\u2013D].\nE. You may know that that is indeed the case, for among them all, the word [of the Lord] called only to Moses, in line with that verse which states, \u201cAnd [God] called to Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1).\nF. \u201cI have exalted one chosen from the people\u201d (Ps. 89:20)\u2014\u201cHad not Moses, whom he chose, stood in the breach before him to turn his wrath from destroying them\u201d [he would have destroyed Israel] (Ps. 106:23).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nThe whole constitutes a single, beautifully worked out composition, applying Ps. 89:20 to Abraham, David, then Moses, at Nos. 1 and 3 (Abraham), 4 (David), and 5 (Moses). No. 2 is a minor interpolation, hardly spoiling the total effect. No. 5.D is jarring and obviously inserted needlessly. That the purpose of the entire construction was to lead to the climactic citation of Lev. 1:1 hardly can be doubted, since the natural chronological (and eschatological) order would have dictated Abraham, Moses, David. That the basic construction, moreover, forms a unity is shown by the careful matching of the stichs of the cited verse in the expositions of how the verse applies to the three heroes. If we had to postulate an \u201cideal form,\u201d it would be simply the juxtaposition of verses, A illustrated by X, B by Y, etc., with little or no extraneous language. But where, in the basic constituents of the construction, we do find explanatory language or secondary development, in the main it is necessary for sense. Accordingly, we see as perfect a construction as we are likely to find: whole, nearly entirely essential, with a minimum of intruded material. To be sure, what really looks to be essential is the notion of God\u2019s communicating by two media to the three great heroes. That is the clear point of the most closely corresponding passages of the whole. In that case, the reorganization and vast amplification come as an afterthought, provoked by the construction of a passage serving Lev. 1:1. Since 5.E contradicts the message of the rest, that must be regarded as a certainty. Then the whole, except 5.E (hence, 5.D too), served Ps. 89:20, and 5.F is the original conclusion, with 5.D\u2013E inserted by the redactor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:V<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. R. Joshua of Sikhnin in the name of R. Levi opened [discourse by citing the following] verse: \u201c \u2018For it is better to be told, \u201cCome up here,\u201d than to be put lower in the presence of the prince\u2019 \u201d (Prov. 25:7).\nB. R. Aqiba repeated [the following tradition] in the name of R. Simeon b. Azzai, \u201cTake a place two or three lower and sit down, so that people may tell you, \u2018Come up,\u2019 but do not go up [beyond your station] lest people say to you, \u2018Go down.\u2019 It is better for people to say to you, \u2018Come up, come up,\u2019 than that they say to you, \u2018Go down, go down.\u2019 \u201d\nC. And so did Hillel say, \u201cWhen I am degraded, I am exalted, but when I am exalted, I am degraded.\u201d\nD. What is the pertinent biblical verse? \u201cHe who raises himself is to be made to sit down, he who lowers himself is to be [raised so that he is] seen\u201d (Ps. 113:5).\nE. So too you find that, when the Holy One, blessed be he, revealed himself to Moses from the midst of the bush, Moses hid his face from him.\nF. That is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u201cMoses hid his face\u201d (Ex. 3:6).\n2. A. Said to him the Holy One, blessed be he, \u201cAnd now, go (LKH), I am sending you to Pharaoh\u201d (Ex. 3:10).\nB. Said R. Eleazar, \u201c[Taking the word \u2018Go,\u2019 LK, not as the imperative, but to mean, \u2018to you,\u2019 and spelled LKH, with an H at the end, I may observe that] it would have been sufficient to write, \u2018You (LK),\u2019 [without adding] an H at the end of the word. [Why then did Scripture add the H?] To indicate to you, \u2018If you are not the one who will redeem them, no one else is going to redeem them.\u2019\nC. \u201cAt the Red Sea, Moses stood aside. Said to him the Holy One, blessed be he, \u2018Now you, raise your rod and stretch out your hand [over the sea and divide it]\u2019 [Ex. 14:16].\nD. \u201cThis is to say, \u2018If you do not split the sea, no one else is going to split it.\u2019\nE. \u201cAt Sinai Moses stood aside. Said to him the Holy One, blessed be he, \u2018Come up to the Lord, you and Aaron\u2019 [Ex. 24:1].\nF. \u201cThis is to say, \u2018If you do not come up, no one else is going to come up.\u2019\nG. \u201cAt the [revelation of the instructions governing sacrifices at] the tent of meeting, [Moses] stood to the side. Said to him the Holy One, blessed be he, \u2018How long are you going to humble yourself? For the times demand only you.\u2019\nH. \u201cYou must recognize that that is the case, for among them all, the Word [of God] called only to Moses, as it is written, \u2018And [God] called to Moses\u2019 \u201d (Lev. 1:1).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nWe have once more to work backward from the end to find out what, at the outset, is necessary to make the point of the unit as a whole. It obviously is the emphasis upon how the humble man is called to take exalted position and leadership, that is, No. 2. Then what components of No. 1 are thematically irrelevant? None, so far as I can see. We may regard 1.A as standing by itself, a suitable introduction to a statement on the theme at hand, namely, it is better to be called upon, as at Lev. 1:1. Then Nos. 1.B, C\u2013D, E\u2013F illustrate the same theme, leading to the introduction of the figure of Moses. E\u2013F are so formulated (\u201cso too you find\u201d) as to continue the foregoing, but, of course, they form a bridge to what follows, No. 2. Accordingly, a rather deft editorial hand has drawn together thematically pertinent materials. I find it difficult to imagine that the composition was not worked out essentially within a unitary framework, with the exegetical program of the whole, expressed at No. 2, fully in hand before the anthology of No. 1 was gathered. But the fact is that Nos. 1.B, C\u2013D, do come from already framed materials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:VI<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. R. Tanhuma opened [discourse by citing the following verse:] \u201c \u2018There are gold and a multitude of rubies, but lips [that speak] knowledge are the [most] valuable ornament\u2019 [Prov. 20:15].\nB. \u201cUnder ordinary circumstances [if] a person has gold, silver, precious stones, pearls, and all sorts of luxuries, but has no knowledge\u2014what profit does he have?\nC. \u201cIn a proverb it says, \u2018If you have gotten knowledge, what do you lack? But if you lack knowledge, what have you gotten?\u2019 \u201d\n2. A. \u201cThere is gold\u201d\u2014all brought their freewill offering of gold to the tabernacle.\nB. That is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u201cAnd this is the offering [which you shall take from them, gold] \u2026\u201d (Ex. 25:3).\nC. \u201cAnd a multitude of rubies\u201d\u2014this refers to the freewill offering of the princes.\nD. That is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u201cAnd the rulers brought [onyx stones and the stones to be set]\u201d (Ex. 35:27).\nE. \u201cBut lips [that speak] knowledge are the [most] valuable ornament\u201d (Prov. 20:15).\nF. Now Moses was sad, for he said, \u201cEveryone has brought his freewill offering for the tabernacle, but I have not brought a thing!\u201d\nG. Said to him the Holy One, blessed be he, \u201cBy your life! Your words [of address to the workers in teaching them how to build the tabernacle] are more precious to me than all of these other things.\u201d\nH. You may find proof for that proposition, for among all of them, the Word [of God] called only to Moses, as it is written, \u201cAnd [God] called to Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nOnce more we see a complete construction, with a seemingly irrelevant introduction, No. 1, serving to cite a verse in no way evoked by the passage at hand. The exposition of the verse, further, does not appear to bring us closer to the present matter. But at No. 2, both the cited verse and the exposition of the verse are joined to the verse before us. If we may venture a guess at the aesthetic jeu d\u2019esprit involved, it is this: how do we move from what appears to be utterly irrelevant to what is in fact the very heart of the matter? The aesthetic accomplishment is then to keep the hearer or reader in suspense until the climax, at which the issue is worked out, the tension resolved. It must follow, of course, that we deal with unitary composition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:VII<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. What subject matter is discussed just prior to the passage at hand? It is the passage that deals with the building of the tabernacle [in which each pericope concludes with the words,] \u201cAs the Lord commanded Moses\u201d (see Ex. 38:22; 39:1, 5, 7, 21, 26, 29, 31, 32, 42, 43; 40:16, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32).\nB. To what may this matter be compared? To a king who commanded his servant, saying to him, \u201cBuild a palace for me.\u201d\nC. On everything that [the employee] built, he wrote the name of the king. When he built the walls, he inscribed the name of the king, when he set up the buttresses, he wrote the name of the king on them, when he roofed it over, he wrote the name of the king on [the roof]. After some days, the king came into the palace, and everywhere he looked, he saw his name inscribed. He said, \u201cNow my employee has paid me so much respect, and yet I am inside [the building he built], while he is outside!\u201d He called him to enter.\nD. So when the Holy One, blessed be he, called to Moses, \u201cMake a tabernacle for me,\u201d on [every] thing that Moses made, he inscribed, \u201c\u2026 as the Lord commanded Moses.\u201d\nE. Said the Holy One, blessed be he, \u201cNow Moses has paid me so much respect, and yet I am inside, while he is outside!\u201d\nF. He called him to come in, on which account it is said, \u201cAnd [God] called Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nThe passage begins with the imputation to the verb QR\u05d0 of the sense of invitation. The focus of exegesis shifts from Moses to God\u2019s calling him. The exegetical resource is the repeated reference, as indicated, to Moses doing as God had commanded him. But this is now read as Moses inscribing God\u2019s name everywhere on the tabernacle as he built it, and the rest follows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:VIII<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. R. Samuel bar Nahman said in the name of R. Nathan, \u201cEighteen times are statements of [God\u2019s] commanding written in the passage on the building of the tabernacle, corresponding to the eighteen vertebrae in the backbone.\nB. \u201cCorrespondingly, sages instituted eighteen statements of blessing in the Blessings of the Prayer, eighteen mentions of the divine name in the recitation of the Shema, eighteen mentions of the divine name in the Psalm, \u2018Ascribe to the Lord, you sons of might\u2019 \u201d (Ps. 29).\nC. Said R. Hiyya bar Ada, \u201c[The counting of the eighteen statements of God\u2019s commandment to Moses] excludes [from the count the entry prior to the one in the verse], \u2018And with him was Oholiab, son of Ahisamach of the tribe of Dan\u2019 [Ex. 38:23], [thus omitting reference to Ex. 38:22, \u2018And Bezalel, son or Uri son of Hur of the tribe of Judah, made all that the Lord commanded Moses\u2019]. [But the counting then includes all further such references to the end of the book [of Exodus].\u201d\n2. A. To what is the matter comparable? To a king who made a tour of a province, bringing with him generals, governors, and lesser officers, and, [in watching the procession], we do not know which one among them is most favored. But [when we see] to whom the king turns and speaks, we know that he is the favorite.\nB. So everyone surrounded the tabernacle, Moses, Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and the seventy elders, so we do not know which one of them is the favorite. But now, since the Holy One, blessed be he, called to Moses and spoke to him, we know that he was the favorite of them all.\nC. On that account it is said, \u201cAnd [God] called Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1).\n3. A. To what may the matter be compared? To a king who made a tour of a province. With whom will he speak first? Is it not with the market inspector, who oversees the province? Why? Because he bears responsibility for the very life of the province.\nB. So Moses bears responsibility for Israel\u2019s every burden,\nC. saying to them, \u201cThis you may eat\u201d (Lev. 11:2), \u201cand this you may not eat\u201d (Lev. 11:4); \u201cThis you may eat of whatever is in the water\u201d (Lev. 11:9), and this you may not eat; \u201cThis you shall treat as an abomination among fowl\u201d (Lev. 11:13), and so these you shall treat as an abomination, and others you need not abominate, \u201cAnd these are the things that are unclean for you\u201d (Lev. 11:29), so these are unclean, and those are not unclean.\nD. Therefore it is said, \u201cAnd [God] called Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nNo. 1 bears no relationship to what follows. It continues I:VII, with its interest in the repetitions of the statement about Moses having done as God had commanded him. 1.A\u2013B however stand completely outside the present frame of reference, Lev. 1:1. 1.C harmonizes the number of times the cited phrase actually occurs with the number of vertebrae in the backbone. No. 1 further occurs at B. Ber. 28b, Y. Ber. 4:3, so we may be certain the passage was tacked on because of the interest in the verse at the center of the preceding item.
\nNo. 2 and No. 3 match one another, making essentially the same point and leading up to the citation of the verse by establishing the same connotation, \u201ccalled\u201d in the sense of \u201crecognized, gave preference to.\u201d 3.C is wildly out of place, since, as it is now composed, the emphasis is on the fact that, if Scripture says you may not eat a certain thing, whatever is not covered in the negative statement then may be eaten. That is why the language of the verse is repeated, \u201c\u2026 not this \u2026 but then that is permitted.\u201d In fact, we should move from 3.A\u2013B to D. The passage as a whole then is a composite of three distinct items.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:IX<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. \u201cAnd [the Lord] called to Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1) [bearing the implication, to Moses in particular].\nB. Now did he not call Adam? [But surely he did:] \u201cAnd the Lord God called Adam\u201d (Gen. 3:9).\nC. [He may have called him, but he did not speak with him, while at Lev. 1:1, the Lord \u201ccalled Moses and spoke to him\u201d], for is it not undignified for a king to speak with his tenant farmer [which Adam, in the Garden of Eden, was]?\nD. \u201c\u2026 and the Lord spoke to him\u201d (Lev. 1:1) [to him in particular].\nE. Did he not speak also with Noah? [But surely he did:] \u201cAnd God speak to Noah\u201d (Gen. 8:15).\nF. [He may have spoken to him, but he did not call him,] for is it not undignified for a king to speak with [better: call] his ship\u2019s captain [herding the beasts into the ark]?\nG. \u201cAnd [the Lord] called to Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1) [in particular].\nH. Now did he not call Abraham? [But surely he did:] \u201cAnd the angel of the Lord called Abraham a second time from heaven\u201d (Gen. 22:15).\nI. [He may have called him, but he did not speak with him,] for is it not undignified for a king to speak with his host (Gen. 18:1)?\nJ. \u201cAnd the Lord spoke with him\u201d (Lev. 1:1) [in particular].\nK. And did he not speak with Abraham? [Surely he did:] \u201cAnd Abram fell on his face, and [God] spoke with him\u201d (Gen. 17:3).\nL. But is it not undignified for a king to speak with his host?\n2. A. \u201cAnd the Lord called Moses\u201d (Lev. 1:1), but not as in the case of Abraham.\nB. [How so?] In the case of Abraham, it is written, \u201cAnd an angel of the Lord called Abraham a second time from heaven\u201d (Gen. 22:15). The angel did the calling, the Word [of God] then did the speaking.\nC. \u201cHere, [by contrast,]\u201d said R. Abin, \u201cthe Holy One, blessed be he, said, \u2018I am the one who does the calling, and I am the one who does the speaking.\u2019\nD. \u201c \u2018I, even I, have spoken, yes, I have called him, I have brought him and he shall prosper in his way\u2019 \u201d (Is. 48:15).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nThe point of No. 1 is clear, but the text is not. What is demanded is three instances in which God called someone but did not speak with him, or spoke with him but did not call him, in contrast with the use of both verbs, \u201ccall\u201d and \u201cspeak,\u201d in regard to Moses at Lev. 1:1. If that is what is intended, then the pattern does not work perfectly for all three: Adam, Noah, and Abraham. 1.A\u2013D and E\u2013G are smooth. With Abraham, however, the exposition breaks down, since the point should be that he called Abraham but did not actually speak with him, and it is only No. 2 that makes that point. The repetition of J at M therefore is only part of the problem of the version. We can readily reconstruct what is needed, of course, in the model of the passages for Adam and Noah.
\nNo. 2 of course is independent of No. 1, and handsomely worked out. But No. 2 cannot have served the form selected by the framer of the triplet at No. 1.
\nMy guess is that No. 1 fails as it does because of yet another problem. E does have God speaking with Noah, while F says that that is undignified, and the same problem recurs with Abraham. In all, No. 2 is a success, and No. 1 is not. Here it is difficult to claim that someone deliberately worked up the entire unit, leading to the climax at the very end. Two existing sets have been combined, and the first of the two turns out to be flawed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:X<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. \u201c[And the Lord called Moses and spoke to him] from the tent of meeting\u201d (Lev. 1:1).\nB. Said R. Eleazar, \u201cEven though the Torah [earlier] had been given to Israel at Sinai as a fence [restricting their actions], they were liable to punishment on account of [violating] it only after it has been repeated for [taught to] them in the tent of meeting.\nC. \u201cThis may be compared to a royal decree, that had been written and sealed and brought to the province. The inhabitants of the province became liable to be punished on account of violating the decree only after it had been proclaimed to them in a public meeting in the province.\nD. \u201cAlong these same lines, even though the Torah had been given to Israel at Sinai, they bore liability for punishment on account of violating it[s commandments] only after it had been repeated for them in the tent of meeting.\nE. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018Until I had brought him into my mother\u2019s house and into the chamber of my teaching [lit.: parent]\u2019 [Song 3:4].\nF. \u201c \u2018\u2026 into my mother\u2019s house\u2019 refers to Sinai.\nG. \u201c \u2018\u2026 and into the chamber of my teaching\u2019 refers to the tent of meeting, from which the Israelites were commanded through instruction [in the Torah].\u201d<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nThe passage is formally perfect, running from the beginning, a general proposition, 1.B, through a parable, C, explicitly linked to the original proposition, D, and then joined to the exposition of a seemingly unrelated verse of Scripture, which turns out to say exactly what the general proposition has said. So the original statement, B, is worked out in two separate and complementary ways, first, parabolic, second, exegetical.
\nI cannot see any problem but one: What has the stated proposition to do with the present context? In fact, the theme is the tent of meeting, that alone. We may expect an anthology of materials on the tent of meeting, none of which bears any distinctive relationship to what happens there, so far as Lev. 1:1ff. will tell us. In other words, the redaction of materials following the order of verses of Scripture in the present instance imposes no thesis upon what will be said about those materials, what is important in them. Rather we have nothing more than a list of topics, each to be treated through the formation of an anthology of materials relevant to a topic, not through the unpacking of a problematic indicated by the substance and the context at hand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:XI<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. Said R. Joshua b. Levi, \u201cIf the nations of the world had known how valuable the tent of meeting was to them, they would have sheltered it with tents and ballustrades.\nB. \u201c[How so?] You note that before the tabernacle was erected, the nations of the world used to hear the sound of [God\u2019s] word and [fearing an earthquake(?)] they rushed out of their dwellings.\nC. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018For who is there of all flesh, who has heard the voice of the living God [speaking out of the midst of the first as we have, and lived]?\u2019 \u201d (Deut. 5:23).\n2. A. Said R. Simon, \u201cThe word [of God] went forth in two modes, for Israel as life, for the nations of the world as poison.\nB. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018\u2026 as you have, and lived\u2019 [Deut. 4:33].\nC. \u201cYou hear [the voice of God] and live, while the nations of the world hear and die.\u201d\nD. That is in line with what R. Hiyya taught [= Sifra Dibura dinedabah 2:10], \u201c \u2018\u2026 from the tent of meeting\u2019 [Lev. 1:1] teaches that the sound was cut off and did not go beyond the tent of meeting.\u201d<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nNos. 1 and 2 go over the same ground but are unrelated. For the sense of 1.B, 1 follow Margulies. But then the relevance of the verse cited at 1.C is not clear. I should have thought that the nations of the world would benefit from the possibility of hearing God\u2019s speech, which would then have warned them about an impending earthquake, for example, getting them out of their houses in time. But 1.C and No. 2 make the point that the tent of meeting prevented the gentiles from hearing God\u2019s voice, and this was good for them, since the Torah was life for Israel and death for the gentiles. Accordingly, the sense of 1.B as Margulies reads it seems incongruous to the meaning required by its context. Israelstam (p. 14) gives: \u201c\u2026 rushed in fright out of their camps.\u201d I cannot suggest anything better. As noted above, the larger context of Lev. 1:1 makes no impact upon the exegesis of the passage, which is focused upon the theme, the tent of meeting, and not on the meaning of the place or tent in this setting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:XII<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. Said R. Isaac, \u201cBefore the tent of meeting was set up, prophecy was common among the nations of the world. Once the tent of meeting was set up, prophecy disappeared from among them. That is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018I held it\u2019 [the holy spirit, producing], \u2018and would not let it go [until I had brought it \u2026 into the chamber of her that conceived me]\u2019 \u201d (Song 3:4).\nB. They said to him, \u201cLo, Balaam [later on] practiced prophecy!\u201d\nC. He said to them, \u201cHe did so for the good of Israel: \u2018Who has counted the dust of Jacob\u2019 [Num. 23:10]. \u2018No one has seen iniquity in Jacob\u2019 [Num. 23:21]. \u2018For there is no enchantment with Jacob\u2019 [Num. 23:23]. \u2018How goodly are your tents, O Jacob\u2019 [Num. 24:5]. \u2018There shall go forth a star out of Jacob\u2019 [Num. 24:17]. \u2018And out of Jacob shall one have dominion\u2019 \u201d (Num. 24:19).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n\u201cThe chamber\u201d of 1.A is the tent of meeting, as before. In fact the passage at hand is continuous with the foregoing. As we shall see, the established theme then moves forward in what follows. The construction is of course unitary. \u201cThey said to him\u201d of B simply sets up discourse; it is not meant to signify an actual conversation, rather serves as a convention of rhetoric. B then allows C to string out the relevant verses. We now continue the same matter of Balaam, prophet of the gentiles, and Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:XIII<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. What is the difference between the prophets of Israel and those of the nations [= Gen. R. 52:5]?\nB. R. Hama b. R. Haninah and R. Issachar of Kepar Mandi:\nC. R. Hama b. R. Hanina said, \u201cThe Holy One, blessed be he, is revealed to the prophets of the nations of the world only in partial speech, in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018And God called [WYQR, rather than WYQR\u05d0, as at Lev. 1:1] Balaam\u2019 [Num. 23:16]. On the other hand, [he reveals himself] to the prophets of Israel in full and complete speech, as it is said, \u2018And [the Lord] called (WYQR\u05d0) to Moses\u2019 \u201d (Lev. 1:1).\nD. Said R. Issachar of Kepar Mandi, \u201cShould that [prophecy, even in partial form] be [paid to them as their] wage? [Surely not, in fact there is no form of speech to gentile prophets, who are frauds]. [The connotation of] the language, \u2018And [God] called (WYQR) to Balaam\u2019 [Num. 23:16] is solely uncleanness. That is in line with the usage in the following verse of Scripture: \u2018That is not clean, by that which happens (MQRH) by night\u2019 [Deut. 23:11]. [So the root is the same, with the result that YQR at Num. 23:16 does not bear the meaning of God\u2019s calling to Balaam. God rather declares Balaam unclean.]\nE. \u201cBut the prophets of Israel [are addressed] in language of holiness, purity, clarity, in language used by the ministering angels to praise God. That is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018And they called (QR\u05d0) one to another and said\u2019 \u201d (Is. 6:3).\n2. A. Said R. Eleazar b. Menahem, \u201cIt is written, \u2018The Lord is far from the evil, but the prayer of the righteous does he hear\u2019 [Prov. 15:29].\nB. \u201c \u2018The Lord is far from the wicked\u2019 refers to the prophets of the nations of the world.\nC. \u201c \u2018But the prayer of the righteous does he hear\u2019 refers to the prophets of Israel.\nD. \u201cYou [furthermore] find that the Holy One, blessed be he, appears to the prophets of the nations of the world only like a man who comes from some distant place.\nE. \u201cThat is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018From a distant land they have come to me, from Babylonia\u2019 [Is. 39:3].\nF. \u201cBut in the case of the prophets of Israel [he is always] near at hand: \u2018And he [forthwith] appeared [not having come from a great distance]\u2019 (Gen. 18:1), \u2018and [the Lord] called\u2019 \u201d (Lev. 1:1).\n3. A. Said R. Yose b. Biba, \u201cThe Holy One, blessed be he, is revealed to the prophets of the nations of the world only by night, when people leave one another: \u2018When men branch off, from the visions of the night, when deep sleep falls on men\u2019 [Job 4:13], \u2018Then a word came secretly to me\u2019 [Job 4:12]. [Job is counted among the prophets of the gentiles.]\u201d\n4. A. R. Hanana b. R. Pappa and rabbis [= Gen. R. 74:7]:\nB. R. Hanana b. R. Pappa said, \u201cThe matter may be compared to a king who, with his friend, was in a hall, with a curtain hanging down between them. When [the king] speaks to his friend, he turns back the curtain and speaks with his friend.\u201d\nC. And rabbis say, \u201c[The matter may be compared] to a king who had a wife and a concubine. When he walks about with his wife, he does so in full public view. When he walks about with his concubine, he does so in secret. So, too, the Holy One, blessed be he, is revealed to the prophets of the nations of the world only at night, in line with that which is written: \u2018And God came to Abimelech in a dream by night\u2019 [Gen. 29:3]. \u2018And God came to Laban, the Aramean, in a dream by night\u2019 [Gen. 22:24]. \u2018And God came to Balaam at night\u2019 [Num. 22:20].\nD. \u201cTo the prophets of Israel, however, [he comes] by day: \u2018[And the Lord appeared to Abraham \u2026] as he sat at the door of his tent in the heat of the day\u2019 [Gen. 18:1]. \u2018And it came to pass by day that the Lord spoke to Moses in the land of Egypt\u2019 [Ex. 6:28]. \u2018On the day on which he commanded the children of Israel\u2019 [Lev. 7:38]. \u2018These are the generations of Aaron and Moses. God spoke to Moses by day on Mount Sinai\u2019 \u201d (Num. 3:1).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nOnce the topic of comparing Israel\u2019s receiving of revelation to that of the nations of the world has arisen, at I:XII, we pursue it further, and, as we shall see, I:XIV adds still more pertinent material. We have a fine superscription in I:XIII, 1.A, with three independent items strung together, 1.B\u2013D, 2, 3, and 4. Nos. 1.B\u2013D and 4, follow an obvious, simple pattern, and Nos. 2 and 3 simply assign a protracted saying to a given name. We have no reason to suppose the entire set has come from a single hand. Since the same points are made by two or more authorities, it is likely that a redactor has chosen pertinent materials out of what he had available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I:XIV<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. What is the difference between Moses and all the other [Israelite] prophets?\nB. R. Judah b. R. Ilai and rabbis:\nC. R. Judah said, \u201cAll the other prophets saw [their visions] through nine lenses [darkly], in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018And the appearance of the vision which I saw was like the vision that I saw when I came to destroy the city; and the visions were like the vision that I saw by the River Chebar, and I fell on my face\u2019 [Eze. 43:3] [with the root R\u05d0H occurring once in the plural, hence two, and seven other times in the singular, nine in all].\nD. \u201cBut Moses saw [his vision] through a single lense: \u2018in [one vision] and not in dark speeches\u2019 \u201d (Num. 12:8).\nE. Rabbis said, \u201cAll other [Israelite] prophets saw [their visions] through a dirty lense. That is in line with the following verse of Scripture: \u2018And I have multiplied visions, and by the ministry of the angels I have used similitudes\u2019 [Hos. 12:11].\nF. \u201cBut Moses saw [his vision] through a polished lense: \u2018And the image of God does he behold\u2019 \u201d (Num. 12:8).\n2. A. R. Phineas in the name of R. Hoshaia: \u201c[The matter may be compared] to a king who makes his appearance to his courtier in his informal garb [as an intimate] [Lieberman in Margulies, p. 870 to p. 32].\nB. \u201cFor in this world the Indwelling Presence makes its appearance only to individuals [one by one], while concerning the age to come, what does Scripture say? \u2018The glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see [it together, for the mouth of the Lord has spoken]\u2019 \u201d (Is. 40:5).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\nThe continuous discourse continues its merry way, ignoring not only the passage at hand\u2014Lev. 1:1\u2014but the several topics provoked by exposition of the theme under discussion in connection with the tent of meeting. Having compared Balaam to Israelite prophets, we proceed to compare Israelite prophets to Moses, with the predictable result. No. 1 preserves the matter. But No. 2 on the surface is wildly out of place, since Moses now is forgotten, and the contrast is between prophecy in this age and in the time to come\u2014a subject no one has hitherto brought up. But the messianic finis is a redactional convention.
\nNote that Margulies rejects as spurious I:XV, in the standard printed text. This passage is absent in all manuscript evidence of Lev. R. except for one and was added in the earliest printed texts (p. 32 n. to line 5).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Parashah Two<\/p>\n\n\n\n
II:I<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. A. \u201cSpeak to the children of Israel [and say to them, when any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of cattle from the herd or from the flock]\u201d (Lev. 1:2).<\/code><\/pre>\n\n\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Part One The Logic of the Composition 1 The Logic of the Composition The Issue of the Mishnah\u2019s Relationship to Scripture The advent of the Mishnah in circa A.D. 200 demanded that people explain the status and authority of the new document. At its very beginnings the Mishnah was turned into an authoritative law code, … <\/p>\n